基式外交：伊拉克的命运之日 @《基式外交研究》2025年第2期

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

来源：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第2期

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. "A Date of Destiny for Iraq." The Washington Post, February 11, 2004.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、全文翻译

美国自行设定的6月30日将主权移交给伊拉克当局的最后期限，常常被视为美国开始脱离伊拉克事务的标志。实际上，占领的正式结束改变的是美国介入的性质，而非介入本身的必要性。这需要一种新的战略，将权力转化为合法性，进而为外交事务开启一个新的维度。

美国在伊拉克的目标常常被抽象地表述，仿佛我们发动战争仅仅是为了改革这个国家。但我们不仅在伊拉克的内部结构上有利害关系，在其政治取向方面也有自身的利益诉求。一个主权独立的伊拉克，若要让联军部队基于协议而非占领的形式继续驻扎在其领土上，那么这个国家必须有一个具有代表性、安全稳定、得到国际认可且与和平世界相适应的政府。承认伊拉克新政府的国家必须采取互补的政策，以免它们之间的竞争撕裂伊拉克新政权那脆弱的架构。伊拉克当局必须接受基本的安排，而不能自视为这一安排的受害者，否则他们的领土收复主义情绪可能会点燃地区局势。

尽管各大国在战前存在诸多争端，但实际上，它们在伊拉克的利益已经变得更加一致。它们都将受到复兴的激进伊斯兰势力的威胁。这些国家明白，伊拉克局势的失败所带来的后果将跨越国界蔓延；它们能从合作中获得很多益处，而如果重蹈争端的覆辙则会损失惨重。如果主权独立的伊拉克走向激进或原教旨主义，那么每一个受到恐怖主义或激进伊斯兰势力威胁的国家都将处于危险之中。像埃及、沙特阿拉伯、约旦、摩洛哥甚至印度尼西亚这样的温和伊斯兰国家都有这样的认知，尽管有些国家可能因为过于忌惮而不敢公开承认。这种基于共同恐惧的共同目标，或许会成为构建国际秩序新方式的开端，就如同冷战后的国际秩序那样。

即使在最理想的情况下，这也将是一项艰巨的任务。一个主权独立的伊拉克，其内部动态将极其复杂。美国的传统是通过制衡体系来保障不受专断政治行为的侵害。但在伊拉克并没有类似的经验。因此，伊拉克的各个群体并不指望政府来保护自己；相反，他们通过加强自己所属的社区、部落、家族或宗教的作用来寻求安全。因此，民主化的早期阶段往往会使这个国家走向分裂，而非实现统一。每个群体都在寻求最大限度地保障自己不被其他群体统治，并获取最大份额的权力和财富。这就是为什么在6月30日之后，伊拉克的安全局势可能会恶化——至少是暂时的——因为各个心怀不满的群体将把攻击目标转向新政府的机构。

这就是经常被提及的与德国和日本被占领情况的类比站不住脚的地方。德国和日本是民族国家，没有严重的分裂主义运动或国内游击队。在战败后，它们很快就达成了共识，即与占领国合作是恢复其社会和国际地位的关键。领导人通过表现出与占领军的亲近关系来获得支持。

在伊拉克，这些条件一个都不具备。民众把这场战争视为萨达姆・侯赛因的失败，而非国家的失败。对被推翻的独裁者的仇恨并不会自动转化为对美国的支持。事实上，许多伊拉克领导人通过与美国保持距离来寻求自身的合法性。德国和日本用了将近七年的时间才实现了完全的主权独立。而在伊拉克，目标是在七个月内完成这一进程。

有三大群体在新伊拉克中争夺影响力。占多数的什叶派坚持举行选举，其实际效果将是让他们获得主导地位。对于其他群体来说，问题在于什叶派将如何利用他们的多数地位，尤其是考虑到一些什叶派派别要求建立一个伊斯兰共和国的诉求。到目前为止，伊拉克的激进和原教旨主义阿亚图拉们还没有动用他们最有力的武器，即组织大规模示威的能力。伊拉克未来的稳定将取决于他们是在等待占领结束后展示自己的力量，还是真正接受一个多元、世俗的结果。

