不只是“去美元”：全球南方如何“自造”新货币

Club提要：在霍尔木兹海峡受阻引发的全球能源冲击下，美元体系脆弱性进一步暴露。新开发银行前副行长、经济学家巴蒂斯塔 （Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.）为北京对话撰文指出，应加快探索一种不依附单一国家的新型国际储备货币，由全球南方联合创建发行，以货币与国债篮子为支撑，保障稳定与制度独立。尽管面临地缘政治阻力，但在能源与金融双重不确定性上升背景下，替代路径已具现实紧迫性。

保罗·诺盖拉·巴蒂斯塔（Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.）经济学家、作家。他曾于2015年至2017年担任金砖国家在上海设立的新开发银行副行长，并于2007年至2015年在华盛顿担任国际货币基金组织执行董事，代表巴西及其他10个国家。图为他在2025年7月由北京对话与巴西金砖国家政策中心（BRICS Policy Center)联合主办的“里约-北京对话会”上致闭幕辞（图源：北京对话）

（翻译｜潘佳怡， 核译｜韩桦）

是否有可能且有必要创造一种新的国际货币，作为美元的替代？这一问题具有争议性。许多人认为这不可能，另一些人则认为不可取。我属于少数派，认为这不仅是可能的，而且是可取的，甚至或许是不可或缺的。

我曾多次撰文讨论创建一种新的储备货币，最早可以追溯至两年多前，即2023年8月，题为《一种金砖国家货币？》（A BRICS currency?），发表于俄罗斯高等经济学院《当代世界经济》（Contemporary World Economy Journal ）期刊。随后，我于今年4月完成的论文中对这一提案进行了更为完整和系统的阐释（《地缘政治与国际货币——通向一种新储备货币的路径》（Geopolitics and International Money – A Path to a New Reserve Currency，尚未发表）。

本文将概述这一构想的一些主要方面。这是一种创新性的替代方案，应当接受批评性审视，因为它显然仍有待改进与修订。

世界货币（图源：remitly）

在近几个世纪的世界货币史中，国际货币的角色主要由国家货币承担。某一种或少数几种由国家中央银行（或在欧元的情况下，由区域性中央银行）发行和管理的货币，曾经并且仍然充当国际货币。由于发行国或发行集团的国家或区域目标通常并不与其他国家的目标一致，因此，国际货币能够恰当地服务于其他国家利益，只是一种偶然情形。

事实上，我们所需要的是一种在实践中没有先例的事物：一种不承担国家职能的国际货币，正如我将尝试说明的那样。但首先，我将简要表明，当今世界并不存在可用或有效的替代方案。

排除替代方案

我们现有的替代方案要么不便利，要么缺乏现实可行性。例如，一种可能的情形是继续生活在以美元为主导（并以欧元为次要支撑）的体系之中。但这并不符合全球南方新兴国家的利益。美元体系效率低下、不可靠，甚至具有危险性。它已经成为勒索与制裁的工具。此外，作为这一霸权货币发行者的美国，其货币、财政与金融基础的脆弱性正日益显现。

长期以来，美国经常利用美元在国际货币体系中的霸权地位，转嫁国内危机，收割世界财富，损害他国经济金融稳定和民众福祉。美元霸权已成为威胁世界经济的重要不稳定因素（图源：新华社）

美元是否可以至少在一定程度上被其他全球北方货币所取代？这种情形同样不可行，尤其是在大规模层面上。欧元面临与美元相同的问题，因为它同样已被扭曲为制裁工具。而欧洲的经济状况甚至比美国更加严峻。日本日元也存在类似问题：日元从未在国际上扮演过重要角色，此外，日本经济表现不佳，难以激发信心。全球北方的其他货币，要么规模过小（例如瑞士法郎、加拿大元或澳大利亚元），要么受到其发行国经济弱点的制约（例如英国）。

另一方面，由于价格的剧烈波动，黄金无法取代美元，除非是在有限程度上作为中央银行及其他经济主体的储备资产。尽管如此，鉴于对美元的广泛不安，国际储备（无论官方还是私人）的构成已经在发生变化，其结果是黄金价格的飙升。

唯一在一定程度上具有可行性的情形，是中国货币的大规模国际化。人民币在国际舞台上的重要性已经上升，这反映了中国经济权重的增长。但在其能够在实质意义上取代美元之前，仍有很长的路要走。而中国方面对此路径持审慎态度。

