翻译的国外网站对NATF项目内容：是美海军主动放弃NATF
TSQ
2019-04-08 16:16
（一直以来国内都有美国海军NATF项目是苏联解体的原因被美国会砍掉的说法，以前在这方面也讨论过，也给过相关的英文说明，包括下面的链接文章我也发过和翻译过，但是很遗憾不知道是一些人没有看过，还是看过但没有改变看法。现在重新翻译，帖到下面供大家参考。）
Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) 1988-1991—美海军先进战术飞机（NATF）1988-1991
链接：http://www.globalsecurity.org/military///systems//aircraft/natf.htm
Due to Congressional intervention, the US Navy agreed to evaluate a navalized version of the US Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (now the F/A-22) as a possible replacement for their F-14s. In return, the US Air Force would evaluate a derivative of the ATA as a replacement for their F-111s.
因为国会干预，美国海军同意评估美国空军的先进战术飞机(现在的F/A-22)的海军化版本来替代海军的F-14，作为回报，美国空军同意评估先进战术攻击机(ATA即A-12)的衍生来替代空军的F-111。
In late 1988, a Naval ATF (NATF) program office was set up at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and the existing ATF Dem/Val contracts were modified to include studies of potential NATF variants.
在1988年晚些时候，一个海军先进战术战斗机（NATF）办公室在赖特-帕特森空军基地成立，评估已有的先进战术飞机研制机型的验证合同,看如何能够调整合同包含NATF到里面。
The Major Aircraft Review reduced the peak production rates of both the ATF and NATF. This had the effect of substantially increasing the program cost. In August 1990, Admiral Richard Dunleavy, who was in charge of Navy aircraft requirements, stated that he did not see how the NATF could fit into any affordable plan for naval aviation. In early 1991, before the final contractor for the ATF was even selected, the consideration of the NATF was dropped. This was mainly due to the fact that the Navy realized that a series of upgrades to their existing F-14's could meet the Navy's air superiority needs through 2015.
（美国国防部的）主战飞机评估的结果削减了ATF和NATF的峰值产量，这大幅度增加了项目的开支。在1990年8月，负责海军作战飞机需求的理查德•邓利维上将说，他看不出NATF怎么能让海军航空负担得起。在1991年早期（大概是1991年2月），美国空军选定最终的ATF供应商前，海军放弃了NATF项目。主要原因是美海军认为对现有的F-14进行一系列升级就能够满足海军的空中优势到2015年。
The F-22N was studied in the Major Aircraft Review as an NATF concept, and canceled in large measure because the projected high gross take-off weight exceed the capacity of current carriers.
（美国国防部的）主战飞机评估也研究了F-22N（F-22海军型）成为NATF的可能，但后来取消了，很大程度上是因为（F-22N的）最大起飞重量超过了现有航母的能力。
Carrier aircraft fly slower approaches than land-based aircraft and must be able to perform a wave off at low speed. Therefore, a full power 1.5g turn at 0.2M and sea level with all stores and reserve fuel on board may be needed to ensure an adequate maneuver margin. This requirement determines the wing loading for sea-based aircraft [the SSF was exempt from this wave off requirement because it performs vertical landings].
航母舰载机比陆基飞机具有更低的进近速度，并且希望能够在更低速度放弃降落重新拉起。所以，要求飞机能够携充足的（保留足够的回旋能力）降落燃油和必要的载荷情况下，在海平面高度0.2马赫速度下具有1.5g的转弯（机）动能力。这个要求决定了舰载机的翼载【未翻译这句话，不清楚SSF的意思。the SSF was exempt from this wave off requirement because it performs vertical landings 】。
Carrier operations require heavier structures for several reasons: 1) arrested landings require a tail hook and reinforced fuselage, 2) landing gear are designed for 24 ft/s sink rate, and 3) catapult launches require reinforced nose gear and a strengthened fuselage. These weight increments are difficult to quantify because there are no data for aircraft that were designed for both land-based and sea-based operations with exactly the same mission capability. For example, contrary to the expected navalization penalty, the land-based F-4 actually had a higher empty weight than the carrier-based version. But in this case the land-based version used the increased strength and wing area of the carrier aircraft to carry an increased equipment load, which equates to higher mission capability. Similarly, few aircraft have successfully made the transition from land-based to sea-based operations. The carrier version of the British Hawk did perform catapult launches and arrested landings but required substantial structural reinforcement to do so. The navalized Hawk is approximately 11% heavier empty, but it can no longer fly as far as the land-based version.