相比之下，库尔德人由于长期受到巴格达的压迫，他们主张建立一个联邦制体系，该体系将把中央政府的职能限制在国防、外交政策以及主要的行政职能方面，几乎不赋予其执法权力或地方治理权力。库尔德人对自治的定义与独立几乎没有什么区别。

到目前为止一直占主导地位的逊尼派正在为他们失去的优势地位而哀叹。由于在伊拉克的历史上一直占据统治地位，他们至少目前在维护新兴的新政权结构方面没有什么利害关系。在组建政府过程中出现的任何妥协，很可能只会缓解他们的敌意，而无法消除这种敌意。因此，在关于新安排的辩论中，什叶派带来了多元主义限度的挑战，库尔德人带来了联邦制限度的挑战，而逊尼派带来了和解的挑战。

或许对于美国所扮演角色而言，最关键的单一决定因素是我们的民主理想对伊拉克传统价值观的影响。例如，克服制度化的女性不平等问题，将会使我们与伊斯兰宗教机构产生冲突，无论是逊尼派还是什叶派的宗教机构。因此，伊拉克最终的国内问题很可能取决于世俗化与伊斯兰化之间的较量。而伊拉克主要的世俗化力量是复兴党，我们已经将其推翻。在美国的治国方略中，在伊拉克寻找国内合作伙伴将成为一个主要考验。

伊拉克的邻国在这一进程中会有自己的想法。叙利亚能够接受一个世俗、发展中的伊拉克，但无法接受一个由什叶派主导的伊拉克，并且它会对伊拉克亲西方的倾向感到不安。伊朗害怕一个强大的伊拉克，并且会抵制一个亲美的伊拉克。土耳其会欢迎一个亲西方的伊拉克，但会对伊拉克的联邦制感到不安。

伊朗的立场最为复杂。它在巴格达建立一个尽可能弱小的中央政府方面有着战略利益，以阻止伊拉克重新崛起成为一股能够平衡德黑兰地区霸权野心的主要力量。它支持联邦制，但又害怕库尔德人，担心库尔德人的自治会挑战德黑兰对伊朗境内库尔德人的统治。伊朗的王牌是伊拉克南部占多数的什叶派人口。对于伊拉克什叶派是更珍视国家独立还是宗教和睦，人们存在不同的看法。一些人认为，由于历史上伊拉克南部是什叶派正统教义的中心，伊拉克什叶派可能会成为德黑兰阿亚图拉们在意识形态上的竞争对手——不过他们肯定会建立起某种自己的伊斯兰统治，从而削弱伊拉克其他地区实现稳定的前景。

无论如何，伊朗显然处于一个特殊的位置，能够在什叶派地区获得支持，并阻碍任何对其利益不利的整合。但伊朗可能会试图将我们的不满情绪控制在不至于引发我们报复的水平之下。因此，美国能否就对伊朗的政策达成一致，将坚定性与外交选择相结合，这将在很大程度上影响伊朗在伊拉克的行为。

作为北约盟友，土耳其在防止美国遭遇挫折方面有着重大利益。并且它准备为稳定伊拉克局势提供援助。然而，存在两个限制因素：奥斯曼帝国时期土耳其的统治历史，以及库尔德地区治理方面潜在的冲突。前者阻碍了——或者至少使土耳其参与安全领域的事务变得复杂。而且土耳其在库尔德地区的利益与美国对库尔德人自治的支持并不完全一致。土耳其领导人担心占土耳其人口20%的土耳其库尔德人会提出类似的自治要求。如果库尔德人的自治超出一定程度，那么土耳其进行军事干预的威胁就不可忽视，而且这种干预可能会得到伊朗的支持。

