基式外交：伊拉克问题的关键是成果而非时间表 @《基式外交研究》2025年第9期

作者：亨利・A・基辛格、乔治・P・舒尔茨

来源：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第9期

文源：Kissinger, Henry A., and George P. Shultz. "Results, Not Timetables, Matter in Iraq." The Washington Post, January 25, 2005.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、中文翻译

关于伊拉克问题的争论正出现新的变化。原定于1月30日举行的伊拉克选举，就在不久前还被视为一个重要的阶段性成果，现在却被形容为引发内战的开端。选举的时间安排和投票方式都引发了争议。所有这些都预示着人们对一项撤离战略的需求，许多批评者所说的撤离战略，指的是对美国在伊拉克行动设定某种明确的时间限制。

我们不认同这种建议。“撤离战略”这个词的含义必须被清晰地理解，其后果不容敷衍。一项可接受的撤离战略的基本前提是取得可持续的成果，而不是一个随意设定的时间限制。因为伊拉克局势的结果将塑造美国未来十年的外交政策。如果在伊拉克遭遇失败，将会在该地区引发一系列动荡，因为激进分子和原教旨主义者会趁机争取主导权，而且他们似乎正得势。在任何有大量穆斯林人口的地方，激进分子都会受到鼓舞。当世界其他国家面对这一现实时，美国在伊拉克的混乱表现会削弱他们的方向感。美国仓促撤军几乎肯定会引发一场比南斯拉夫内战规模还要大的内战，而且随着邻国将目前的介入升级为全面干预，情况会变得更加复杂。

我们有责任明确：怎样的选举后格局既符合美国价值观，又能维护全球安全？我们也有责任为伊拉克人民努力争取一个能提升他们塑造自身未来能力的结果。

从具体层面来说，成功的要素相对容易界定：建立一个被伊拉克人民认为具有足够合法性的政府，这样才能招募一支有能力且愿意捍卫国家体制的军队。这个目标无法通过一个随意设定的最后期限来加快实现，因为这样的期限首先很可能会让盟友和敌人都感到困惑。政治努力和军事努力是不可分割的。历史证明，脱离政治土壤的单纯军事训练难以为继。军政任务必须双轨并进，否则将一事无成。

但这样的政府是什么样的呢？乐观主义者和理想主义者认为，在美国政治进程能够维持的时间框架内，可以建立一整套西方民主制度。但现实很可能会让这些期望落空。伊拉克是一个被几个世纪的宗教和民族冲突所撕裂的社会，它几乎没有或根本没有实行代议制机构的经验。面临的挑战是确定政治目标，即使这些目标达不到最高理想，却仍能代表重大进展，并获得各个不同民族群体的支持。因此，1月30日的选举应该被看作是从军事占领到实现政治合法性这一政治演变过程中不可或缺的第一步。

乐观主义者还认为，由于什叶派占人口的大约60%，库尔德人占15%到20%，而且这两个群体都不希望由逊尼派统治，所以几乎自然而然地就形成了一个民主多数派。按照这种观点，伊拉克什叶派领导人通过目睹邻国伊朗的什叶派神权统治下缺乏民主和世俗国家所带来的后果，已经认识到了民主化和世俗国家的好处。

一个由什叶派领导的多元化社会确实会是一个令人满意的结果。但我们必须小心，不能仅凭愿望就制定政策。如果民主进程要和平地统一伊拉克，在很大程度上取决于什叶派多数派如何定义多数统治。

到目前为止，那些精明的什叶派领导人在经历了萨达姆・侯赛因几十年的暴政后变得更加老练，他们对自己的目标一直含糊其辞。他们坚持提前举行选举——事实上，1月30日这个选举日期是基于最杰出的什叶派领导人、大阿亚图拉阿里・西斯塔尼近乎最后通牒式的要求确定的。什叶派还敦促采用基于全国候选人名单的投票程序，这不利于联邦和地区政治机构的发展。最近什叶派的声明肯定了建立世俗国家的目标，但对多数统治的解释却没有明确。绝对地实行多数统治将很难实现政治合法性，库尔德少数民族和伊拉克国内的逊尼派部分将永远处于反对地位。

