“百位中国通”联名信粉碎了“美国对华共识”吗？

编者按：7月3日，由近百名美国对华研究领域顶级专家、学者和前官员联署的致美国总统和国会议员的公开信在《华盛顿邮报》发表，公开信的题目是“美国与中国为敌事与愿违”。公开信反对美国政府在每个领域都与中国进行对抗，认为北京不是一个经济上的敌人或是对美国国家安全的威胁。信中指出，视中国为敌人并将之与全球经济脱钩的做法将损害美国的国际角色和声誉，最终孤立的是自己，而不是北京。

这是近期以来美国精英层发出的反对现行对华政策的最强大声音。此信在国内引起巨大反响，也值得我们认真思考如何应对中美关系。大国策智库特邀知名专家从不同视角解读此信的意义。

公开信原文附在文末。

日前美国百余位专家学者联名表态，实际目的就是在为遏制中美关系蜕变为敌人关系作最后的努力。在英文世界，敌人的定义是：遇事的第一本能反应是要伤害对方。当事双方如果相互确认过眼神，双边关系未来发展的轨迹将呈螺旋式下降之势。

过去的中美关系四十年，是双方各界在排除困难和阻力推石头上山的艰苦过程。现在，前途愈发陡峭，峰回路不转，中美关系开始了新一轮调整，全世界的战略智库都在设身处地地推演：眼见巨石滑落，如何当现有支撑框架倾覆时保持完卵。在这封公开信件上签名的重要人士，实际上是在当前的关键时刻试图在巨石滑落形成巨大势能之际，在做最后关头的刹车努力。

情况进入不可逆转的状况的关键，就是双方定义对方为“敌人”。对这个定位绝不可举重若轻，一定要三思而行。

两个令人无法反驳的经验事实是：敌人是互相建构出来的。如果把对方当作敌人对待，对方就一定会成为敌人。  

避免互相开启敌对范式的可行之路就是要关注、发现、培育双方的共同利益。把共同利益放在各自利益之上的适当位置上。通过扩大共同利益正向影响双方各自利益的冲突之处。用共同利益的扩展，覆盖各自利益的矛盾与痛点。

总之，不踹石头下坡，不把双边关系推向敌人的心理设定，这本身就需要眼界，勇气与力量。四十年后，中美关系变化前景再一次成为世界的中心。没有欣喜，我们将冷静对待。

这封联名信代表的应该是对华接触派对目前对华关系、战略发展趋势的严重担忧，因为这种政策基于对中国力量与意图的判断过度，不符合美国利益。为此，他们需要发声来影响舆论与社会认知，并试图牵制华盛顿政客进一步推进中美关系向敌对方向发展的态势。从中可以有以下几种认识：

1. 这种平衡的声音很可能在当前华盛顿鹰派主导的对华对抗政策的大氛围遭到淹没，不会产生很大的政策影响。

2. 这种声音代表着美国在对华政策上并没有形成完全的共识，对华接触、合作加制衡的战略仍然可能在未来的政府中复活。

3. 它会激起更多的辩论、讨论，甚至影响民主党总统候选人在选战中如何框定对华政策基调。

4. 美国对华政策不会再完全回复到过去民主党政府的样子，这些人的观点也在变化，不同程度上对中国外交与国内政策存在严重不满，主张加大对华多管齐下施压，但核心（底线）是保持接触、经济合作、军事交流与危机管控，同时扩大在国际问题与全球治理上的合作。

5. 中国既要保持与这一派的沟通、协调，吸收他们合理建设性的意见，支持他们继续发声，为他们提供有利的中美继续合作证据。但也需要看到他们的两面性，中国目前国内政治与对外政策已经造成的战略困境减弱了我们与他们的共同性，要避免刻意扩大他们的作用，过度解读他们的观点，不能完全按照他们的提供的路线走，主要是保持我们的基本定力。

关于百名美国的“中国通”致特朗普的公开信，已经被一些中国学者理解为美国对华政策并未定型的强烈依据。位列公开信六位发起人之一的布鲁金斯学会李成博士在接受财新记者的访问中也表示，“美国学界与政府的对华情绪和政策非常不同，并非是一致的立场”，他甚至认为这标志着对华政策的钟摆“开始往另一个方向摆”。笔者对此有所保留。在我看来，这封公开信反对的是美国把中国当作敌人，这本来就不是普遍被接受的共识，而是特朗普政府内少数强硬派与美国深暗势力（deep state)的主张与看法。