航母上操作要求（飞机）有更重的结构重量原因有几个：1）拦阻着陆需要增加尾钩和更强的机身，2）起落架要满足24英尺/秒的下降率，3）弹射起飞要求加强前起落架和机身结构强度。这些重量难以准确量化，因为没有关于飞机设计成同时满足陆基和海基操作并具有完全同样的任务能力的相关数据。譬如，与预期相反，陆基F-4实际上比舰载版本空重还要大。不过这种情况下陆基版本增加了结构强度和机翼面积也提升了载荷能力，相应的也具有更高的任务能力。类似的，少有飞机成功的从陆基飞机改成舰载机。英国鹰式教练机舰载版本为了弹射和拦阻着舰做了大量的结构加强工作。舰载鹰式增加了11%的空重，飞行距离也比达不到陆基飞机的距离。
Since historical research did not provide values for fuselage and landing gear weight penalties for carrier operations, an estimate had to be made another way. To this end, the F-14 and F-18 were modelled using ACSYNT's land-based weight equations. The actual aircraft fuselage and landing gear structure weights were approximately 30% greater than those modelled by ACSYNT. Therefore, 30% fuselage and landing gear weight penalties may be applied to carrier-based aircraft in this study. Informal comments by US Navy personnel agreed that 30% was a reasonable estimate.
因为历史研究中不能提供有价值的关于舰载机结构和起落架重量增加数据，就用了另外其它方法进行评估。结果，F-14和F-18用于来进行陆基飞机（上舰）增重确定ACSYNT评估重量公式（方程？）。评估方程得出舰载机相比陆基飞机结构和起落架重量大约增加30%。因此，在这项研究中，舰载机的结构重量和起落架重量认为是要增加30%，美海军基本也同意30%是个合理的估计。
Early in the ATF/NATF development, a Naval variant of the F-22 could have been developed. By the late 1990s, however, to graft a Naval requirement onto an existing F-22 program would be similar to the mistake that the Department made in developing the F-111. In that program, DOD directed the Air Force to add Naval requirements to an existing Air Force EMD concept "with minimal disruption" to the program. As a result, the Naval version of the F-111 was significantly overweight and subsequently canceled in favor of a new start Navy aircraft, the F-14. The appropriate time to join multi-service requirements is early in the program, and the ideal time is while the requirements are being developed in a balanced systems engineering approach.
在ATF/NATF研究的早期，也在考虑发展海军化F-22（译者认为就是前面的提到的F-22N）。但在九十年代末，认为把海军的需求移植到已有的F-22项目上将导致以前国防部在开发F-111时犯的错。在F-111的项目中，国防部要求美空军用在进入工程发展阶段后用最小的代价把海军的需求增加进去。但结果是海军版本的F-111明显的超重随后取消了,取而代之的是一个新的开始海军飞机F-14。最适当增加多种要求的时间其实是项目初期，在项目开始时是平衡多种需求的理想时间。
上述文章说明以下几点：
1、搞NATF项目并不是美海军真正需求；
2、是美海军主动放弃NATF项目，而不是美国会砍掉NATF。美海军放弃NATF的原因是太贵，通过改进F-14就能在2015年前满足美海军的空中作战要求。
3、美海军放弃NAFT项目时是1991年早期（目前看到别的论坛上资料是1991年2月），是在美空军选定洛克希德研制F-22前放弃。美空军选定F-22是1991年4月。
4、舰载机要求比较特殊，要求低速进近能力和相当的操纵能力，这个不同于空军的要求。
5、美国还研究过F-22直接上舰，研究的结果认为是最大起飞重量超过现有航母的能力。后面讲了评估是怎么考虑的但讲的含糊。总的来说是结构重量和起落架重量要增加30%，一般战斗机结构重量占总重差不多30%左右，换句话说结构重量和起落架增重差不多10%，符合常见说法。
6、最后提到，海军需求要和空军需求都要考虑时，最理想的时间是一开始就一起考虑，在项目发展到一定程度再把海军的需求纳入到空军的需求中，就会犯F-111上的错误。这个说法其实也是在认为F-22上舰不理想。
Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) 1988-1991—美海军先进战术飞机（NATF）1988-1991
链接：http://www.globalsecurity.org/military///systems//aircraft/natf.htm
Due to Congressional intervention, the US Navy agreed to evaluate a navalized version of the US Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter (now the F/A-22) as a possible replacement for their F-14s. In return, the US Air Force would evaluate a derivative of the ATA as a replacement for their F-111s.
