基式外交：摒弃中东问题上的固有观念 @《基式外交研究》2025年第3期

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作者：亨利・A・基辛格

来源：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第3期

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "Discarding Blinders in the Middle East." The Washington Post, May 9, 2004.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、中文翻译

对中东和平的追求，其矛盾之处可谓层出不穷。

在阿里埃勒・沙龙总理所在的利库德集团以压倒性多数票反对他从加沙地带的所有以色列定居点以及约旦河西岸的四个定居点撤军计划的同一个周末，亚西尔・阿拉法特在向欧盟发出的呼吁中，谴责这一撤军行动是“和平进程的终结”。布什总统支持这样一种观点，即作为最终解决方案的一部分，一些以色列定居点可以继续留在约旦河西岸，而且寻求回归的巴勒斯坦难民应在未来规划的巴勒斯坦国境内定居，而非在以色列，这一观点也遭遇了类似的命运。

沙龙的计划因被广泛指责为抢先采取行动而绕过谈判，这使得52名退休的英国外交官联名致信英国首相托尼・布莱尔以示抗议，他们指责这是“对原则的背弃”。60名退休的美国外交官员也提交了类似的抗议。

这里颇具讽刺意味。指责绕过谈判的声音，大多来自那些一直谴责美国外交消极被动，并坚持认为美国应迫使以色列采纳一项详细计划的阵营。该计划包括回到1967年的边界线、对耶路撒冷进行分割，以及制定一个关于难民问题的模糊方案——而所有这些举措的回报，是阿拉伯国家对以色列的承认以及国际社会提供的某种保障。然而，真正的问题不在于外部势力对和平进程的影响，而在于和平进程的本质以及推进的时机。美国的立场是，通过设定一些框架参数，让各方随后就这些参数的细节展开谈判，从而使和平进程摆脱先入为主观念的束缚。美国在欧洲和国内的批评者则专注于启动和平进程，然后在不可避免地出现僵局时，强行推行他们所青睐的解决方案。

尽管这一观点可能与传统观念相悖，但我认为，美国的立场通过明确几十年来外交中一直隐含的主题，为取得重大进展创造了机会。和平进程之所以陷入僵局，是因为各方一直拒绝面对一个根本现实，即任何解决方案都不会回到1967年的边界线，因为这些边界线从来都不是国际公认的边界，而只是1948至1949年战争结束时的停火线。1967年的联合国第242号决议提到的是被占领土的归还，而不是“全部”被占领土。尽管阿拉伯国家的发言人从未接受这一解释，但自1969年的罗杰斯计划以来，美国的政策一直承认有必要对停火线进行调整。在卸任前的最后一周，克林顿总统详细阐述了他对这些调整的理解，并将他的提议标注为“个人观点”。

布什总统消除了大家心知肚明却一直不愿明说的含糊之处。但他不仅认可了分界线的改变，还对这种改变的程度进行了限制。美国政策所认可的定居点集群，是2000年各方在戴维营以及在塔巴的相关谈判中讨论过的那些，这些定居点约占约旦河西岸领土的5%，与此同时，以色列将向未来规划的巴勒斯坦国让出与其现有领土相当面积的土地。如果认为美国通过确定可能的谈判框架参数就破坏了谈判，那就是把口号置于实质内容之上了。只有当各方都认可对方的最低需求时——以色列的安全需求以及阿拉伯方面的尊严需求，才能达成持久的解决方案。

欧盟以及许多美国中东问题专家所秉持的传统立场，无法满足这些需求。要回到1967年的边界线并放弃所有定居点，将需要以色列人做出如此巨大的牺牲，放弃其基本信念，这将动摇这个犹太国家的心理基础。自1967年战争以来，没有一位以色列总理或参谋长曾动摇过这样一种观点，即以色列的长期安全与回到1967年的边界线是不相容的。即使放弃那些明显起到缓冲脆弱边界作用的定居点，也会使以色列沦为一个类似保护国的境地，其国防将依赖于一些国家的保障，而这些国家的领导人不可靠，无法理解以色列安全问题的微妙之处，并且这些国家的民众也不愿为以色列的安全做出重大牺牲。这样一种强加的解决方案，远不会像其倡导者所宣称的那样对穆斯林世界起到缓和作用，反而更可能被激进分子视为彻底消灭犹太国家道路上的第一步。