可是，对于把中国当作战略竞争对手，则是美国左右派别、学界与政府都能接受的，也是2010-2015期间各界辩论所达成的共识。百位中国通这一公开信的一大目的，是提醒特朗普：战略竞争对手与敌人之间并没有绝对的界限，明确认定竞争对手是可以的，也是必要的，但明确认定敌人则是危险的，在损害敌人的同时，也将严重损害美国的利益。这实际上凸显了一点：美国学界内外有一大批人并不同意把中国界定为“新版的苏联”，也警告特朗普政府中的强硬派别走得太远。

首先，这种观点在对中国崛起给美国主导的国际秩序带来挑战的严重性上与特朗普政府所代表的右翼并无根本区别，指出：中国近年来的令人不安的行为——包括其转向更大的内部压制，增加国家对私营企业的控制，未能履行若干贸易承诺，更大的努力来控制外国舆论和更进取的外交政策，对世界其他国家提出了严峻的挑战。实际上是认同中国属于“修正主义国家”。

其次，这些接触派实际上是奥巴马对华政策主张的延续，回归到了接触加对冲的传统二轨政策，而美国内相当一部分人认为是不成功甚至是失败的，现美国政府，国会及部分民意是反对的。

第三，其开出的药方：盟友，威慑及与中国的开明力量接触是过去几十年美对华政策的一贯，也是自由派的主流观点，更是其目前遭到诟病的原因。

最后，经过中美贸易战的一轮僵持博弈，双方重启谈判，表明强硬派的攻势有所式微，接触派的力量正在增大。未来，美对华政策走向将取决于二者的力量消长。

美国百名学者联名信是经过深思熟虑的，时间节点也选择恰当。特朗普政府的对华政策和作法大阪G20后可能会有所调整。至今其对华的经贸战、科技战、地缘政治战都没有取得预期效果。因为所有这些“战争”没有盟国和友好国家支持，靠美国一己之力是打不赢的。而恰恰对于美国发起的对华“战争”，绝大多数在旁观，不配合，甚至拉美国后退，形成美国单打独斗。以现在的中国政治、经济、社会状况，仅美国的单打独斗，别说打赢，恐怕伤害中国的几率都不大，反倒倒逼中国下决心做一些重要事情，倒逼中国民心凝聚，倒逼中国发展更好。

所以，美国的中国问题专家学者意识到了特朗普政府的对华政策和作法需要调整，这样做下去于美国不利。因为他们了解中国，了解中国人。在美国历届总统中，最了解中国和中国人的当属老布什。在八十年代末的紧张环境中，西方制裁中国，老布什就呼吁，过度的“外压”会使中国人更加团结。

由于处在结构性的对抗中，中美关系大幅下滑可能是一个长期的问题。尽管美国没有把中国看成敌人，但是在两年之内中美关系下滑到如此程度，对于大多数普通中国人而言是非常意外的。理性的中国人会看到，自己还有1660万的农村贫困人口问题需要解决，中国没有实力、也没有必要取代美国成为全球的领导者，中国需要把更多的精力放在解决自身存在的问题上。改革开放成就了今天的中国、融入国际体系发展了中国。“世界好，中国才能好；中国好，才能世界好，”这是中国对现行国际体系的基本认识。作为现行国际体系的受益者，中国主张改革而不是推翻现行国际体系，目的是推动国际秩序更加公正合理，这样才能保证国际秩序的稳定和可持续性。美国选择孤立主义可能代表了公众意志，但这不能成为质疑中国推动的“一带一路”理由。因为绝大多数“一带一路”在建项目都是发达国家不愿意做的，自己不愿意做又不让中国做，这对中国非常不公平。当然，对于中国而言，国家实力的增长要与建设法治国家同步，甚至要先于国家实力的增长。这样不仅能提高发展对外关系的能力，而且能增加与其它国家的合作基础。最后，中美关系牵一发而动全身，中国需要对中美关系保持战略定力和理性认识，避免带有情绪化的政策和认识，让中美关系在相对宽松的空间内互动，生成符合中美两国国家利益的共识。