原因何在？这一问题较为复杂。此处作一简要概述。若要使人民币国际化成为可行路径，至少需要两个前提条件：自由可兑换以及允许汇率大幅升值的意愿。中国政府在这两点上均持保守态度，而这种态度具有其合理性。在中国的情境下，自由可兑换在本质上意味着取消资本管制，而资本管制在过去数十年一直是中国经济政策的核心要素之一，并在很大程度上促成了其经济稳定。与此同时，人民币的外部升值将削弱出口竞争力，而出口正是中国经济活力的主要来源之一。此外，在中国当前经历批发价格通缩与消费者价格接近零通胀的背景下，人民币的大幅升值存在将经济推入通缩陷阱并伴随衰退风险的可能。正如足球中的说法，为何要对一支正在获胜的球队进行干预？

4月14日，国务院新闻办公室举行新闻发布会，海关总署副署长王军，海关总署新闻发言人、统计分析司司长吕大良介绍2026年一季度进出口情况。海关总署14日发布数据显示，2026年一季度我国货物贸易进出口总值11.84万亿元，同比增长15%，季度规模首超11万亿元的同时，季度增速创近5年最高（图源：新华社）

即便中国有意愿或有能力走上其货币广泛国际化的道路，仍然存在一个问题：从其他全球南方国家的视角来看，这是否只是“以一换一”？另一种国家货币——人民币——将取代美元所留下的空间。中国人民银行这一国家中央银行将取代美联储，人民币将部分或全部替代美元，而中国将大规模发行一种国际储备资产。世界其他国家仍将继续经历我们当下面对的与美元及其中央银行相关的问题，尽管这种状况或许会有所缓和。

换言之：存在创造一种新型储备货币的空间。任何提案（且路径不止一种）都将面临地缘政治问题（根本上是来自美国的阻力）以及技术性问题（构建能够为新货币生成信任的制度与运作结构并非易事）。然而，应对这一挑战具有必要性，尤其是在未来数年甚至数月内，西方资本市场再次爆发重大金融危机的可能性无法被排除，例如与人工智能和科技公司相关的股票泡沫破裂。一旦发生此类情形，美国经济及其货币——本已处于削弱状态——将面临进一步加速的衰退。届时，各方都将急于寻找解决方案。因此，尽早展开对替代路径的讨论更为适宜。

2025年12月，国际货币基金组织(IMF)官员在北京结束为期十天的访华行程时表示，中国应允许人民币升值，并更多地依赖国内消费者支出，而不是不断增长的出口（图源：纽约时报中文网）

一种可能的路径

通向一种新货币的最佳路径是什么？

在理论上，一种方式是以黄金为新货币提供支撑，正如俄罗斯经济学家所建议的那样。然而，据我所知，这些经济学家尚未解决这一替代方案所涉及的问题——尤其是如下问题：在以一种本质上高度不稳定的资产为支撑的情况下，如何赋予一种新货币以稳定性？对此或许存在解决方案，但如果确有其事，我尚未获知。

在我看来，以另一种方式为新货币提供支撑会更为适宜。下面加以说明。我将对若干关键方面作一简要讨论。

谁来创造这一新货币？在当前国际情势下，只有一种可能——由全球南方国家组成的一个国家集团，大致为15至20个国家，其中包括大多数金砖国家以及其他新兴中等收入国家。

这一国家集团是否可以将新货币的发行委托给现有机构之一？不能，没有任何现有机构能够高效且可靠地承担这一任务。

因此，有必要创建一个新的国际金融机构——一个发行银行，其唯一且专属的职能是发行并投放这一新货币。该发行银行不会取代各国中央银行，其货币将与发起国集团各国的本币以及世界上其他现存的国家或区域货币并行流通。它将被限定用于国际交易，不承担国内职能。因此，与通常所说不同，它并非一种类似欧元的货币，即并非一种由单一中央银行发行、并取代既有欧洲各国货币（如德国马克、法国法郎、意大利里拉等）的单一货币。

如何确保一种货币的成功？是什么使一种新货币得到广泛使用？关键在于建立信任，而信任取决于这一新货币安排在制度层面的构建方式。

在我看来，最具可行性的路径将包括以下若干法律性保障：1）新货币价值的稳定性；2）其不被用作对国家实施制裁或施压的工具；3）发行银行的运作自主性；4）其发行规模的上限；5）以发起国政府债券篮子作为该货币的支撑。

我对这五点作一极为简要的说明。

第一点：该货币将基于参与国货币的加权篮子，因此其价值将随这些货币的变动而波动。由于篮子中的所有货币均为浮动或弹性汇率，该新货币也将是一种浮动货币。篮子中的权重将依据各国按购买力平价计算的GDP在发起国集团总GDP中的占比确定。