为了使谈判进程摆脱固有观念的束缚，美国的政策还试图打破在巴勒斯坦难民回归权问题上的僵局。没有一位巴勒斯坦领导人曾经处于，或者可能处于能够正式放弃巴勒斯坦人回归他们认为是自己家园的领土的立场。没有一位以色列领导人能够提出更低的要求，因为大量散居海外的巴勒斯坦人的回归将等同于犹太国家的毁灭。美国的提议试图弥合这一差距；沙龙放弃了以色列方面要求巴勒斯坦人正式放弃回归权的主张，以换取美国承诺利用其影响力将难民的回归范围限制在未来规划的巴勒斯坦国境内。

出现敌对反应的另一个原因是，人们普遍对沙龙不信任，这源于他长期主张扩大犹太人定居点，以及他对以色列安全需求的强硬解读。从这个角度来看，以色列从加沙地带撤军被解读为沙龙毕生致力于推动以色列在约旦河西岸扩张，并操纵谈判以使任何最终建立的巴勒斯坦国被限制在一系列不相连的飞地内的行动的一部分。

美国通过宣布结束在实质问题上的幻想，也使得重新审视以色列总理在和平进程中的角色成为可能。沙龙如今已经75岁了。他不可能对不仅来自穆斯林国家，而且来自欧洲以及大多数其他国家的公众舆论的敌意视而不见。如果以色列继续占领约旦河西岸，即使它允许存在一系列阿拉伯飞地，它也将被人口结构变化的趋势所压倒。在可预见的时间内，巴勒斯坦人将成为以色列人口中的多数。他们将通过选举程序改变以色列这个国家。

也许沙龙明白，他对这个他曾助力塑造，并一直以无比的奉献精神和坚定态度捍卫的国家所能做出的最后贡献，是达成一项解决方案，尽管这一方案极其痛苦，但能维护以色列安全的核心，并防止其完全孤立。落实与总统达成的谅解的精神，对于维护与美国的长期关系而言是必要的，而沙龙深知这一点。这也是他敢于冒着导致执政党内部分裂的风险的最佳解释。

显然，美国的中东政策不能基于对一个盟友领导人动机的猜测。美国外交必须坚持沙龙在华盛顿所承诺的原则，即使对他动机的这种解读被证明是错误的，或者即使他因以色列国内政治因素而无法将这些原则付诸实施。我们在中东的总体立场要求采取重大的外交举措，以充分实现与沙龙在华盛顿达成的谅解的全部意义。为了推行这一战略，美国需要与包括巴勒斯坦人在内的所有各方保持接触。但它必须避免陷入盲目给予过多保证的陷阱，因为这些保证可能会相互抵消。

与此同时，穆斯林世界，尤其是阿拉伯国家必须承担起自己的责任。其中首要的责任是克服那些激进分子，他们将以色列的任何撤军行动都视为对暴力的屈服，以及逐步消灭犹太国家进程中的一个阶段。公众舆论——尤其是美国以外的舆论——严厉批评以色列采取的强硬措施，这些措施是以色列用以保护自己免受自杀式炸弹袭击者攻击的手段。但它却很少理解以色列人对和平的深切渴望，以色列人在其历史的大部分时间里都未得到阿拉伯邻国的承认，并且他们每天都能在阿拉伯国家的出版物上读到、在阿拉伯国家的电视上看到要求摧毁以色列的激烈言辞。改变官方宣传口径将是阿拉伯国家对和平进程的一项重要贡献。最后，巴勒斯坦人不能仅仅以承认犹太国家作为唯一的贡献，却坚持要得到一个理想的结果而不做出任何其他牺牲。在正常的国家间关系中，相互承认并非是一种奖赏；它是外交政策的起点，而非终点。