《把中国当作敌人适得其反》，这封选择在美国独立日前、习特会之后发表在《华盛顿邮报》的公开信，似乎想要为当前日趋紧张的中美关系注入一点冷静剂。综观全信七条内容，不可不谓深谙“话语平衡术”：显然，这封信不仅是写给美国人看的，也是送给中国人读的。作为一个中国学者，我最感兴趣的是信的末尾那句话：在华盛顿并没有一些人所相信的那样，有一个必须与中国为敌的压倒性共识。

自从2017年12月18日，美国《国家安全战略报告》将中国列为战略竞争对手以来，关于美国国内是否存在着对华共识一直为战略学界所关注。有研究者指出，美对华的战略报告执笔人来自两党资深人士，并非特朗谱团队的鹰派一家之言，说明“对付中国”是他们的共识。也有研究者指出，基于美国政治的制衡特点，加上中美贸易额如此之大，不可能存在一个这样的共识。谁是谁非呢？这封“百名中国通”的公开信似乎佐证了后者，果真如此吗？

事实上，根据阿罗不可能定理，根本不存在一个面向所有者的“共识”。因此，重要的不是去论证有没有“共识”，而是找到“共识”的限度。就政治话语来说，话语是一种权力，“共识”的限度在于当权者的“话语圈”，如果当权者的话语圈内存在共识，则其话语指向就要值得关注了。特朗普的决策话语圈内有没有关于中国的“共识”？话语指向何方？答案不言自明。鉴于特朗普执政团队及美国政治的特点，我们只能谨言如斯：美国当前政府也许存在着一个反华“共识”，但不是“压倒性”的。

从2019年1月谢淑丽开始提出防止美国对华政策的过度反应开始，美国关于重新反思对华强硬而僵化的政策的趋势开始出现。近日美国100名左右政商学界精英给特朗普写公开信，反对美国把中国定义为敌人，主张平衡中美的竞争与合作，主张对华接触政策，联合盟友与伙伴威慑中国，并坚持多边主义政策来约束中国的激进政策。

这说明，近半年来美国精英对美国对华政策的过度反应的认知开始扩大，起码在美国的中国通群体中，谢淑丽式的认知从少数异议派，走向多数派。如果这种趋势继续下去，再加上普通消费者及其它涉华经济利益集团的正面努力，美国对华极端化政策有望得到控制，中美关系有望在未来恢复到理性发展的轨道上。

建立互信的关键是调整相互政策与认知，双方皆应该对目前的局势冷静对待、理性分析。中方调整其“过度扩张”的政策或采取措施防止战略透支，而美方克制其过度反应或调整“遏制政策”。这是中美重建互信关系的关键性开始。公开信事件是一个好的开始，但结果仍难以预料。

对于这封联名信，我的看法有四：

第一，中方的表态是非常得体且积极的。中国外交部表态充分肯定了这封公开信中的正面内容，但也非常谨慎地避免对全信所有的观点下定论。因为公开信中也有不少内容、主张，和中国政府的一贯立场是有相当差距的。

第二，尽管仍然存在认知、立场上的差距，但该公开信相对特朗普政府，尤其是相对其内阁中较为鹰牌的主政者，在立场、话语方面都拉开了相当的距离。这既是其进步性的体现，也在一定程度上代表了美国对华政策精英圈的呼声。

第三，这封公开信也打破了美国强硬派在过去2年来所极力营造所谓“全美上下一心，全力打压中国”的幻象。公开信明确向全美国、中国和国际社会展现出美国社会的多元性，以及这个成熟国家内在的纠错机制，使美国自身的发展方向、中美关系的发展方向有可能转到正确、健康、互利、可持续发展的方向。

第四，美版“清流上书”发出后，已经成为一个媒体事件，一个带有浓重政策含义的文本（text）也已经生成。它对华总体而言当然利好，但中方怎么打好这张牌，同时打赢外宣、内宣两场舆论战，为其在中美新型大国博弈中赢得更多主动权，仍费思量。

