一屋子人用空调，为什么美国拿着遥控器？

　　Club提要：“美元对全球经济周期和利率周期的单边控制，就像大家同处一个有中央空调的房间，遥控器却被美国握在手里”。

　　在北京对话和联合国南方中心South Center共同主办、中国公共外交协会指导的“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会上，中国人民大学区域国别研究院院长、北京对话特约专家翟东升教授以上述比喻，批评美元霸权。

　　翟东升提出，全球货币体系应回归“硬锚”，建立一种新的可兑付货币，以实现更公平合理的全球金融秩序。他并从历史角度审视了世界经济分裂的可能性，并以苏联经济为例，强调建立平行经济体系的重要性。

　　8月下旬，北京对话将邀请国内外专家继续就“金砖国家与多极世界构建”展开对话。为了更好地承上启下，我们精选部分特约专家在五月份研讨会上的发言，以中英文形式陆续发布。‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍

　　以下为翟东升发言：

　　翟东升在“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会发言 （图源：北京对话）

　　首先我要回应一下今天的主题，当前货币体系的缺陷。正巧，我曾撰写过相关的论文，并且在教授的一门课中详细探讨了这个主题。当前货币体系的主要特点及其形成可以追溯到1971年的一次违约。这一体系并非通过合法的国际组织、谈判、协议形成，而是由于美国在1971年单方面采取的行动所导致的。

　　二战后，44个国家签署并认可了布雷顿森林体系，该体系以黄金作为“硬锚”。如今使用各国货币进行兑付只能兑付到美元，但在1945年至1971年间，持有美元的人还可以按照固定价格兑换黄金。因此，尽管这一规则存在逻辑缺陷，但其合法性是得到国际协议认可的。然而在1971年，美国尼克松政府单方面进行了所谓的“软违约”，宣布“暂时关闭黄金窗口”。尽管当时美国强调关闭是“暂时”的，但事实上这一状态到现在已持续了半个多世纪。如今的体系可以说是不合法的，它没有得到任何国家的官方认可。这是我想强调的第一点。

　　在“软违约”之后，世界进入了复杂的互动博弈阶段。如今，全球货币秩序有两个显著特点：第一，主权货币主要是美元，成为全球储备资产。其他货币，如欧元、日元和英镑，在一定程度上也具有储备功能。这种分布呈幂律分布，主要特点是一种货币占据绝大部分，其余依次递减。第二，现代货币与实际商品或资产脱钩，即不可兑付。换言之，现在持有美元已无法在美联储兑换黄金。

　　这两个特点塑造了今天经济金融世界的诸多奇怪现象。例如，每当美国经济出现问题，美元反而上涨，而非下跌。就如同一个将死之人，其信用没有崩塌反而大涨。这些反直觉现象源自上述两个结构性缺陷。我用一个比喻来形容这种不公平性：假设我们在一个大房间里，有中央空调，但遥控器在我手中。我根据个人喜好调控温度，忽视他人的感受。问题在于遥控器和空调都是公器，却被我一个人霸占。这就好比全球经济周期取决于美国的债务周期，全球利率周期取决于美联储的利率周期。我认为，抛开所有这些金融学的专业术语，这个比喻可以更清楚地解释当前这种安排的不合理性和它的危害。

　　另一个不公平之处在于，全世界的钱，本质上储存在美国的主权信用里，即你们辛勤劳动所赚的钱都在我的口袋里，我需要时可以随时支取，无需你们同意。例如，在新冠疫情期间，美国、欧洲应对疫情不力，但经济却依旧繁荣，一个主要原因就是因为美国、欧洲、英国、日本这四大央行的资产负债表扩张了10万亿美元。相当于我在替大家保管钱时挪用大家的钱支付我自己的巨额账单。这10亿人口占全世界80亿人的一小部分，但是他可以随意的支取其它国家的人的钱，在这两年里每人平均支取1万美元。

　　基于以上论述，我与IMF特别提款权部门的长期负责人沃伦·科茨博士合写了一篇英文论文，主张全球货币体系应回归“硬锚”，即建立一个可兑付的、有硬锚的新货币。我们两个人一个是忠诚的美国共和党人，一个是忠诚的中国共产党人，但是我们可以在这个问题上达成一致。这种新货币将使全球货币体系更加公平合理，长期来看对美国也是有利的。虽然短期内美国享有特权，但长期将导致其产业空心化、经济泡沫化及社会分裂。

