基式外交：伊朗核问题乃大西洋联盟的试金石 @《基式外交研究》2025年第10期

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

来源：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第10期

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "Iran: A Nuclear Test Case." The Washington Post, March 8, 2005.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、中文翻译

布什总统近期的欧洲之行与他首任期的氛围截然不同。与伊拉克战争前夕不同，此次大西洋两岸均致力于缩小分歧、寻求共识。然而，良好氛围仅是制定共同政策的第一步。伊朗核问题或将成为试金石——要么让跨大西洋联盟更加紧密，要么在形势迫近时再次撕裂联盟关系。

亟待解决的核心问题包括：

当盟友宣称反对伊朗拥核时，这是“不可取”还是“不可接受”的定性？

联盟是否仅满足于外交手段，抑或准备好在外交失败后采取进一步行动，其底线何在？

反对核扩散是普世原则（包括民主国家），还是仅针对伊朗、朝鲜这类“流氓政权”？

联盟必须首先明确核扩散下一阶段的后果。我认同美国的观点：核武器扩散至动荡地区将彻底改变国际格局，其威胁远超冷战时期的核威慑梦魇。这种趋势极可能导致全球性灾难，最终催生强制性国际核管控机制。

冷战时期的威慑逻辑基于两大前提：核战争必然导致千万级伤亡；且必须展现承受风险的决心（至少在临界点前），才能阻止极权主义扩张。当时的威慑有效，是因为全球仅存在两个战略主体，双方对核战争风险的评估基本对称。但随着核武扩散，威慑的数学公式变得愈发脆弱：难以判断威慑对象、威慑逻辑失效、新核国家可能将核武作为对抗国际秩序的屏障，且核大国对周边核冲突的反应难以预测。巴基斯坦向朝鲜、利比亚、伊朗的秘密核扩散网络更证明，即使非流氓国家参与扩散，也会对国际秩序造成重大冲击。

因此，抵制核扩散本身才是关键。扩散国的政权性质虽加剧问题紧迫性，但并非决定性因素。

大西洋联盟的分歧可能集中在应对策略上。欧洲倾向于将外交作为主要手段，视其为“软实力”的象征性实践。部分欧洲国家宁可接受核扩散风险，也不愿承受共同施压的代价。美国政府则明确伊朗拥核“不可接受”，强调需保留外交以外的选项。尽管口头支持外交路径，但美国始终回避具体参与方式——部分原因是保留政权更迭选项（这遭到欧洲领导人明确反对）。问题在于：

能否将两种策略结合？

美国能否克服外交模糊性，欧洲能否接受递进式施压方案？

在核扩散问题上，“软实力”与“硬实力”的界限本就模糊。外交本质是向对方展示政策选项的利弊权衡，无论措辞如何优雅，都隐含施压能力，尤其对敌对国家而言。欧洲谈判代表在伊朗核问题上进展有限，正是因为美国在僵局时可能采取行动的隐性威慑。美欧协商的核心应是外交时机、内容及后续措施的协同，而非手段优劣的争论。

防扩散外交的核心在于时间博弈。英法德三国谈判的最低目标是通过技术障碍延缓伊朗核进程，而伊朗则试图缩短核武研发周期，以便周期性勒索新让步。欧洲提出的激励方案需设定明确上限，否则可能诱发更多国家效仿，将核扩散作为获取利益的手段。

伊朗宣称发展核能是为了发电，但作为石油大国，核能实为资源浪费。其真实意图是获取战略屏障，阻止外部干预其意识形态驱动的革命外交。这种矛盾心理导致伊朗在榨取最大利益与保持战略警惕间摇摆——激励措施既增加其对目标国家的依赖，又意味着融入其长期抗拒的国际秩序。

有效政策需满足两个条件：一是实现伊朗可核查的无核化（至少军事层面），这是检验政策的唯一标准；二是欧洲需承诺在外交失败后采取进一步行动。伊朗可能利用外交拖延至布什第二任期，同时推进核计划至“临门一脚”状态，并尽可能获取经济与技术利益而不履行裁军承诺。联盟外交应聚焦打破此类策略，建立可核查的无核化标准。

若如布什总统所言即将开启密集外交阶段，美国必须实质性参与——至少在激励方案设计层面，可能还需直接参与谈判。单纯依赖政权更迭来阻止核计划并不可靠：政权更迭耗时可能超过伊朗核计划周期，且新政权很可能延续核武政策。