因为国会干预，美国海军同意评估美国空军的先进战术飞机(现在的F/A-22)的海军化版本来替代海军的F-14，作为回报，美国空军同意评估先进战术攻击机(ATA即A-12)的衍生来替代空军的F-111。
In late 1988, a Naval ATF (NATF) program office was set up at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and the existing ATF Dem/Val contracts were modified to include studies of potential NATF variants.
在1988年晚些时候，一个海军先进战术战斗机（NATF）办公室在赖特-帕特森空军基地成立，评估已有的先进战术飞机研制机型的验证合同,看如何能够调整合同包含NATF到里面。
The Major Aircraft Review reduced the peak production rates of both the ATF and NATF. This had the effect of substantially increasing the program cost. In August 1990, Admiral Richard Dunleavy, who was in charge of Navy aircraft requirements, stated that he did not see how the NATF could fit into any affordable plan for naval aviation. In early 1991, before the final contractor for the ATF was even selected, the consideration of the NATF was dropped. This was mainly due to the fact that the Navy realized that a series of upgrades to their existing F-14's could meet the Navy's air superiority needs through 2015.
（美国国防部的）主战飞机评估的结果削减了ATF和NATF的峰值产量，这大幅度增加了项目的开支。在1990年8月，负责海军作战飞机需求的理查德•邓利维上将说，他看不出NATF怎么能让海军航空负担得起。在1991年早期（大概是1991年2月），美国空军选定最终的ATF供应商前，海军放弃了NATF项目。主要原因是美海军认为对现有的F-14进行一系列升级就能够满足海军的空中优势到2015年。
The F-22N was studied in the Major Aircraft Review as an NATF concept, and canceled in large measure because the projected high gross take-off weight exceed the capacity of current carriers.
（美国国防部的）主战飞机评估也研究了F-22N（F-22海军型）成为NATF的可能，但后来取消了，很大程度上是因为（F-22N的）最大起飞重量超过了现有航母的能力。
Carrier aircraft fly slower approaches than land-based aircraft and must be able to perform a wave off at low speed. Therefore, a full power 1.5g turn at 0.2M and sea level with all stores and reserve fuel on board may be needed to ensure an adequate maneuver margin. This requirement determines the wing loading for sea-based aircraft [the SSF was exempt from this wave off requirement because it performs vertical landings].
航母舰载机比陆基飞机具有更低的进近速度，并且希望能够在更低速度放弃降落重新拉起。所以，要求飞机能够携充足的（保留足够的回旋能力）降落燃油和必要的载荷情况下，在海平面高度0.2马赫速度下具有1.5g的转弯（机）动能力。这个要求决定了舰载机的翼载【未翻译这句话，不清楚SSF的意思。the SSF was exempt from this wave off requirement because it performs vertical landings 】。
Carrier operations require heavier structures for several reasons: 1) arrested landings require a tail hook and reinforced fuselage, 2) landing gear are designed for 24 ft/s sink rate, and 3) catapult launches require reinforced nose gear and a strengthened fuselage. These weight increments are difficult to quantify because there are no data for aircraft that were designed for both land-based and sea-based operations with exactly the same mission capability. For example, contrary to the expected navalization penalty, the land-based F-4 actually had a higher empty weight than the carrier-based version. But in this case the land-based version used the increased strength and wing area of the carrier aircraft to carry an increased equipment load, which equates to higher mission capability. Similarly, few aircraft have successfully made the transition from land-based to sea-based operations. The carrier version of the British Hawk did perform catapult launches and arrested landings but required substantial structural reinforcement to do so. The navalized Hawk is approximately 11% heavier empty, but it can no longer fly as far as the land-based version.
