基式外交：如何从伊拉克撤军 @《基式外交研究》2025年第15期

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

译者：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心

来源：《基式外交研究》2025 年第 15 期“经典文献重译”专栏文章

审定：基式外交研究中心学术委员会

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. “How to Exit Iraq.” The Washington Post, December 18, 2005.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，版权归原作者所有。如有问题请即刻联系，如需转载请注明出处。

一、摘要

本文通过基式外交视角，剖析2005年美国从伊拉克撤军的战略困境。基辛格以现实主义立场强调，撤军决策必须超越技术性争议，聚焦全球战略后果。作者提出军事政治协同路径，主张通过构建国际共识、整合地区力量，实现从军事介入到政治存在的平稳过渡。研究揭示，基式外交的核心在于将地缘政治现实与意识形态博弈相结合，为当代大国战略决策提供历史镜鉴。

二、中文

当前，美国政府与批评者似乎达成一个共识：美军从伊拉克开始撤军将成为历史转折点。双方的分歧主要集中在撤军速度、规模以及撤军应遵循时间表还是塑造事件发展的战略这一核心问题上。

尽管这个问题常常被用专业术语来阐述，但它的核心并非撤军的具体操作方式。相反，这场辩论应该围绕撤军的后果展开：最终，撤军是会被视为被迫的撤退，还是会被看作是一项旨在增强国际安全的审慎且精心规划的战略的一部分。无论人们对发动伊拉克战争的决定、介入战争的方式，还是进行战争的战略持何种观点——我本人支持最初发动战争的决定——都必须清楚失败可能带来的后果。如果我们离开时，留下的只是一个失败的国家和一片混乱，那么这对该地区以及美国在世界上的地位都将是灾难性的。

激进伊斯兰主义现象远超从巴厘岛到雅加达、新德里、突尼斯、利雅得、伊斯坦布尔、卡萨布兰卡、马德里直至伦敦的恐怖袭击总和。这是伊斯兰激进势力试图在穆斯林聚居区清除世俗主义、多元价值观和西方制度的意识形态洪流。其动力源于一种确信：既定目标正走向衰落且缺乏抵抗意志。

任何看似印证这种确信的事件都将加剧革命动能。若在巴格达或摩苏尔、巴士拉等主要城市建立原教旨主义政权，若恐怖分子获得大片训练与庇护领地，或美国干预以混乱与内战告终，伊斯兰激进势力将在任何穆斯林人口密集区或非原教旨主义伊斯兰政权国家获得加速扩张。在圣战势力所及范围内，没有一个国家能够幸免于由构成圣战的众多狂热中心所引发的动荡后果。

军事失利将严重损害美国的全球信誉。我们的领导力及在巴勒斯坦、伊朗等地区问题上的话语权将被削弱；中、俄、欧、日等主要国家对美国贡献能力的信心将下降。军事压力暂缓后，更大危机将接踵而至。

灾难性后果由全球影响而非国内政治话语界定。布什总统已提出可行战略，承认政策需在实践中完善。但是，要求设定撤军时间表的呼声日益高涨，这掩盖了历史告诉我们的、克服游击战所必需的耐心品质。即便战略正确，操之过急也会导致功亏一篑。

批评者与政府发言人在“伊拉克部队训练成熟后应接替美军”这一观点上达成共识，这正是围绕伊拉克部队战备状态争议的根源。但单纯以伊军替代美军的战略可能导致令人不满的僵局长期化。即使假设训练按计划完成且伊军战斗力与所替代美军相当（这本身存疑），我仍质疑美军削减应与伊军训练线性挂钩的前提。仅仅为了维持当前安全局势而制定的战略，有可能证实这样一句格言：只要游击队不失败，他们就算是胜利了。

更优方案是将首批完全训练的伊军视为联军增援而非替代力量，从而得以部署兵力至边境遏制渗透，并加速针对游击队基础设施的进攻行动。这种策略有助于缓解地面部队短缺问题，该问题已延缓整个占领期间的反恐行动。虽看似耗时更长，却能为稳定局势创造更好条件，进而提供更可靠的撤军路径。

新部队的战斗力不能仅以训练标准衡量。用五角大楼术语来说，终极指标是其对既定政治目标的忠诚度。他们为何而战将决定其战斗效能。

负责任的撤军战略必须实现政治与安全要素的系统整合——重中之重是巩固国民政府。当伊拉克武装力量自视为（并被民众视为）国家利益而非宗派或地区利益的捍卫者时，才算取得实质进展。当他们能向逊尼派地区推进并愿意解除多数兵员来源的什叶派地区民兵武装时，才能真正成为国家军队。

因此，将撤军时机的判断完全交给军事指挥官，会给他们带来过于沉重的负担。他们关于安全的观点需要与对一项重大行动必然会产生的政治及附带后果的判断相结合。要实现这种平衡，前提是我们国内辩论的各方都能因认识到失败的严重后果而保持克制。