鉴于中国在总体中至少占40%至45%的比重（具体取决于集团构成），可以预期该货币的汇率将相对稳定。人民币在篮子中的较高权重将提供一定程度的稳定性，因为中国货币本身具有稳定性。此外，还存在一个内生性的稳定因素：篮子中同时包含大宗商品出口国与进口国，分别处于大宗商品价格周期的相对两端。这些内生稳定因素还可以通过外生方式得到强化，例如规定加权平均采用几何平均并进行对称截尾处理。对于波动超过预设范围的货币，将被暂时排除出篮子。

2015年12月1日，国际货币基金组织（IMF）正式宣布将人民币纳入特别提款权（SDR）货币篮子，新的SDR篮子将于2016年10月1日生效。人民币与美元、欧元、日元、英镑4种货币一道，共同成为IMF的国际储备货币（图源：《人民日报》）

第二点：明确承诺不诉诸制裁，将与美元和欧元被滥用于惩罚与勒索所带来的不安全性形成对比。这一法律性保障将通过发行银行的运作自主性得到强化。

第三点，运作自主性，将通过赋予银行行长和副行长相对较长的任期（例如五年）来实现。这将传递出一个信号，即该银行不会轻易受到其创建者的政治干预与外交操作。这种自主性在所有或几乎所有国际金融组织中均有所保障。它并不能完全防止干预，但具有其价值。该机构的管理应由发起国在理事会与董事会中的指定代表进行监督并承担问责，但这种监督与问责应通过正常的制度渠道实现，而非通过对行长及副行长施加个别压力。

第四点，对银行流通货币总量设定上限，将为防止过度发行提供一定程度的保护。因此，这一新货币将具备西方及其他货币所不具备的一种约束机制。

然而，这一上限只是次要工具，更为关键的是新货币的支撑方式。因此第五点：将发起国以及未来加入国家的国债篮子界定为该体系的支撑基础。发行银行将发行新的储备货币（NRC）以及新的储备债券（NRB），其利率将具有吸引力，因为它们反映参与国债券的利率，而这些利率普遍高于以美元和欧元计价的债券利率。NRC将可以完全兑换为NRB，而NRB又可以进一步兑换为参与国债券篮子。由一个经济基础稳健的国家所发行、且在篮子中占据较高权重的中国货币，将有助于增强对NRC支撑机制的信心，同时也有助于稳定该货币的平均汇率。

位于上海浦东新区世博园区的金砖国家新开发银行总部大楼（图源：新华社）

西方的反应

该提案存在其自身的脆弱性，这些问题已在刚刚完成的论文中得到详细讨论。为避免本文过于冗长，我不在此展开所有这些薄弱环节。我仅强调其中我认为最为严重的一点——这一倡议可能引发西方的负面反应，其可能对参与创建美元与欧元替代方案的国家诉诸威胁与制裁。

这一风险是现实存在的。处于明显衰退之中的西方，比以往任何时期都更为任意且更具暴力性。

然而，我们需要提出的问题是：我们是否将无限期地生活在这一由西方自第二次世界大战以来所构建的货币与金融体系之中——一个日益失灵、并被反复作为地缘政治工具加以使用和滥用的体系？抑或我们将汇聚经济、政治与智识资源，从这一困境中脱身？

未来数年将表明，全球南方国家是否具备应对这一挑战的能力。

3月26日，美国财政部宣布，特朗普总统的签名将于今年晚些时候出现在美元纸币上（图源：纽约时报中文网）

以下为英文原文：

The Global South needs a new international reserve currency

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.

The author is an economist, researcher and writer. He was vice president of the New Development Bank, established by the BRICS in Shanghai, from 2015 to 2017, and executive director at the IMF for Brazil and 10 other countries in Washington, from 2007 to 2015. 

Is it possible and desirable to create a new international currency as an alternative to the United States dollar? The topic is controversial. Many believe that it is not possible, others that it is not desirable. I am part of the minority that believes that it is not only possible, but desirable and perhaps indispensable.

I have written a number of  times about the creation of a new reserve currency, beginning more than two years ago, in August 2023, under the title "A BRICS currency?", published in Russia by the Contemporary World Economy Journal of the Higher School of Economics. Since then, I have developed the proposal in a more complete and comprehensive way in a paper concluded in April 2026 (“Geopolitics and International Money – A Path to a New Reserve Currency”, April 2026, unpublished).

In the present article, I will summarize some of the main aspects of the idea. It is an innovative alternative that should be subjected to criticism, as it certainly needs improvements and revision. 