西方民主是在同质化社会中发展起来的。少数群体认为多数统治是可以接受的，因为他们有成为多数群体的可能性，而且多数群体在行使权力时会受到其暂时地位以及司法保障的少数群体权利的限制。在少数群体的地位因宗教信仰而被永久确定，并且因民族差异和几十年的残酷独裁统治而更加复杂的情况下，这种平衡机制并不适用。在这种情况下，多数统治会被视为强者压迫弱者的另一种形式。在多民族社会中，少数群体的权利必须通过结构和宪法保障措施来保护。联邦制可以减轻多数群体在数量上可能出现的专断行为的影响，并在特定范围内界定自治权。

对顽固不化的逊尼派暴行的反应以及相对平静的什叶派局面，绝不能诱使我们将伊拉克的合法性等同于不受约束的什叶派统治。自1979年以来美国在伊朗经历的什叶派神权统治，并没有让我们对预测什叶派的发展演变或者什叶派主导的势力扩展到地中海地区的前景充满信心。一项深思熟虑的美国政策不会在一场激烈进行了一千年的宗教冲突中偏袒任何一方。

选举产生的制宪会议在一定程度上会拥有主权。但美国持续的影响力应该集中在四个关键目标上：

（1）防止任何团体利用政治进程建立逊尼派以前所享有的那种统治地位；

（2）防止任何地区陷入类似塔利班控制下的状况，成为恐怖分子的庇护所和招募中心；

（3）防止什叶派政府变成伊朗式的或本土的神权政体；

（4）在伊拉克的民主进程中为地区自治留出空间。

美国完全有理由与各方进行对话，以鼓励出现由民族主义者和地区代表组成的世俗领导力量。制宪的结果应该是建立一个联邦制国家，重点强调地区自治。任何提出超出这些界限要求的团体都应该明白，伊拉克国家分裂成各个组成部分会带来什么样的后果，包括伊朗控制的南部地区、伊斯兰主义者-侯赛因派逊尼派控制的中部地区，以及邻国对库尔德地区的入侵。

经过精心调整的美国政策将努力把渴望过上正常生活的逊尼派群体与试图重新建立逊尼派控制的群体区分开来。美国需要继续组建伊拉克军队，在逊尼派叛乱的情况下，这支军队将越来越多地由什叶派新兵组成——这会让拒绝接受现状的逊尼派陷入必败的境地。但必须把握分寸，绝不能以什叶派神权取代逊尼派独裁。这条微妙的平衡线，将决定伊拉克政策的成败。

在伊拉克新出现的政治机构的合法性在很大程度上取决于国际社会对新政府的认可。应该成立一个国际联络小组，就伊拉克的政治和经济重建提供建议。此举既是展现领导力的自信姿态，也符合美国持续提供安全与资金保障的现实需求。我们的欧洲盟友不能再继续对这一政治进程袖手旁观，无论他们对近期历史有何看法，这一进程对他们未来的影响甚至比对我们的影响更大，否则他们会让自己和传统联盟蒙羞。我们也不应该把印度和俄罗斯等拥有大量穆斯林人口的国家当作旁观者，因为伊拉克局势的发展很可能关系到这些国家的国内稳定。

在伊拉克建立起足够的安全保障之前，理想的政治目标仍将停留在理论层面。在政治暗杀、大规模屠杀和抢劫横行的氛围中，当从巴格达通往其国际机场的道路每天都发生恐怖主义或犯罪事件时，没有哪个政府能够长期维持公众的信心。训练、装备并激励一支有效的伊拉克武装部队是其他所有努力的前提条件。然而，无论训练和装备多么精良，那支军队如果对政府没有信心，就不会为其作战。这种恶性循环需要被打破。

不言而喻，游击队员如果不被打败就算是胜利。在伊拉克，游击队员没有被打败，至少在逊尼派地区是这样，至少从表面上看是这样。一项成功的战略需要回答这些问题：

我们是否正在进行一场军事和政治努力相互促进的“统一战争”？

指导和监督这些任务的机构是否充分协调？

我们的战略目标是否是在至少一些关键城镇和主要交通线路上实现完全的安全（定义为将暴力程度降低到历史犯罪水平）？这将符合这样一条准则，即在全国70%的地区实现完全安全要好于在全国100%的地区实现70%的安全——因为完全安全的地区可以成为那些处于不安全地区的人们的榜样和向往之地。