现阶段无需（也不应）采取美伊双边对话。赖斯国务卿已指出伊朗阻碍全面谈判的行为，包括支持恐怖组织（如真主党）和破坏伊拉克稳定。可借鉴朝核问题六方会谈机制，构建多边谈判框架。

冷战经验表明，谈判应与战略红线设定同步进行。里根总统在称苏联为“邪恶帝国”的同时，仍致信勃列日涅夫寻求对话。必须避免重蹈伊拉克战争覆辙：初期策略一致，后期战略分歧导致危机。

随着美国采取更灵活策略，欧洲需理解：正是美国坚持伊朗拥核不可接受，才迫使伊朗在核问题上展现有限灵活性。最终，我们不能在涉及国家安全的问题上让渡否决权，但应确保单边行动作为最后选项。

真正的联盟防扩散政策需明确：

伊朗核能力形成前的窗口期有多长？

何种策略能有效阻止其核计划？

如何防止外交成为扩散合法化工具？

外交失败后将采取哪些强制措施？

如何界定外交僵局？

必须牢记：失败将使我们面临远超冷战时期的核威胁。

二、英语原文

President Bush’s recent visit to Europe took place in an atmosphere vastly different from that of his first term. Unlike the prelude to the Iraq war, this time, each side of the Atlantic seemed determined to minimize differences and seek areas of agreement. At the same time, an improved atmosphere is only a first step toward defining common policies. This is why the issue of nuclear weapons in Iran may well turn into a test case, either bringing the alliance closer together or rending it again when its dynamics brook no further procrastination.

The following questions must be answered with some urgency: When the allies proclaim that they oppose nuclear weapons for Iran, do they mean that these weapons are undesirable or that they are unacceptable? Do the allies intend to confine their efforts to diplomacy, or are they prepared for other measures if diplomacy fails, and how far are they willing to go on such a course? Is the opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons generic – does it extend even to fully democratic countries? Or is it because of the rogue quality of the regimes farthest advanced on the road toward acquiring nuclear weapons: Iran and North Korea?

The alliance needs, above all, clarity on the consequences of the next stage of proliferation. In the American view – which I share – the spread of nuclear weapons, especially into regions of revolutionary upheaval, will produce a qualitatively different world whose perils will dwarf the worst nuclear nightmares of the Cold War. Such a world is all too likely to culminate in a cataclysm followed by an imposed international regime for nuclear weapons.

All Cold War administrations navigated in the awful calculus of deterrence: the certainty that the decision to use nuclear weapons could involve tens of millions of casualties, coupled with the awareness that a demonstrated willingness to run the risk – at least up to a point – was essential if the world was not to be turned over to ruthless totalitarians. Deterrence worked because there were only two major players in the world. Each made comparable assessments of the perils to it from the use of nuclear weapons. But as nuclear weapons spread into more and more hands, the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly ephemeral, and deterrence less and less reliable. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring whom and by what calculations. Even if it is assumed that aspirant nuclear countries make the same calculus of survival as the established ones with respect to initiating hostilities against each other – an extremely dubious judgment – new nuclear weapons establishments may be used as a shield to deter resistance, especially by the United States, to terrorist assaults on the international order. Nor is it certain how nuclear powers will react to nuclear war on their doorstep. Finally, the experience with the “private” proliferation network of apparently friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya and Iran demonstrates the vast consequences to the international order of the spread of nuclear weapons, even when the proliferating country does not meet the formal criteria of a rogue state.

For all these reasons, it is the fact of further proliferation that needs to be resisted. The quality of a regime that undertakes proliferation compounds the problem and provides a sense of urgency, but it is not the decisive factor.

It is over how to resist the process of proliferation that disagreements are likely to occur within the Atlantic Alliance. Our allies tend to view diplomacy as the principal tool and to see in such a strategy the symbolic expression of their preferred – if not exclusive – reliance on “soft” power. Some would rather face the perils of a proliferation world than the risks of avoiding it by common pressures. The administration holds the view that Iranian nuclear weapons are unacceptable in the literal sense and stresses the need for options beyond diplomacy. It affirms its support for a diplomatic course, though it has been reluctant to indicate a particular method for actively engaging itself – partly to keep open the option of regime change as a solution (a course most European leaders explicitly reject). Is it possible to merge the two approaches? Can the United States overcome its reluctance to define the content of diplomacy, and can Europe agree to a strategy of escalating pressures if diplomacy falters?