航母上操作要求（飞机）有更重的结构重量原因有几个：1）拦阻着陆需要增加尾钩和更强的机身，2）起落架要满足24英尺/秒的下降率，3）弹射起飞要求加强前起落架和机身结构强度。这些重量难以准确量化，因为没有关于飞机设计成同时满足陆基和海基操作并具有完全同样的任务能力的相关数据。譬如，与预期相反，陆基F-4实际上比舰载版本空重还要大。不过这种情况下陆基版本增加了结构强度和机翼面积也提升了载荷能力，相应的也具有更高的任务能力。类似的，少有飞机成功的从陆基飞机改成舰载机。英国鹰式教练机舰载版本为了弹射和拦阻着舰做了大量的结构加强工作。舰载鹰式增加了11%的空重，飞行距离也比达不到陆基飞机的距离。
Since historical research did not provide values for fuselage and landing gear weight penalties for carrier operations, an estimate had to be made another way. To this end, the F-14 and F-18 were modelled using ACSYNT's land-based weight equations. The actual aircraft fuselage and landing gear structure weights were approximately 30% greater than those modelled by ACSYNT. Therefore, 30% fuselage and landing gear weight penalties may be applied to carrier-based aircraft in this study. Informal comments by US Navy personnel agreed that 30% was a reasonable estimate.
因为历史研究中不能提供有价值的关于舰载机结构和起落架重量增加数据，就用了另外其它方法进行评估。结果，F-14和F-18用于来进行陆基飞机（上舰）增重确定ACSYNT评估重量公式（方程？）。评估方程得出舰载机相比陆基飞机结构和起落架重量大约增加30%。因此，在这项研究中，舰载机的结构重量和起落架重量认为是要增加30%，美海军基本也同意30%是个合理的估计。
Early in the ATF/NATF development, a Naval variant of the F-22 could have been developed. By the late 1990s, however, to graft a Naval requirement onto an existing F-22 program would be similar to the mistake that the Department made in developing the F-111. In that program, DOD directed the Air Force to add Naval requirements to an existing Air Force EMD concept "with minimal disruption" to the program. As a result, the Naval version of the F-111 was significantly overweight and subsequently canceled in favor of a new start Navy aircraft, the F-14. The appropriate time to join multi-service requirements is early in the program, and the ideal time is while the requirements are being developed in a balanced systems engineering approach.
在ATF/NATF研究的早期，也在考虑发展海军化F-22（译者认为就是前面的提到的F-22N）。但在九十年代末，认为把海军的需求移植到已有的F-22项目上将导致以前国防部在开发F-111时犯的错。在F-111的项目中，国防部要求美空军用在进入工程发展阶段后用最小的代价把海军的需求增加进去。但结果是海军版本的F-111明显的超重随后取消了,取而代之的是一个新的开始海军飞机F-14。最适当增加多种要求的时间其实是项目初期，在项目开始时是平衡多种需求的理想时间。
上述文章说明以下几点：
1、搞NATF项目并不是美海军真正需求；
2、是美海军主动放弃NATF项目，而不是美国会砍掉NATF。美海军放弃NATF的原因是太贵，通过改进F-14就能在2015年前满足美海军的空中作战要求。
3、美海军放弃NAFT项目时是1991年早期（目前看到别的论坛上资料是1991年2月），是在美空军选定洛克希德研制F-22前放弃。美空军选定F-22是1991年4月。
4、舰载机要求比较特殊，要求低速进近能力和相当的操纵能力，这个不同于空军的要求。
5、美国还研究过F-22直接上舰，研究的结果认为是最大起飞重量超过现有航母的能力。后面讲了评估是怎么考虑的但讲的含糊。总的来说是结构重量和起落架重量要增加30%，一般战斗机结构重量占总重差不多30%左右，换句话说结构重量和起落架增重差不多10%，符合常见说法。
6、最后提到，海军需求要和空军需求都要考虑时，最理想的时间是一开始就一起考虑，在项目发展到一定程度再把海军的需求纳入到空军的需求中，就会犯F-111上的错误。这个说法其实也是在认为F-22上舰不理想。