　　当前国际形势为我们提供了一个良好的机会之窗，以金砖国家为抓手，加上上海合作组织，以及“一带一路”沿线国家，甚至欧洲、美洲国家，共同推进一个新的、可兑付、有硬锚的货币单位。

　　刚才有老师提到大宗商品加权平均，这是一个可行的做法。这一新货币关联的商品可以包括黄金、白银等贵金属，以及钢、铝、锂、镍等卑金属，以及其它所有可以在大宗交易市场兑付的大宗商品。持有该货币的人可以在相应网络中按照固定价格兑换大宗商品，其他货币如人民币，卢布，卢比将参照该货币浮动。这种货币可以用于贸易和债权债务结算，避免基准单位被敌对国家或者怀有恶意的国家操控。具体利益分享和责任分担需进一步讨论，但必须强调的一点是不能只有一个国家说了算或者有一票否决权。另外铸币税分享机制也尤为重要，是另一个重中之重。

　　最后我还想谈论一下对这个想法的反对意见，及对其反驳。最常见的一种反对意见认为，这个想法已经有前车之鉴了，类似欧元一体化的失败会重演。理由就是一个地区货币一体化了，但财政没有一体化，两者之间的这种不匹配将会导致危机。但我认为金砖币并非金砖国家货币一体化，而是一种防御性做法，是对当前不合理和潜在危机的边际改善。很显然它不是一个能让从此以后世界太平的方案，而是一个面对当下的不合理和潜在的危机的一些防御性的安排。各个国家的货币仍然存在，各国并没有放弃自己的货币主权，只不过创造了一种新的工具，避免美元和美元相关的支付体系，金融体系潜在带来的权利和伤害。

　　翟东升在“会议一：当前全球货币金融体系的缺陷”与其他专家交流（图源：北京对话）

　　自由问答环节：

　　刚才几位老师的提问都涉及到我所说的遥控器的比喻，我在这里再稍作回应。一个是李世默的观点，认为遥控器为美国带来了巨大的益处。一个非常准确的描述是，美国曾经是一个伟大、甚至是最伟大的制造业国家，但正是由于这样的美元化全球货币体系，其虚拟经济环境反过来重塑了其实体经济。今天，美国成为一个庞大的金融帝国，但制造业占比大幅下降。目前，其制造业就业人口仅占总就业人口的8%，并且自2008年以来一直稳定在这一水平，尽管采取了各种措施却未能反弹。

　　因此，可以说美国经济已经对这种货币霸权上瘾。曾经“肌肉发达”的它现在变得“脂肪堆积”，而为了维持这种舒适的生活，它必然会努力维持货币霸权。就像Marco刚才提到的那样，他们的反抗是完全可以理解的。而且尽管我刚才强调，我们创建一个新的、有实物可兑付、无法轻易违约的货币单位看起来是防御性的措施，但实际上它客观上具有进攻性和破坏性效果。因为一旦这个货币单位被创建出来并稳定运行一段时间后，连华尔街的大家族，包括控制美联储的或对美联储有投票权和分红权的大家族，也会将部分资金投入这种资产，因为这对他们是一个巨大的诱惑。

　　另外，我想再补充一点，根据我的研究，在没有硬锚的货币体系中，也就是过去五十年的货币体系，谁的主权债务越大，谁的金融越安全。因此，债务率越高越安全，债多不愁。而且这种债务必须是以本币计价的国债，越多越安全，越少越不安全。但是，如果我们将规则改变为可兑付的、有硬锚的货币体系，整个逻辑就会反转。债权人将拥有巨大的权力，而债务人的债务越多越麻烦。这是一个规则的重大变化。可惜的是，在我读过的金融学教科书里，没有老师明确指出这一点。这也可以理解，因为中国的金融学教科书和经济学教科书主要是翻译自英语，而英语教科书中的知识构造许多停留在金本位时代的逻辑之下。这是我想补充的第一点。

　　第二点，关于龚刚老师提到的经济循环问题。我最近正带领一个小团队研究苏联经济。因为我们正重新面对一种可能性，尽管我们中国人不愿意，但不得不面对这种可能性，即世界经济正在分裂。那么分裂之后会怎么样？前几年我出版了一本书，叫做《平行与竞争》，可能是最近一轮中文世界中较早提出平行体系、再造平行体系的书。经过研究，我惊讶地发现，苏联从未建成平行体系。只有在斯大林的最后几年里，他试图建设一个平行的经济体系。但赫鲁晓夫上台后立刻飞到戴维营去和美国谈和平竞争。结果就是苏联失败垮台，因而才有今天的俄乌冲突。苏联的失败恰恰在于当年毛泽东提出的建议未被采纳。毛泽东曾建议，东风压倒西风，苏联要多少个师中国都可以提供。赫鲁晓夫在回忆录中写道，他当时回应毛泽东说在核武器时代这个想法是错误的，一百个师、一千个师在核武器时代都是炮灰。现在回过头来看，我认为毛泽东其实是正确的。核武器不能真正使用。它只有在核国家对无核国家时有核讹诈功能，但在核大国之间是无法使用的。假如当年赫鲁晓夫听从了毛泽东的意见，可能垮台的根本不会是苏联。