心理影响——尤其是对伊拉克政治结构的即时影响——将至关重要。计划于上周选举后启动的首批撤军将被视为不可逆转的快速全面撤军的第一步，还是取决于明确政治安全进展的阶段性安排？若属前者，伊拉克各政治派系将着手保护眼前利益，准备应对预期的势力较量。考虑美国对统一伊拉克世俗包容政府偏好的动力将减弱。政府在认为失去关键军事支持的时刻，将难以扩大执政基础。在此情况下，即使非公开设定时间表、旨在安抚美国民意的有限撤军也可能演变为不可逆转的进程。

若以越南经验为鉴，在这种氛围下，撤军规模可能成为评判美国政策成败的主要国内标准。继续或加速撤军的压力可能放大，导致与政治进展标准脱节。由技术或国内因素驱动的进程可能引发伊拉克派系间的竞赛，竞相通过政治施压或动用民兵加速美军撤离以获取民族主义声誉。

美国介入伊拉克是为了保护该地区的安全以及自身的安全。但是，如果不将撤军进程建立在某种国际共识的基础之上，就无法完成这一进程。地缘政治现实不会从这个已经与之共存并深受其害数千年的地区消失，而且这个地区曾在20世纪50年代和80年代将美国军队卷入黎巴嫩的漩涡，在 2001 年将其卷入阿富汗，在1991年和2003年将其卷入波斯湾，还曾导致美国两次处于军事戒备状态（分别是1970年叙利亚入侵约旦和1973年阿以战争期间）。伊拉克各派别之间的激情、信念和竞争仍将继续存在。无论我们是与这些势力互动，还是听之任之，这个国家都会以这样或那样的形式出现一个地区体系。因此，美国必须接受无法完全政治撤离的现实，尽管军事存在的规模与形式会变化。为避免激进势力主导，必须始终将政治与安全目标相结合。

必须让与伊拉克安全稳定相关或认为自身安全稳定受其影响的国家参与下一阶段政策制定。伊拉克正在发展的政治机构需要融入国际与地区体系——这并非出于对理论上多边主义的盲从，而是因为若不然，美国将不得不独自扮演永久警察角色，而这一角色既可能被未来伊拉克政府长期拒绝，亦会因国内争议而难以维系，且本文所述辩论本身就会阻碍这一角色的履行。

现在不仅需要明确伊拉克战略前景，还应扩大整个地区的政治协商基础。应在伊拉克选举后组建包括欧洲主要盟友、印度（因其穆斯林人口）、巴基斯坦、土耳其及伊拉克邻国在内的政治联络小组。美国驻巴格达大使与伊朗当局关于伊拉克的政治对话已获批准。

但不能仅与巴格达邻国进行此类接触。联络小组的职能应包括为伊拉克政治演变提供建议、扩大政府合法性基础，并体现国际社会对该地区稳定与发展的广泛关切。随着时间推移，该小组可发展为处理影响中东稳定其他问题的论坛，包括伊斯兰激进主义根源问题。政治框架不能替代军事胜利，但没有政治框架，军事胜利也难以持久。

三、英文

The administration and its critics seem to agree that the beginning of an American withdrawal from Iraq will mark a turning point. What divides them is the speed and extent of the drawdown and whether it should be driven by a timetable or by a strategy that seeks to shape events.

Though often put into technical terms, the issue is not the mechanics of withdrawal. Rather, the debate should be over consequences: whether, in the end, withdrawal will be perceived as a forced retreat or as an aspect of a prudent and carefully planned strategy designed to enhance international security. Whatever one's view of the decision to undertake the Iraq war, the method by which it was entered, or the strategy by which it was conducted – and I supported the original decision – one must be clear about the consequences of failure. If, when we go, we leave nothing behind but a failed state and chaos, the consequences will be disastrous for the region and for America's position in the world.

For the phenomenon of radical Islam is more than the sum of individual terrorist acts extending from Bali through Jakarta to New Delhi, Tunisia, Riyadh, Istanbul, Casablanca, Madrid and London. It is an ideological outpouring by which Islam's radical wing seeks to sweep away secularism, pluralistic values and Western institutions wherever Muslims live. Its dynamism is fueled by the conviction that the designated victims are on the decline and lack the will to resist.

Any event that seems to confirm these convictions compounds the revolutionary dynamism. If a fundamentalist regime is installed in Baghdad or in any of the other major cities, such as Mosul or Basra, if terrorists secure substantial territory for training and sanctuaries, or if chaos and civil war mark the end of the American intervention, Islamic militants will gain momentum wherever there are significant Islamic populations or nonfundamentalist Islamic governments. No country within reach of jihad would be spared the consequences of the resulting upheavals sparked by the many individual centers of fanaticism that make up the jihad.