In the world monetary history of recent centuries, the role of international currency has been played mainly by national currencies. One or a few currencies, issued and managed by national central banks (or by a regional one, in the case of the euro), served and serve as international currency. Since the national or regional objectives of the issuing country or countries do not usually coincide with those of the others, it is only by chance that the international currency will adequately serve the interests of other nations. 

We need, in fact, something that has no practical precedent: an international currency that does not perform national functions, as I will try to explain. But first, I quickly show that there are no available or efficient alternatives in the world today. 

Discarding alternatives 

The alternatives we have are either inconvenient or unlikely. One possible scenario, for example, would be to continue living with the system dominated by the dollar (and secondarily by the euro). But this does not suit the emerging countries of the Global South. The dollar system is inefficient, unreliable and even dangerous. It has become an instrument of blackmail and sanctions. In addition, the precariousness of the monetary, fiscal and financial foundations of the US economy, the issuer of the hegemonic currency, is becoming increasingly clear. 

Could the dollar be replaced, at least in part, by other currencies of the Global North? This other scenario is also not feasible, not in a large scale. The euro suffers from the same problems as the dollar, since it has also been distorted as an instrument of sanctions. And Europe's economic situation is even more problematic than that of the US. The Japanese yen has similar problems. The yen never played a major international role; in addition, the Japanese economy is not doing well and does not inspire confidence. The other currencies of the Global North are either too small (Swiss franc, Canadian dollar or Australian dollar, for example) or suffer from the weaknesses of the economies of the countries that issue them (the United Kingdom, for example). Gold, in turn, given the intense volatility of its price, is not able to replace the dollar, except partially, as a reserve asset for central banks and other economic agents. Nevertheless, the change in the composition of international reserves, official and private, has already been happening, given widespread nervousness about the dollar. The result has been an explosion in the price of gold. 

The only scenario that may present some viability would be the large-scale internationalization of the Chinese currency. The renminbi has become more important on the world stage, reflecting the growing weight of the Chinese economy. But there is a long way to go before it can replace the dollar in a significant way. And the Chinese are reluctant to try. 

Why? The subject is complex. I try to summarize. For the internationalization of the Chinese currency to be viable, there would be at least two preconditions: free convertibility and the willingness to allow a large exchange rate appreciation. The Chinese government is hesitant on both of these points – and rightly so. In the Chinese case, free convertibility would essentially mean removing capital controls, a central element of China's economic policy in recent decades, which has greatly contributed to its stability. The external appreciation of the renminbi, in turn, would threaten the competitiveness of exports, one of the main sources of dynamism in the Chinese economy. Moreover, since China has been experiencing deflation (in wholesale prices) and inflation very close to zero (in consumer prices), a sharp rise of the renminbi risks landing the economy in a deflationary trap with the associated risk of recession. As they say in football, why mess with a team that is winning?

Even if the Chinese wanted or could follow the path of broad internationalization of their currency, one question remains: from the point of view of the other countries of the Global South, wouldn't we be exchanging six for half a dozen? Another national currency, the renminbi, would occupy the space left by the dollar. The People's Bank of China, another national central bank, would replace the U.S. Federal Reserve, the renminbi would replace the dollar, in part or in full, and China would issue an international reserve asset on a large scale. The rest of the world would continue to experience, albeit perhaps in a milder way, the problems we already face today with the U.S. dollar and central bank. 

In other words: there is room to create a new reserve currency. Any proposal (there is more than one possible path) will face geopolitical problems (fundamentally US resistance) and technical problems (it is not easy to build the institutional and operational structure capable of generating confidence in the new currency). But facing the challenge seems necessary, not least because it cannot be ruled out that another major financial crisis in Western capital markets will occur in the coming years or even months, such as the bursting of the stock bubble associated with artificial intelligence and technology companies. If this happens, the US economy and the dollar, already weakened, will face an acceleration of their decline. Everyone will be scrambling for a solution. It is better, therefore, to discuss alternatives without delay.

A possible path  

What would be the best path to a new currency? 

One way, in theory, would be to back the new currency with gold, as has been suggested by Russian economists. However, these economists have not, as far as I know, solved the problems that this alternative entails – notably the following: how to give stability to a new currency while supporting it with an eminently unstable asset? There may be a solution for this, but if there is, it has not come to my knowledge.

It would be better, it seems to me, to back the new currency in another way. Let's see how. I present below a brief discussion of the essential aspects. 

Who would create the new currency? There is only one possibility in the current international circumstances – a group of countries in the Global South, something like 15 to 20 countries, which would include most of the BRICS and other emerging middle-income nations. 