以下为英文全文：

First, I would like to respond to today’s topic: the flaws in the current monetary system. It so happens that I have written papers on this subject and have taught a course that studies this topic in detail. The main characteristics of the current monetary system can be traced back to its formation in 1971 due to a “default”. This system was not formed through legitimate international organizations, negotiations, or agreements, but rather was the result of unilateral actions taken by the United States in 1971.

After World War II, 44 countries signed and recognized the Bretton Woods system, which used gold as a “hard anchor”. Today, various national currencies can only be exchanged for US dollars. However, from 1945 to 1971, holders of the US dollar could also convert them to gold at a fixed price. Therefore, despite the logical flaws in this system, its legality was recognized by international agreements. However, the Nixon Administration unilaterally conducted a so-called “soft default” and announced the “temporary suspension of convertibility into gold” in 1971. Although the US emphasized at the time that the suspension was “temporary”, this state of affairs has actually gone on for more than half a century. The current system can be said to be illegitimate, as it has not been officially recognized by any country. This is the first point I want to emphasize.

After the soft default, the world entered an era of complex geopolitical jostling. Today, the global monetary order has two notable characteristics. First, sovereign currencies, in particular the US dollar, have become global reserve assets. Other currencies such as the euro, yen, and pound also have serve as reserve currencies to some extent. Their relative usage follows a power-law distribution, where the US dollar holds the dominant position, followed by others in exponentially decreasing order. Second, exchange rates are floating and fiat. Modern currencies are decoupled from actual goods or assets, meaning they are fiat. In other words, US dollars holders can no longer exchange for gold at the Federal Reserve. These two characteristics lead to many peculiar phenomena in today’s economic and financial world. For example, whenever the US economy encounters problems, the US dollar appreciates instead of depreciating. It’s as if a dying person’s credit does not collapse but soars instead. These counterintuitive phenomena stem from the two structural flaws mentioned above. Let me use an analogy to describe this unfair situation: imagine we are in a large room with central air conditioning, but I hold the remote control. I adjust the temperature according to my personal preference, ignoring others’ feelings. The problem is that both the remote control and the air conditioner are public goods but are used for my personal preferences. Basically, the global economic cycle depends on the US debt cycle, and the global interest rate cycle depends on the US Federal Reserve’s interest rate cycle. I believe that by setting aside financial jargon, this analogy can drive home the illogical and dangerous nature of the current arrangement.

Another unfair aspect lies in the fact that the world’s money is essentially stored in the US sovereign credit. Thats is, the money earned through your hard work is in America’s pocket, they can withdraw it whenever they need it, without your consent. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, while the US and Europe have responded poorly to the pandemic, their economies remained prosperous. One main reason is that the central banks of the US, Europe, UK, and Japan expanded their balance sheets by $10 trillion. It’s as if I embezzle the money I was safeguarding for everyone to pay my own huge bills. This group of one billion people, a small part of the world’s eight billion, can freely withdraw money from others, getting an average of $10,000 per person over two years.

Based on the above, I co-authored an English paper with Dr. Warren Coats, the long-term head of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights department. We advocated that the global monetary system should return to a “hard anchor” by establishing a new currency that is redeemable and anchored to real goods. Despite our different political backgrounds—he is a loyal American Republican, and I am a loyal Chinese Communist—we reached a consensus on this issue. This new currency would make the global monetary system fairer and more reasonable, and in the long run, it would benefit the US as well. Although the US currently enjoys short-term privileges, it will lead to industrial hollowing, economic bubbles, and social division in the long run.

The current international situation provides us with a good opportunity. By starting with BRICS countries at the core, with the addition of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the countries along the Belt and Road, and even inviting interested countries from Europe and the Americas, we can jointly promote a new currency unit that is redeemable and hard-anchored.