这封信最重要的意义不在于改变特朗普政府的对华政策。美国社会的多元性、复杂性决定了任何人和群体的作用都是有限的。尤其是特朗普政府和大部分智库间的距离更让这种政策影响力大打折扣。

尽管如此，特朗普政府毕竟是暂时的存在。美国社会和精英层才是需要长久应付的群体。这封信的社会和舆论影响力不可低估。

对中国而言，这封信的最大意义在于破除了国内舆论中关于“美国对华共识”的迷信，认识到美国精英层的共识并非我们之前所担心的那么强，至少应该分层次地予以区别。即便美国精英层普遍把中国视为一个需要着力应付的强大对手，但是此信的主旨--“不可与中国为敌”-是与特朗普团队的认知根本不同。在“如何应付中国”这个问题上美国精英层尤其存在巨大分歧，这对中国而言意义不可估量。

这封信提醒我们这边要同样理性冷静地看待中美关系。一方面不要把特朗普政府和美国精英甚至美国社会等同，应该更冷静更克制地处理中美关系。另一方面也要理性看待这些专家，以及那些没有签名的专家，避免过分解读。这里面的很多专家对中国可能很不客气，颇多批评。但是此信中“中美不可为敌”的主旨是被所有签名者接受的。因此必须认识到，这封信不是要表达这些专家亲华或反华的态度，而是如何理性的对待中国。我们不能从选边站队、非友即敌的惯性思维对待这些专家，而是积极寻找与这些专家之间的契合点，让中美关系在竞争中防控冲突，促进合作。

公开信原文

Making China a U.S. enemy is counterproductive

By M. Taylor Fravel , 

J. Stapleton Roy , 

Michael D. Swaine , 

Susan A. Thornton and 

Ezra Vogel 

July 3

Dear President Trump and members of Congress:

We are members of the scholarly, foreign policy, military and business communities, overwhelmingly from the United States, including many who have focused on Asia throughout our professional careers. We are deeply concerned about the growing deterioration in U.S. relations with China, which we believe does not serve American or global interests. Although we are very troubled by Beijing’s recent behavior, which requires a strong response, we also believe that many U.S. actions are contributing directly to the downward spiral in relations.

The following seven propositions represent our collective views on China, the problems in the U.S. approach to China and the basic elements of a more effective U.S. policy. Our institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only.

1. China’s troubling behavior in recent years — including its turn toward greater domestic repression, increased state control over private firms, failure to live up to several of its trade commitments, greater efforts to control foreign opinion and more aggressive foreign policy — raises serious challenges for the rest of the world. These challenges require a firm and effective U.S. response, but the current approach to China is fundamentally counterproductive.

2. We do not believe Beijing is an economic enemy or an existential national security threat that must be confronted in every sphere; nor is China a monolith, or the views of its leaders set in stone. Although its rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing toward a more assertive international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a moderate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach with the West serves China’s interests. Washington’s adversarial stance toward Beijing weakens the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the right balance of competition and cooperation, U.S. actions can strengthen those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs.

3. U.S. efforts to treat China as an enemy and decouple it from the global economy will damage the United States’ international role and reputation and undermine the economic interests of all nations. U.S. opposition will not prevent the continued expansion of the Chinese economy, a greater global market share for Chinese companies and an increase in China’s role in world affairs. Moreover, the United States cannot significantly slow China’s rise without damaging itself. If the United States presses its allies to treat China as an economic and political enemy, it will weaken its relations with those allies and could end up isolating itself rather than Beijing.

4. The fear that Beijing will replace the United States as the global leader is exaggerated. Most other countries have no interest in such an outcome, and it is not clear that Beijing itself sees this goal as necessary or feasible. Moreover, a government intent on limiting the information and opportunities available to its own citizens and harshly repressing its ethnic minorities will not garner meaningful international support nor succeed in attracting global talent. The best American response to these practices is to work with our allies and partners to create a more open and prosperous world in which China is offered the opportunity to participate. Efforts to isolate China will simply weaken those Chinese intent on developing a more humane and tolerant society.