Could this group of countries delegate the issuance of the new currency to one of the existing institutions? No, none is able to take on this mission efficiently and reliably. 

A new international financial institution would therefore have to be created – an issuing bank, whose sole and exclusive function would be to issue and put into circulation the new currency. This issuing bank would not replace the national central banks and its currency would circulate in parallel with the national currencies of the countries of the sponsoring group and in parallel with the other national and regional currencies existing in the world. It would be restricted to international transactions, with no domestic role. Contrary to what is often said, it would not, therefore, be a euro-type currency, that is, a single currency, issued by a single central bank, which took the place of the pre-existing European currencies (Deutsche Mark, French franc, Italian lira, etc.).

How do you ensure the success of a currency? What would make the new currency widely used? The essential thing is to ensure confidence, which depends on the way in which the new monetary arrangement is constructed from an institutional point of view. 

The path that seems most viable to me would include, among other elements, the following legal guarantees: 1) stability of the new currency in terms of value; 2) its non-use as an instrument of sanction or pressure on countries; 3) operational autonomy of the issuing bank; 4) maximum limit for its issuance; and 5) backing of the currency by a basket of government bonds of the sponsoring countries. 

I address the five points in a very tight summary. 

First point: the currency would be based on a weighted basket of the currencies of the participating countries and would therefore fluctuate on the basis of changes in these currencies. Since all currencies in the basket would be floating or flexible, the new currency would also be a floating currency. The weights in the basket would be given by the share of each country's PPP GDP in the total GDP of the sponsor group. 

The currency’s exchange rate can be expected to be relatively stable since China accounts for at least 40/45% of the total, depending on the exact composition of the group. The relative weight of the renminbi in the basket would provide a certain stability, given the stability of the Chinese currency. There would be, moreover, an additional endogenous factor of stability: the presence in the basket of currencies of both exporters and importers of commodities, at the opposite sides of the commodity price cycle. These endogenous factors of  stability could be exogenously reinforced by establishing that the weighted average would be geometric and symmetrically trimmed. Currencies with large fluctuations, beyond pre-established limits, would be temporarily excluded from the basket. 

Secondly, an explicit commitment not to resort to sanctions would contrast with the insecurity resulting from the abusive use of the dollar and the euro as a basis for punishment and blackmail. This legal guarantee would be reinforced by the bank's operational autonomy. 

Operational autonomy, the third point, would be ensured by granting the bank's presidents and vice-presidents relatively long terms (five years, for example). This will send the message that the bank would not be easily subject to political interference and diplomatic maneuvering by its founders. This kind of autonomy is guaranteed in all or almost all international financial organizations. It does not fully protect the bank from interference, but it has its value. The institution’s management would have to be overseen by and accountable to the designated representatives of the sponsoring countries on the Board of Governors and on the Board of Directors. But this oversight and accountability should occur through the normal institutional channels, not by individual pressures on the president and vice presidents. 

Fourth, a cap on the amount of currency circulated by the bank would provide some protection against excess issuance. The new currency would thus have a brake that Western and other currencies do not have. 

But this ceiling would be a secondary instrument, as the most relevant one is the form of backing of the new currency. Fifth point, therefore: to define as backstop of the system a basket of national bonds of the founding countries and those that will join later. The issuing bank would issue the new reserve currency (NRC) and new reserve bonds (NRB), whose interest rates would be attractive as they would reflect the interest rates on the bonds of the participating nations, all of which are higher than the rates on the bonds in dollars and euros. The NRC would be fully convertible into NRB and these, in turn, into the basket of bonds of the participating countries. The high weight of the Chinese currency, issued by a country with a solid economy, would favor confidence in the backing of the NRC, besides helping to stabilize the currency’s average exchange rate.

The reaction of the West

The proposal has its vulnerabilities, discussed in detail in the paper just concluded. I will not go into all these weak spots now so as not to make this article too long. I will only highlight the one that seems to me to be the most serious – the risk that the initiative will provoke negative reactions from the West, which could resort to threats and sanctions against the countries involved in the creation of an alternative to the dollar and the euro.

This risk is real. The West, in frank decline, is even more arbitrary and violent than in other times. 

What we have to ask ourselves, however, is this: Are we going to live indefinitely with the monetary and financial system that the West has created since World War II, an increasingly dysfunctional system that has been used and abused as a geopolitical tool? Or will we gather economic, political and intellectual efforts to get out of this trap? 

The next few years will tell whether Global South countries are up to this challenge.