Professor Cao mentioned a feasible approach of weighted average of commodities. This new currency could be linked to commodities such as gold, silver, and other precious metals, as well as base metals like steel, aluminum, lithium, and nickel, and other commodities tradable in bulk commodity markets. Holders of this currency could legally exchange a basket of commodities at a fixed price within a corresponding network. Other currencies, including the RMB, Ruble, and Rupee, would float relative to this new currency. This baseline currency could be used for trade and debt settlement, avoiding manipulation or control by a hostile or malicious country. The specific distribution of benefits and sharing of responsibilities need further technical discussions, but it must be emphasized that it is not acceptable for just one country to have the final say or veto power. Another crucial point is a mechanism for sharing of seigniorage, which is of paramount importance.

Finally, I want to address objections to this idea and my rebuttal to that. The most common objection is concern that this would just repeat the failure of the Euro integration, where regional currency integration without fiscal integration leads to crises. However, I believe that the BRICS currency is not trying to integrate the BRICS countries’ currencies. It is a defensive measure rather than an offensive one, a marginal improvement to address the current illogical situation and avert potential crises. It is clear that this is not designed to solve every problem forever, but a defensive measure to address the present illogical situation and avert potential crises. Each country’s currency would still exist, and countries would not give up their monetary sovereignty. Instead, a new tool would be created to avoid the potential dangers and harms brought by the dollar and the dollar-based payment and financial systems.

Several of your questions addressed my analogy regarding a remote control, so I would like to respond further. One point is from Eric, who believes that the remote control has brought enormous benefits to the United States. A more precise description is that the United States was once a great, even the greatest, manufacturing country. However, due to the dollarized global monetary system, its financial economy has reshaped its real economy. Today, the US has become a major financial empire, but the relative contribution of its manufacturing sector has significantly decreased. Currently, its manufacturing employment accounts for only 8% of total employment, and has remained stable at this level since 2008, despite various measures that have been taken to stimulate it.

Thus, it can be said that the US economy is addicted to this dollar hegemony. The U.S. was once “muscular”, but it has now become “fat-laden”. To maintain this comfortable lifestyle, it inevitably strives to maintain dollar hegemony. As Marco mentioned earlier, their resistance is entirely understandable. Although our creation of a new, non-fiat, and non-defaultable currency unit appears to be a defensive measure, it actually has offensive attributes. Once this currency unit is created and operates stably for some time, even the major families on Wall Street, including those who control the Federal Reserve or have voting rights and dividend rights in the Federal Reserve, will also invest part of their funds in this asset, because it looks very attractive.

Additionally, I want to add one more point. According to my research, in a monetary system without a hard anchor, which describes the world’s monetary system over the past 50 years, rising sovereign debt makes your financial system more secure. Hence, the higher the debt ratio, the more secure it is, and the less you need to be worried about it. Also, this debt must be government bonds denominated in your own currency—the more, the safer, and vice versa. However, if we change into a redeemable, hard-anchored monetary system, the entire logic reverses. Creditors will have enormous power, and the more debtors owe, the more trouble they run into. This would be a significant change in the rules. Unfortunately, in the financial textbooks I have read, no one has explicitly pointed this out. This is also understandable, because China’s financial and economic textbooks are mainly translated from English, and the logic within English textbooks largely carries over from the time of the gold standard era. This is the first point I want to add.

The second point concerns the economic cycle mentioned by Professor Gong Gang. Recently, I have been leading a small team to study the Soviet economy. We are facing a possibility, a possibility that we Chinese do not like but have to confront: the world economy is decoupling. What will happen after this split? A few years ago, I published a book called “Parallel Competition”, which might be one of the earlier books in the Chinese world to propose the idea of parallel systems and rebuilding parallel systems. Through my research, I was surprised to find that the Soviet Union never built a parallel system. Only in Stalin’s final years did he attempt to build a parallel economic system. But once Khrushchev came to power, he immediately flew to Camp David to negotiate peaceful competition with the U.S. The result was the failure and collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to today’s Russia-Ukraine conflict. The failure of the Soviet Union lies precisely in Khrushchev’s failure to adopt Mao Zedong’s suggestions. Mao Zedong had proposed that, as “the East wind prevails over the West wind”, China was willing to provide as many divisions as the Soviet Union needed. As Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, his response to Mao was that in the nuclear age, Mao’s idea was wrong, even hundreds or thousands of divisions would end up as just cannon fodder in the nuclear age. Looking back now, I think Mao Zedong was actually right. Nuclear weapons cannot be used; they can only be used for nuclear blackmail by nuclear-weapon states over states without nuclear weapon, but they cannot be used between nuclear powers. If Khrushchev had followed Mao’s advice back then, the Soviet Union might not have collapsed at all.

（翻译：王樟宸）