以色列从加沙地带撤军将迫使人们面对一个核心问题：是否有可能在以色列撤军后留下的真空地带建立一个和平、进步且富有成效的、不受外国势力控制的巴勒斯坦实体。这样一个举措，比任何谈判方案都更能让该地区的人们切实感受到和平共处的机会。温和的阿拉伯国家在提供资源以及认可为实现和平所需做出的牺牲方面可以发挥重要作用。

欧盟的贡献同样重要。几十年来，我们的欧洲盟友一直专注于发表支持巴勒斯坦最大诉求的劝诫性声明——这种做法要么无法实现，要么一旦实施，就会损害以色列的长期安全。他们政策的主要方向一直是促使美国强行推行他们所青睐的解决方案，并利用他们的外交手段来迎合阿拉伯民众的情绪。

在这个过程中，他们无意中加剧了外交上的僵局。如果欧洲能够在阿拉伯国家中支持制定一个灵活方案的必要性，那么实现突破的可能性将大大增加。

因此，美国外交有三项任务：贯彻总统所概述的谈判立场的内涵；争取欧洲盟友的支持，以帮助在阿拉伯世界推动实现这样的结果；促使一些温和的阿拉伯国家承担起在阿拉伯方面进行谈判和实施解决方案的部分责任。

关于这一谈判进程，还应该重新审视以色列对那些继续保留的以色列定居点向未来规划的巴勒斯坦国提供的领土补偿问题。此前的设想是，以色列将割让沙漠地区的一些领土——比如南部的内盖夫沙漠。一种更周全的做法是割让那些靠近1967年分界线、有巴勒斯坦人居住的土地。这样，分界线将更符合人口分布的现实情况。

这样的做法必然会面临来自双方的初步抵制。以色列可能不愿意确立这样一个原则，即目前在以色列境内的阿拉伯社区今后应生活在巴勒斯坦国。以色列的巴勒斯坦人可能不愿意接受——至少在最初阶段——与较为繁荣的以色列分离后，巴勒斯坦国较低的生活水平。目前的巴勒斯坦领导人可能会反对任何使巴勒斯坦分治对以色列来说更容易接受的结果。然而，这些都是如果现在不加以解决，将会给未来带来隐患的问题。维持移交给巴勒斯坦控制地区的生活水平这一问题，可以由国际社会，尤其是欧洲和美国来解决。

为推动中东和平进行重大努力的时机正在临近。现在就必须奠定基础。但真正的障碍在于实质问题，而非程序问题。而且，最近发生的一系列事件为在美国的领导下实现概念上的突破提供了一个独特的机会。

二、英语原文

The quest for peace in the Middle East never exhausts its incongruities.

On the same weekend that an overwhelming majority of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's own Likud party voted against his plan to withdraw all Israeli settlements in Gaza and four on the West Bank, Yasser Arafat, in an appeal to the European Union, denounced the withdrawal as "the death of the peace process." President Bush's endorsement of the idea that some Israeli settlements could remain on the West Bank as part of an ultimate resolution and that Palestinian refugees seeking to return should be settled in the projected Palestinian state, not in Israel, suffered a similar fate.

Widely condemned as preempting negotiations, Sharon's plan moved 52 retired British diplomats to protest in an open letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, charging "an abandonment of principle." Sixty retired U.S. foreign service officers filed a similar protest.

There is no little irony here. The charge of preempting negotiations comes largely from quarters that have been denouncing U.S. diplomatic passivity and have insisted that the United States oblige Israel to adopt a detailed program that includes return to the 1967 borders, the partition of Jerusalem and an undefined formula on refugees – all this in return for recognition of Israel by the Arab states and some sort of guarantees by the international community. Yet the real issue is not the influence of outside powers on the peace process but its nature and timing. The U.S. position seeks to liberate the peace process from the blinders of its preconceptions by establishing parameters whose details are then negotiated by the parties. Its European and domestic critics concentrate on starting a peace process and then imposing their preferred solution when the inevitable deadlock occurs.