5. Although China has set a goal of becoming a world-class military by midcentury, it faces immense hurdles to operating as a globally dominant military power. However, Beijing’s growing military capabilities have already eroded the United States’ long-standing military preeminence in the Western Pacific. The best way to respond to this is not to engage in an open-ended arms race centered on offensive, deep-strike weapons and the virtually impossible goal of reasserting full-spectrum U.S. dominance up to China’s borders. A wiser policy is to work with allies to maintain deterrence, emphasizing defensive-oriented, area denial capabilities, resiliency and the ability to frustrate attacks on U.S. or allied territory, while strengthening crisis-management efforts with Beijing.

6. Beijing is seeking to weaken the role of Western democratic norms within the global order. But it is not seeking to overturn vital economic and other components of that order from which China itself has benefited for decades. Indeed, China’s engagement in the international system is essential to the system’s survival and to effective action on common problems such as climate change. The United States should encourage Chinese participation in new or modified global regimes in which rising powers have a greater voice. A zero-sum approach to China’s role would only encourage Beijing to either disengage from the system or sponsor a divided global order that would be damaging to Western interests.

7. In conclusion, a successful U.S. approach to China must focus on creating enduring coalitions with other countries in support of economic and security objectives. It must be based on a realistic appraisal of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals and behavior; an accurate match of U.S. and allied resources with policy goals and interests; and a rededication of U.S. efforts to strengthen its own capacity to serve as a model for others. Ultimately, the United States’ interests are best served by restoring its ability to compete effectively in a changing world and by working alongside other nations and international organizations rather than by promoting a counterproductive effort to undermine and contain China’s engagement with the world.

We believe that the large number of signers of this open letter clearly indicates that there is no single Washington consensus endorsing an overall adversarial stance toward China, as some believe exists.

M. Taylor Fravel is a professor of political science at MIT. J. Stapleton Roy is a distinguished scholar at the Wilson Center and a former U.S. ambassador to China. Michael D. Swaine is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Susan A. Thornton is a senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Ezra Vogel is a professor emeritus at Harvard University.

The above individuals circulated the letter, which was signed by the following:

1. James Acton, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program and Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2. Craig Allen, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei from 2014–2018

3. Andrew Bacevich, co-founder, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

4. Jeffrey A. Bader, former senior director for East Asia on National Security Council 2009-2011 and fellow, Brookings Institution

5. C. Fred Bergsten, senior fellow and director emeritus, Peterson Institute for International Economics

6. Jan Berris, vice president, National Committee on United States-China Relations

7. Dennis J. Blasko, former U.S. Army Attaché to China, 1992-1996

8. Pieter Bottelier, visiting scholar, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University

9. Ian Bremmer, president, Eurasia Group

10. Richard Bush, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, Brookings Institution

11. Jerome A. Cohen, faculty director, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University

12. Warren I. Cohen, distinguished university professor emeritus, University of Maryland

13. Bernard Cole, former U.S. Navy captain

14. James F. Collins, U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation 1997-2001

15. Gerald L Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus, Columbia University

16. Toby Dalton, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

17. Robert Daly, director, Kissinger Institute on China and the U.S., Wilson Center

18. Michael C. Desch, Packey J. Dee Professor of International Affairs and director of the Notre Dame International Security Center

19. Mac Destler, professor emeritus, University of Maryland School of Public Policy

20. Bruce Dickson, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University

21. David Dollar, senior fellow, Brookings Institution

22. Peter Dutton, senior fellow, U.S.-Asia Law Institute; adjunct professor, New York University School of Law

23. Robert Einhorn, senior fellow, Brookings Institution; former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, 1999-2001

24. Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University

25. Thomas Fingar, Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University; former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, 2005-2008

26. Mary Gallagher, political science professor and director of the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan

27. John Gannon, adjunct professor, Georgetown University; former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 1997-2001

28. Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

29. Steven M. Goldstein, associate of the Fairbank Center; director of the Taiwan Studies Workshop at Harvard University

30. David F. Gordon, senior advisor, International Institute of Strategic Studies; former director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, 2007-2009

31. Philip H. Gordon, Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; former special assistant to the president and Coordinator for the Middle East and assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs

32. Morton H. Halperin, former director of Policy Planning Staff at State Department, 1998-2001

33. Lee Hamilton, former congressman; former president and director of the Wilson Center

34. Clifford A. Hart Jr., former U.S. consul general to Hong Kong and Macau, 2013-2016

35. Paul Heer, adjunct professor, George Washington University; former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, 2007-2015