如果说伊拉克的邻国让局势变得更加复杂，那么其他国家的态度则带来了一些充满希望的前景。法国和德国已经重新思考了与美国的紧张关系：他们要求在联合国的主持下更快地移交主权的压力已经被事态的发展所超越。无论是否有联合国的支持，伊拉克都将在几个月内实现主权独立，而且美国政府已经让联合国参与到这一进程的前期准备工作中。未来的关键问题是，这些盟友将如何应对新兴的伊拉克：他们会在一个共同的进程中与美国团结一致，还是会利用他们与主权独立的伊拉克政府加强后的接触机会，开始与我们竞争，以削弱美国在巴格达的影响力呢？欧洲会试图成为一股平衡力量，还是在规划伊拉克和中东的未来时成为一个合作伙伴呢？欧洲是否准备好为其增强的影响力做出与之相称的安全和财政贡献呢？

矛盾的是，两年前曾有可能破坏联盟的伊拉克的未来，如今可能会变成一个重建大西洋联盟的机会，甚至更广泛地说，成为重建国际秩序的一个机会。在7月1日之前，美国有能力独自塑造一个主权伊拉克的制度体系。在那之后，伊拉克的主权将使其他国家不可避免地参与进来。甚至在那之前，美国政府就已经让联合国参与进来，以帮助解决选举问题。因此，明智的美国政策应该在被我们自己启动的这个进程所迫使之前，就努力塑造事态的发展。

·将主权移交给伊拉克绝不能成为美国从伊拉克撤军的开始，而应该是美国以一种不同方式介入的新阶段的起点。

·安全仍然至关重要，但在这个新阶段，伊拉克部队可能会逐步承担起国内安全职能，而美国军队则负责处理边境事务、防范渗透路线以及应对大规模部队的攻击。

·由于伊拉克政治未来的国际化进程最迟将在7月1日启动，所以现在美国最好通过北约内部的一个联络小组让更多国家参与到这个进程中来，从而为国际机构在伊拉克采取联合行动奠定基础。

如果有必要面对最终的挑战，即像南斯拉夫一样，出于战略原因而建立的伊拉克无法通过代议制机构维持统一，它可能会走向独裁统治，或者分裂成各个组成部分，那么这样的安排就显得尤为重要。尽管这远非我们所期望的结果，但事态的发展可能会导致伊拉克分裂成三个国家。但这需要坚定的国际指导。

这并不意味着美国将其政策拱手让给多边共识，而是要以强有力的领导力来塑造政策。由于我们的军事和财政贡献，我们必然会拥有一个主要的——很可能是主导性的——话语权，就如同我们在阿富汗所做的那样。我们通过领导一个自愿联盟，实现了消除萨达姆・侯赛因所带来威胁的重要目标。建立一个新的和平架构需要更广泛的基础。

二、材料原文

The self-imposed deadline of June 30 for the transfer of sovereignty from American to Iraqi authorities is often treated as marking the start of U.S. disengagement. In fact, the formal end of occupation changes the nature of the American engagement, not the need for it. It requires a new strategy for converting power into legitimacy and hence a new dimension to diplomacy.

American objectives in Iraq are often stated abstractly, as if we went to war exclusively to reform the country. But we have a stake in the political orientation of Iraq, not only its internal structure. A sovereign Iraq on whose soil coalition forces will remain by agreement rather than occupation presupposes a government that is representative, secure, accepted internationally and compatible with a peaceful world. The countries recognizing it must be brought to conduct complementary policies lest their competition rend the delicate fabric of the new Iraqi authority. The Iraqi authorities must accept the basic arrangement and not see themselves as victims of it, lest their irredentism inflame the region.