However counterintuitive it may appear to conventional wisdom, I believe that the U.S. position, by making explicit what has been an implicit theme of diplomacy for decades, creates the opportunity for significant progress. The peace process has been deadlocked by the refusal to face the root reality that any settlement would not return to the 1967 lines, which were never an international border but the cease-fire positions at the end of the 1948-49 war. U.N. Resolution 242 of 1967 spoke of a return of occupied territories, not of "the" occupied territories. Though Arab spokesmen have never accepted that interpretation, U.S. policy going back to the Rogers plan of 1969 has avowed the need for adjustments in the cease-fire lines. In his last week in office, President Clinton detailed his interpretation of these adjustments, labeling his proposal as "personal."

President Bush has removed all ambiguity about what everybody knew but has been reluctant to express. But he not only accepted a change in the dividing line; he also limited the extent of the change. The settlement blocs accepted by U.S. policy are those discussed by the parties at Camp David in 2000 and during related negotiations in Taba, comprising some 5 percent of West Bank territory in the context of Israel's yielding to the projected Palestinian state a comparable amount of its current territory. To imply that the United States sabotages negotiations by defining the parameters of the possible is to put slogans above substance. A lasting settlement will come about only if each party recognizes the minimum necessities of the other: security for Israel, dignity for the Arab side.

The standard position held by the European Union and many American Middle East experts does not meet these necessities. To return to the 1967 borders and to abandon all settlements would require so massive a renunciation of fundamental convictions as to shake the psychological basis of the Jewish state. No Israeli prime minister or chief of staff since the 1967 war has wavered from the view that the long-term security of Israel was incompatible with a return to the 1967 frontiers. The abandonment of even settlements clearly buffering vulnerable frontiers would turn Israel into the equivalent of a protectorate, dependent for its defense on guarantees by countries whose leaders could not be relied on to understand the nuances of Israel's security and on the sentiments of a public reluctant to sustain major sacrifices on behalf of Israel's security. Such an imposed settlement, far from having the moderating effect on the Muslim world claimed by its advocates, would more likely be viewed by militants as a first step on the road to eliminating the Jewish state altogether.

In the effort to liberate the negotiating process from its blinders, U.S. policy has also sought to break the deadlock over the right of return of Palestinian refugees. No Palestinian leader has ever been – or is likely to be – in a position formally to renounce a return of Palestinians to territory they consider their homeland. No Israeli leader can ever ask for less, since a massive return of diaspora Palestinians would be equivalent to the destruction of the Jewish state. The U.S. proposal has sought to bridge this gap; Sharon abandoned the formal Israeli demand for renunciation of the Palestinians' right of return in exchange for a promise by the United States to use its influence to confine the return of refugees to the territory of the proposed Palestinian state.

Another reason for the hostile reaction is a general distrust of Sharon based on his long advocacy of extending Jewish settlements and his harsh interpretation of Israeli security requirements. In this light, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is interpreted as part of Sharon's lifelong campaign to further Israeli expansion on the West Bank and to manipulate negotiations so that any eventual Palestinian state is confined to a series of non-contiguous enclaves.

The United States, by declaring an end to illusions on substance, makes possible as well a reconsideration of the role of the Israeli prime minister in the peace process. Sharon is now 75 years old. He cannot be oblivious to the hostility not simply of the Muslim countries but of European and most other public opinions. If Israel remains in occupation of the West Bank, even if it allows a series of Arab enclaves, it will be overwhelmed by demographic trends. Palestinians would, within a measurable time, become a majority of the population in Israel. They would transform the Israeli state by an electoral process.