我们是否有一项政策来消除叙利亚和伊朗境内的庇护所，敌人可以在这些地方接受训练、获得补给、得到庇护并有时间重新集结？

我们是否正在制定一项能够为人民带来实际成果并防止为争夺国家控制权和石油收入而发生内乱的政策？

我们是否在维持美国公众的支持，以便在敌人实际上可能即将失败的时候，人为制造的极端暴力事件不会破坏国内公众的信心？

我们是否在获得国际社会的理解，并让他们愿意在这个对全球和平与安全构成威胁的问题上发挥建设性作用？

一项基于实际表现而非人为设定时间限制的撤离战略，将根据对这些问题能否给出肯定答案来判断进展情况。在近期内，很大一部分平叛工作将不得不由美国来承担。过早地从作战行动转向训练任务可能会留下一个缺口，让叛乱分子有机会重振旗鼓。但随着伊拉克军队数量和能力的增加，以及选举后政治建设的推进，一项现实可行的撤离战略将会出现。

没有什么神奇的公式能让我们迅速且平安无事地撤离。但我们有责任尽最大努力实现一个结果，这个结果将标志着在反恐战争中、在中东地区的转型以及在建立一个更加和平与民主的世界秩序方面迈出重大一步。

二、英语原文

The debate on Iraq is taking a new turn. The Iraqi elections scheduled for Jan. 30, only recently viewed as a culmination, are described as inaugurating a civil war. The timing and the voting arrangements have become controversial. All this is a way of foreshadowing a demand for an exit strategy, by which many critics mean some sort of explicit time limit on the U.S. effort.

We reject this counsel. The implications of the term “exit strategy” must be clearly understood; there can be no fudging of consequences. The essential prerequisite for an acceptable exit strategy is a sustainable outcome, not an arbitrary time limit. For the outcome in Iraq will shape the next decade of American foreign policy. A debacle would usher in a series of convulsions in the region as radicals and fundamentalists moved for dominance, with the wind seemingly at their backs. Wherever there are significant Muslim populations, radical elements would be emboldened. As the rest of the world related to this reality, its sense of direction would be impaired by the demonstration of American confusion in Iraq. A precipitate American withdrawal would be almost certain to cause a civil war that would dwarf Yugoslavia's, and it would be compounded as neighbors escalated their current involvement into full-scale intervention.

We owe it to ourselves to become clear about what post-election outcome is compatible with our values and global security. And we owe it to the Iraqis to strive for an outcome that can further their capacity to shape their future.

The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army able and willing to defend its institutions. That goal cannot be expedited by an arbitrary deadline that would be, above all, likely to confuse both ally and adversary. The political and military efforts cannot be separated. Training an army in a political vacuum has proved insufficient. If we cannot carry out both the political and military tasks, we will not be able to accomplish either.

But what is such a government? Optimists and idealists posit that a full panoply of Western democratic institutions can be created in a time frame the American political process will sustain. Reality is likely to disappoint these expectations. Iraq is a society riven by centuries of religious and ethnic conflicts; it has little or no experience with representative institutions. The challenge is to define political objectives that, even when falling short of the maximum goal, nevertheless represent significant progress and enlist support across the various ethnic groups. The elections of Jan. 30 should therefore be interpreted as the indispensable first phase of a political evolution from military occupation to political legitimacy.

Optimists also argue that, since the Shiites make up about 60 percent of the population and the Kurds 15 to 20 percent, and since neither wants Sunni domination, a democratic majority exists almost automatically. In that view, the Iraqi Shiite leaders have come to appreciate the benefits of democratization and the secular state by witnessing the consequences of their absence under the Shiite theocracy in neighboring Iran.

A pluralistic, Shiite-led society would indeed be a happy outcome. But we must take care not to base policy on the wish becoming father to the thought. If a democratic process is to unify Iraq peacefully, a great deal depends on how the Shiite majority defines majority rule.

So far the subtle Shiite leaders, hardened by having survived decades of Saddam Hussein's tyranny, have been ambiguous about their goals. They have insisted on early elections – indeed, the date of Jan. 30 was established on the basis of a near-ultimatum by the most eminent Shiite leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. The Shiites have also urged voting procedures based on national candidate lists, which work against federal and regional political institutions. Recent Shiite pronouncements have affirmed the goal of a secular state but have left open the interpretation of majority rule. An absolutist application of majority rule would make it difficult to achieve political legitimacy. The Kurdish minority and the Sunni portion of the country would be in permanent opposition.

Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards. Federalism mitigates the scope for potential arbitrariness of the numerical majority and defines autonomy on a specific range of issues.

The reaction to intransigent Sunni brutality and the relative Shiite quiet must not tempt us into identifying Iraqi legitimacy with unchecked Shiite rule. The American experience with Shiite theocracy in Iran since 1979 does not inspire confidence in our ability to forecast Shiite evolution or the prospects of a Shiite-dominated bloc extending to the Mediterranean. A thoughtful American policy will not mortgage itself to one side in a religious conflict fervently conducted for 1,000 years.

The Constituent Assembly emerging from the elections will be sovereign to some extent. But the United States' continuing leverage should be focused on four key objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

The United States has every interest in conducting a dialogue with all parties to encourage the emergence of a secular leadership of nationalists and regional representatives. The outcome of constitution-building should be a federation, with an emphasis on regional autonomy. Any group pushing its claims beyond these limits should be brought to understand the consequences of a breakup of the Iraqi state into its constituent elements, including an Iranian-dominated south, an Islamist-Hussein Sunni center and invasion of the Kurdish region by its neighbors.

A calibrated American policy would seek to split that part of the Sunni community eager to conduct a normal life from the part that is fighting to reestablish Sunni control. The United States needs to continue building an Iraqi army, which, under conditions of Sunni insurrection, will be increasingly composed of Shiite recruits – producing an unwinnable situation for the Sunni rejectionists. But it should not cross the line into replacing Sunni dictatorship with Shiite theocracy. It is a fine line, but the success of Iraq policy may depend on the ability to walk it.

The legitimacy of the political institutions emerging in Iraq depends significantly on international acceptance of the new government. An international contact group should be formed to advise on the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. Such a step would be a gesture of confident leadership, especially as America's security and financial contributions will remain pivotal. Our European allies must not shame themselves and the traditional alliance by continuing to stand aloof from even a political process that, whatever their view of recent history, will affect their future even more than ours. Nor should we treat countries such as India and Russia, with their large Muslim populations, as spectators to outcomes on which their domestic stability may well depend.

Desirable political objectives will remain theoretical until adequate security is established in Iraq. In an atmosphere of political assassination, wholesale murder and brigandage, when the road from Baghdad to its international airport is the scene of daily terrorist or criminal incidents, no government will long be able to sustain public confidence. Training, equipping and motivating effective Iraqi armed forces is a precondition to all the other efforts. Yet no matter how well trained and equipped, that army will not fight except for a government in which it has confidence. This vicious circle needs to be broken.

It is axiomatic that guerrillas win if they do not lose. And in Iraq the guerrillas are not losing, at least not in the Sunni region, at least not visibly. A successful strategy needs to answer these questions: Are we waging “one war” in which military and political efforts are mutually reinforcing? Are the institutions guiding and monitoring these tasks sufficiently coordinated? Is our strategic goal to achieve complete security in at least some key towns and major communication routes (defined as reducing violence to historical criminal levels)? This would be in accordance with the maxim that complete security in 70 percent of the country is better than 70 percent security in 100 percent of the country – because fully secure areas can be models and magnets for those who are suffering in insecure places. Do we have a policy for eliminating the sanctuaries in Syria and Iran from which the enemy can be instructed, supplied, and given refuge and time to regroup? Are we designing a policy that can produce results for the people and prevent civil strife for control of the state and its oil revenue? Are we maintaining American public support so that staged surges of extreme violence do not break domestic public confidence at a time when the enemy may, in fact, be on the verge of failure? And are we gaining international understanding and willingness to play a constructive role in what is a global threat to peace and security?

An exit strategy based on performance, not artificial time limits, will judge progress by the ability to produce positive answers to these questions. In the immediate future, a significant portion of the anti-insurrection effort will have to be carried out by the United States. A premature shift from combat operations to training missions might create a gap that permits the insurrection to rally its potential. But as Iraqi forces increase in number and capability, and as the political construction proceeds after the election, a realistic exit strategy will emerge.

There is no magic formula for a quick, non-catastrophic exit. But there is an obligation to do our utmost to bring about an outcome that will mark a major step forward in the war against terrorism, in the transformation of the Middle East and toward a more peaceful and democratic world order.