Despite major powers' pre-war disputes, their interests in Iraq have, in fact, become more congruent. They would all be threatened by a resurgent, radical Islam. They know that the consequences of failure in Iraq would spread across borders; they have much to gain from cooperation and much to lose from a repetition of their disputes. If the sovereign Iraq turns radical or fundamentalist, every country threatened by terrorism or by radicalized Islam will be in jeopardy. The moderate Islamic countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and even Indonesia share this perception, though some may be too intimidated to avow it. This common purpose based on a common fear could be the beginning of a new approach to international order, much as was the post-Cold War order.

Under the best of circumstances, it will be a daunting task. The internal dynamics of a sovereign Iraq will be extraordinarily complicated. The American tradition seeks a guarantee against arbitrary political acts in a system of checks and balances. But there is no comparable experience in Iraq. As a result, its various components do not look to their government for protection; instead they seek safety through enhancing the role of their communities, tribes, families or faiths. The early stages of democratization thus tend to fragment the country rather than unify it. Each community seeks the maximum guarantee against domination by the others and the maximum share of power and wealth. This is why, after June 30, the security situation in Iraq may worsen – at least temporarily – as the various disaffected groups shift their attacks to the institutions of the new government.

This is where the frequently invoked analogy to the occupations of Germany and Japan breaks down. Germany and Japan were national states without serious separatist movements or internal guerrillas. After their defeats, they quickly came to a consensus that cooperation with the occupying power was the key to restoring their societies and international standings. Leaders achieved support by demonstrating closeness to the occupation forces.

In Iraq, none of these conditions are met. The population treats the war as a defeat for Saddam Hussein, not for the nation. Hatred of the deposed dictator does not translate automatically into support for the United States. Indeed, many Iraqi leaders seek legitimacy by distancing themselves from the United States. It took almost seven years for Germany and Japan to achieve full sovereignty. In Iraq, the goal is to accomplish this process in seven months.

Three major communities are striving for influence in the new Iraq. The Shiites, being a majority, insist on elections whose practical effect would be to give them dominance. The issue for the other groups is to what purpose the Shiites would use their majority, especially in light of the demands by some Shiite factions for the creation of an Islamic Republic. The Iraqi radical and fundamentalist ayatollahs have so far sheathed their most potent weapon, the capacity to organize mass demonstrations. The future stability of Iraq will depend on whether they are waiting on showing their power for the end of the occupation or have genuinely accepted a pluralistic, secular outcome.

By contrast, the Kurds, with their history of oppression by Baghdad, urge a federal system that would confine the central government to defense, foreign policy and largely administrative functions with few, if any, enforcement powers or local governance. Kurds define self-government as only microscopically distinguishable from independence.

The heretofore dominant Sunnis are mourning their lost preeminence. Having dominated Iraq for all of its history, they have no stake – at least yet – in preserving the emerging new structure. Whatever compromise emerges in the formation of a government will likely only mitigate their hostility, not dispel it. Thus, in the debate over the new arrangements, the Shiites pose the challenge of the limits of pluralism, the Kurds of the limits of federalism and the Sunnis the challenge of reconciliation.

Perhaps the single most crucial determinant for America's role is the impact of our democratic ideals on traditional Iraqi values. Overcoming the institutionalized inequality of women, for example, will bring us into conflict with the Islamic religious establishment, whether Sunni or Shiite. Thus the ultimate domestic issue in Iraq may well turn on secularization versus Islamization. And the main secularizing force in Iraq was the Baathist party, which we have ousted. Finding domestic partners in Iraq will become a principal test of American statesmanship.

Iraq's neighbors will have their own ideas on this process. Syria can live with a secular, developing Iraq, but not with a Shiite one, and it will be uneasy about a pro-Western orientation. Iran fears a strong Iraq and will resist a pro-American one. Turkey would welcome a pro- Western Iraq but would be uneasy about Iraqi federalism.