Perhaps Sharon sees that his last service to the country that he helped shape, and that he has defended with such dedication and ferocity, is a settlement that, while extremely painful, preserves the essence of Israel's security and prevents its total isolation. Implementing the spirit of the understandings with the president is a necessity for maintaining a long-term relationship with the United States, and Sharon knows it. It is the best explanation for his daring to risk a split in his governing party.

Obviously, U.S. Middle East policy cannot be based on speculation about the motives of an allied leader. U.S. diplomacy will have to pursue the principles to which Sharon committed himself in Washington, even if this interpretation of his motives proves incorrect or if he is prevented by Israeli domestic politics from carrying them out. Our overall Middle East position requires a significant diplomatic initiative to achieve the full implications of the Washington understandings with Sharon. In pursuit of that strategy, the United States needs to be in contact with all parties, including the Palestinians. But it must avoid being tempted into multiplying assurances that could cancel themselves out.

At the same time, the Muslim world and especially the Arab countries must assume their own responsibilities. Foremost among them is to overcome radical elements that see in any Israeli withdrawal a capitulation to violence and a stage in the step-by-step elimination of the Jewish state. Public opinion – especially outside the United States – judges harshly the tough measures by which Israel seeks to protect itself against suicide bombers. But it shows far too little understanding for the deep yearning for peace on the part of Israelis who have lived unrecognized by their Arab neighbors for most of their history and who daily read in Arab publications and see on Arab television fervent exhortations to destroy Israel. A change of official propaganda would be an important Arab contribution to the peace process. Finally, the Palestinians cannot insist on an outcome to which their sole contribution is the recognition of the Jewish state without any other sacrifice. In normal relations between states, mutual recognition is not a prize; it is where foreign policy begins, not where it ends.

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will force the central issue: whether it is possible for a peaceful, progressive and productive Palestinian entity not dominated by a foreign power to be established in the vacuum left by Israeli withdrawal. Such a step, more than any negotiating formula, would bring home to the region the opportunities of peaceful coexistence. The moderate Arabs states have an important role in contributing resources and legitimizing the sacrifices required for peace.

A contribution by the European Union is equally important. For decades our European allies have concentrated on hortatory declarations in support of the maximum Palestinian program – an approach that is either unachievable or, if implemented, undermines Israel's long-term security. The major thrust of their policy has been to induce the United States to impose their preferred solution and to use their diplomacy to appeal to the Arab street.

In the process they have unintentionally fostered the stalemate in diplomacy. If Europe were to support, among Arab states, the need for a flexible program, the possibilities of a breakthrough would be greatly enhanced.

U.S. diplomacy, therefore, has three tasks: to carry through on the implications of the negotiating position outlined by the president; to seek to enlist the European allies to help promote such an outcome in the Arab world; and to induce a group of moderate Arab states to assume some responsibility for negotiations and implementation on the Arab side.

In regard to this negotiating process, another look should be taken at the Israeli territorial compensation to the projected Palestinian state for those Israeli settlements that remain. Heretofore the assumption has been that Israel would cede some territory in the desert – the Negev in the south. A more thoughtful approach would be to cede land populated by Palestinians close to the 1967 dividing line. In this manner, the dividing line would more closely follow demographic realities.

Such an approach would have to overcome initial resistance on both sides. Israel might be reluctant to establish the principle that Arab communities now in Israel should live henceforth in a Palestinian state. The Israeli Palestinians would be reluctant to accept the lower standard of living – at least initially – of the Palestinian state separated from a more prosperous Israel. The current Palestinian leaders would probably object to any outcome that makes the partition of Palestine more tolerable for Israel. Yet these are all problems that, if not dealt with now, will mortgage the future. The issue of sustaining the standard of living of the areas that move to Palestinian control could be dealt with by the international community, especially Europe and the United States.

The time is approaching for a major effort on Middle East peace. The groundwork must be laid now. But the real obstacle is substance, not process. And recent events have provided a unique opportunity to make a conceptual breakthrough under U.S. leadership.