36. Eric Heginbotham, principal research scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies

37. Ambassador Carla A. Hills, former United States Trade Representative, 1989-1993; chair & CEO Hills & Company, International Consultants

38. Jamie P. Horsley, senior fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School

39. Yukon Huang, senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

40. Frank Jannuzi, president and CEO, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

41. Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor and Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

42. Marvin Kalb, nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution

43. Mickey Kantor, former secretary of commerce,1996-1997; U.S. trade representative, 1993-1996

44. Robert Kapp, president, Robert A. Kapp & Associates, Inc.; former president, U.S.-China Business Council; former president, Washington Council on International Trade

45. Albert Keidel, adjunct graduate professor, George Washington University; former deputy director of the Office of East Asian Nations at the Treasury Department, 2001-2004

46. Robert O. Keohane, professor of International Affairs emeritus, Princeton University

47. William Kirby, Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University

48. Helena Kolenda, program director for Asia, Henry Luce Foundation

49. Charles Kupchan, professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

50. David M. Lampton, professor emeritus at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Oksenberg Rholen Fellow, Stanford University Asia-Pacific Research Center; former president, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

51. Nicholas Lardy, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics

52. Chung Min Lee, senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

53. Herbert Levin, former staff member for China on National Security Council and Policy Planning Council

54. Cheng Li, director and senior fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution

55. Kenneth Lieberthal, professor emeritus, University of Michigan; former Asia senior director, National Security Council, 1998-2000

56. Yawei Liu, director of China Program, The Carter Center

57. Jessica Mathews, distinguished fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

58. James McGregor, chairman, Greater China, APCO Worldwide

59. John McLaughlin, distinguished practitioner in residence, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University; former deputy director and acting director of the CIA, 2000-2004

60. Andrew Mertha, Hyman Professor and Director of the China Program, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University

61. Alice Lyman Miller, research fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

62. Mike Mochizuki, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur, George Washington University

63. Michael Nacht, Thomas and Alison Schneider Professor of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; former assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, 2009-2010

64. Moises Naim, distinguished fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

65. Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor emeritus and former dean, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University

66. Kevin O’Brien, political science professor and director of Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley

67. Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University

68. Stephen A. Orlins, president, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

69. William Overholt, senior research fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University

70. Douglas Paal, distinguished fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

71. Margaret M. Pearson, Dr. Horace V. and Wilma E. Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of Maryland, College Park

72. Peter C. Perdue, professor of history, Yale University

73. Elizabeth J. Perry , Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University; director, Harvard-Yenching Institute

74. Daniel W Piccuta, former deputy chief of mission and acting ambassador, Beijing

75. Thomas Pickering, former under secretary of state for political affairs, 1997-2000; former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 1989-1992

76. Paul R. Pillar , nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University

77. Jonathan D. Pollack, nonresident senior fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution

78. Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; director, MIT Security Studies Program

79. Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of East Asian Politics, Davidson College

80. Charles S. Robb, former U.S. senator (1989-2001) and former chairman of the East Asia subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; governor of Virginia from 1982 to 1986

81. Robert S. Ross, professor of political science, Boston College

82. Scott D. Sagan, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

83. Gary Samore, senior executive director, Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University

84. Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies

85. David Shear, former assistant secretary of defense, 2014-2016; former U.S. ambassador to Vietnam

86. Anne-Marie Slaughter, former director of policy planning, State Department, 2009-2011; Bert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University

87. Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

88. James Steinberg, former deputy secretary of state, 2009-2011

89. Michael Szonyi, Frank Wen-Hsiung Wu Memorial Professor of Chinese History Director, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University

90. Strobe Talbott, former deputy secretary of state, 1994-2001

91. Anne F. Thurston, former senior research professor, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University

92. Andrew G. Walder, Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University

93. Graham Webster, coordinating editor, Stanford-New America DigiChina Project

94. David A. Welch, University Research Chair, Balsillie School of International Affairs

95. Daniel B. Wright, president and CEO, GreenPoint Group; former managing director for China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue, Treasury Department

责编 | 袁航 陆沁欣

排版 | 王可

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