Iran's position is the most complex. It has a strategic interest in the weakest possible central government in Baghdad to forestall Iraq's reemergence as a major force balancing Tehran's aspirations to regional hegemony. It favors federalism but fears the Kurds lest their autonomy challenge Tehran's rule over Iran's Kurdish population. Iran's trump card is the majority Shiite population of southern Iraq. Opinion is divided as to whether the Iraqi Shiites prize national independence over religious comity. Some suggest that because historically southern Iraq was the focal point of Shiite orthodoxy, the Iraqi Shiites might emerge as ideological rivals to the Tehran ayatollahs – though surely not without establishing some sort of Islamic rule of their own, weakening prospects for stability in the rest of Iraq.

In any event, Iran is clearly in a special position to generate support in the Shiite region and to hinder a consolidation inimical to its interests. But Iran will probably try to keep our frustration below a level that would cause us to retaliate. Its conduct in Iraq will therefore be heavily influenced by America's ability to come together on an Iranian policy that combines firmness with a diplomatic option.

Turkey, as a NATO ally, has a significant interest in preventing a setback for the United States. And it is prepared to extend assistance in stabilizing Iraq. There are two limitations, however: the history of Turkish rule during the Ottoman Empire and the potential conflict over governance of the Kurdish regions. The former prevents – or at least complicates – Turkish participation in the security field. And Turkey has an interest in the Kurdish region not entirely compatible with American support for Kurdish autonomy. Its leaders fear similar claims for autonomy among the Turkish Kurds, representing 20 percent of Turkey's population. If Kurdish autonomy goes beyond a certain point, there is a not negligible threat of Turkish military intervention, perhaps backed by Iran.

If Iraq's neighbors multiply complexities, the attitude of other countries opens hopeful prospects. France and Germany have had second thoughts about tensions with the United States: Their pressure for a more rapid transfer of sovereignty under U.N. auspices is being overtaken by events. Iraq will have achieved sovereignty in a matter of months regardless of auspices, and the administration has involved the United Nations in the run-up to it. The key question for the future is how the allies deal with the emerging Iraq: Will they close ranks with the United States behind a common process or will they use their enhanced access to the sovereign Iraqi government to begin competing with us to reduce U.S. influence in Baghdad? Will Europe attempt to be a counterweight or a partner in charting the future of Iraq and the Middle East? Is Europe prepared to make a security and financial contribution commensurate with enhanced influence?

Paradoxically, the future of Iraq, which two years ago threatened to destroy the alliance, may turn into an opportunity to rebuild the Atlantic Alliance and, beyond that, the international order in general. Until July 1, the United States is in a position to shape the institutions of a sovereign Iraq by itself. After that, Iraqi sovereignty will give other nations an inevitable participation. And even before that, the administration is involving the United Nations to help resolve the electoral issue. A wise U.S. policy would therefore seek to shape events before it is forced into it by the very process we have started.

·The transfer of sovereignty to Iraq must not be the beginning of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq but the start of a new phase of a different kind of American involvement.

·Security remains essential, but the new phase may permit a gradual assumption of domestic security functions by Iraqi forces, with American troops dealing with frontiers, infiltration routes and attacks by large units.

·Because the process of internationalizing the political future of Iraq will start on July 1 at the latest, it is better for the United States to lead it now by involving more countries in the process by means of a contact group within NATO to bring about a basis for joint allied action in Iraq, in international institutions.

Such an arrangement is all the more important if it becomes necessary to face the ultimate challenge: that like Yugoslavia, Iraq, created for strategic reasons, cannot be held together by representative institutions, that it will tend toward autocracy or break up into its constituent groups. While this is far from the preferred outcome, a breakup into three states may be imposed by events. But it would require firm international guidance.

This implies not an abdication of U.S. policy to a multilateral consensus but shaping it with strong leadership. We are bound to have a major – probably dominant – voice because of our military and financial contributions, much as we have in Afghanistan. We achieved the important objective of removing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by leading a coalition of the willing. Building a new structure of peace requires a wider basis.