With respect to proliferation, the distinction between “soft” and “hard” power is elusive. Diplomacy is about demonstrating to the other side the range of both the benefits and the penalties of its policy options. No matter how elegantly phrased, diplomacy by its nature implies an element of pressure and a capacity for it, especially toward adversaries. One reason why European negotiators have made the limited progress they have on the nuclear issue with Iran is the implied threat of actions the United States might take in case of deadlock. The essential consultation between the United States and Europe should concern the timing and content of diplomacy and the strategy for measures beyond it, not their relative merits.

The diplomacy of nonproliferation is in large part about the use of time. The three allied countries conducting the negotiations – Britain, France and Germany – strive at the very least to gain time by erecting the maximum technical obstacles to building nuclear weapons. Iran seeks to reduce the time needed to complete a weapon, at a minimum to be in a position to extort new concessions periodically as the price for continuing its so-called restraint. The European negotiators are striving to generate a package of incentives to induce Iranian restraint. At the same time, there is a limit to the incentives that even the most passionate advocates of diplomacy should be prepared to offer lest they encourage proliferation to more and more countries as a means of extorting packages of similar benefits.

Iran insists that it has every right to aspire to acquiring nuclear technology, if only to enhance power generation. In fact, for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources. What Iran really seeks is a shield to discourage intervention by outsiders in its ideologically based revolutionary foreign policy. This is why Iran oscillates between extracting the maximum number of “incentives” from the European negotiators and profound suspicion of them. For the so-called incentives increase Iran’s dependence on the states against which the proliferation is, in the end, directed; they imply an entry by Iran into a world order it has heretofore rejected.

For a coordinated policy to succeed, two conditions must be met: The purpose must be the verifiable denuclearization – at least in the military sense – of Iran. That – and not gaining time to delay American pressures – is the test of policy. Second, the European allies must be willing to consider measures beyond diplomacy if diplomacy deadlocks. Iran may well view diplomacy as a way to gain time, perhaps through the Bush administration’s second term, in the meantime continuing to maneuver for a position from which there is only a short, final step to a nuclear weapons program. And it may try to pocket as many incentives of long-term usefulness to its economy and nuclear program as it can induce Western negotiators to offer, without taking the final step toward nuclear disarmament. Allied diplomacy should be designed to overcome these tactics and establish criteria for verifiable denuclearization.

If, as President Bush repeatedly emphasized on his European trip, an intense diplomatic phase is about to begin, some kind of U.S. participation will be necessary, at a minimum with respect to the incentives part of the diplomacy and probably in its conduct as well. This is partly because reliance on regime change in Iran – however desirable in the abstract – to stop its nuclear weapons program may prove not relevant to the issue. Bringing about regime change could take longer than the time estimated for Iran’s completion of its nuclear weapons program. And if the post-ayatollah regime insists on maintaining the weapons program – as seems probable – the nuclear dilemma will persist even after the mullahs are gone from the scene.

Such a course need not – indeed, it should not at this stage – take the form of a bilateral Washington-Tehran dialogue. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has called attention to the aspects of Iranian policy that impede across-the-board negotiations, including the support of groups relying on terrorism (such as Hezbollah) and the policy of fomenting instability in Iraq. But a framework similar to the Beijing six-party forum for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem would serve to explore the viability of the diplomatic option.

During the Cold War, it was the settled policy of several administrations to use negotiations to explore the prospects for diplomatic progress, but at the same time to lay down markers to explain the stage at which confrontation became inevitable and the reason for it. At almost the same time he was calling the Soviet Union the evil empire, President Ronald Reagan wrote a letter to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev inviting him to a dialogue. What must not happen is a repetition of the pattern preceding the Iraqi war: initial agreement on tactics succeeded by a crisis over strategy.

As the United States adopts more flexible tactics, our European allies need to understand that it is the insistence on the unacceptability of Iranian nuclear weapons that has provided perhaps the principal incentive for what little flexibility Iran has shown on the nuclear issue to date. In the end, we cannot grant a veto to other nations on matters affecting national security and global stability. But we can conduct policy in such a way that unilateral action emerges as a last resort.

A genuine allied nonproliferation policy must therefore achieve clarity on these issues: How much time is available before Iran has a nuclear weapons capability, and what strategy can best stop an Iranian nuclear weapons program? How do we prevent the diplomatic process from turning into a means to legitimize proliferation rather than avert it? What range of pressures is to be implemented if diplomacy fails? How do we determine that diplomacy had deadlocked? We must never forget that failure would usher us into an era of dangers dwarfing the nuclear perils and uncertainties surmounted in the Cold War.