Defeat would shrivel U.S. credibility around the world. Our leadership and the respect accorded to our views on other regional issues from Palestine to Iran would be weakened; the confidence of other major countries – China, Russia, Europe, Japan – in America's potential contribution would be diminished. The respite from military efforts would be brief before even greater crises descended on us.

A disastrous outcome is defined by the global consequences, not domestic rhetoric. President Bush has put forward a plausible strategy. It acknowledges that policy has been leavened by experience. But the crescendo of demands for a timetable suppresses the quality of patience that history teaches is the prerequisite for overcoming guerrilla warfare. Even an appropriate strategy can be vitiated if it is executed in too precipitate a manner.

The views of critics and administration spokesmen converge on the proposition that as Iraqi units are trained, they should replace U.S. forces – hence the controversy over which Iraqi units are in what state of readiness. But strategy based on substituting Iraqi for U.S. troops may result in perpetuating an unsatisfactory stalemate. Even assuming that the training proceeds as scheduled and produces units the equivalent of the U.S. forces being replaced – a highly dubious proposition – I would question the premise that American reductions should be in a linear relationship to Iraqi training. A design for simply maintaining the present security situation runs the risk of confirming the adage that guerrillas win if they do not lose.

The better view is that the first fully trained Iraqi units should be seen as increments to coalition forces and not replacements, making possible the deployment of forces toward the frontiers to curtail infiltration, as well as accelerated offensive operations aimed at the guerrilla infrastructure. Such a strategy would help remedy the shortage of ground forces, which has slowed anti-guerrilla operations throughout the occupation. While seemingly more time-consuming, it would present better opportunities for stabilizing the country and would thus provide a more reliable exit route.

The combat performance of new units cannot be measured by training criteria alone. The ultimate metrics – to use Pentagon terminology – are to what extent they are motivated toward agreed political goals. What they fight for will determine how well they fight.

A responsible exit strategy must emerge from the systematic integration of political and security elements – above all, the consolidation of the national government. Real progress will have been made when the Iraqi armed forces view themselves – and are seen by the population – as defenders of the nation's interest, not sectarian or regional interests. They will have become a national force when they are able to carry the fight into Sunni areas and grow willing to disarm militias in the Shiite regions from which the majority of them are recruited.

To delegate to military commanders the judgments as to the timing of withdrawals therefore places too great a burden on them. Their views regarding security need to be blended with judgments regarding the political and collateral consequences that a major initiative inevitably produces. Such a balance presupposes that all sides in our domestic debate adopt a restraint imposed on us by awareness of the grave consequences of failure.

The psychological impact, most immediately on the Iraqi political structure, will be crucial. Will the initial reductions – set to begin sometime after last week's elections – be viewed as the first step of an inexorable process to rapid and complete withdrawal? Or will they be seen as a stage of an agreed process dependent on tangible and definable political and security progress? If the former, the political factions in Iraq will maneuver to protect their immediate assets in preparation for the expected test of strength between the various groups. The incentive to consider American preferences for a secular and inclusive government in a unified Iraq will shrink. It will be difficult to broaden the base of a government at the very moment it thinks it is losing its key military support. In these circumstances, even a limited withdrawal not formally geared to a fixed timetable and designed to placate American public opinion could acquire an irreversible character.

If the experience of Vietnam is any guide, the numbers of returning troops could, in such an atmosphere, turn into the principal domestic test of successful U.S. policy. Pressures to continue or accelerate the withdrawals could be magnified so that the relationship to the political criteria of progress would be lost. A process driven by technical or domestic criteria might evoke a competition between Iraqi factions to achieve nationalist credit for accelerating the U.S. withdrawal, perhaps by turning on us either politically or with some of their militia.

The United States intervened in Iraq to protect the region's security and its own. But it cannot conclude that process without anchoring it in some international consensus. Geopolitical realities will not disappear from a region that has lived with them and suffered from them for millennia and that has drawn U.S. military forces into their vortex in Lebanon in the 1950s and 1980s, in Afghanistan in 2001 and in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 2003 – and has caused two U.S. military alerts (over the Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970 and the Arab-Israeli war in 1973). The passions, convictions and rivalries of the factions in Iraq will continue. A regional system will emerge in that country in one form or another through our interaction, either with these forces or through our default. In that sense, Americans must accept the reality that their country can never make a total political withdrawal, though the size and location of the military presence will vary. It will always have to meld political and security objectives if the predominance of radical states is to be avoided.

The countries that are relevant to Iraq's security and stability or that consider their security and stability affected by the emerging arrangements must be given a sense of participation in the next stage of Iraq policy. The developing political institutions in Iraq need to be built into an international and regional system – not out of obeisance to a theoretical multilateralism but because otherwise America will have to function alone as the permanent policeman, a role that any projected Iraqi government is likely to reject in the long run and that the very debate discussed in this article inhibits.

The time has come not only to define the strategic future in Iraq but also to broaden the base of political consultation in the region at large. A political contact group including key European allies, India (because of its Muslim population), Pakistan, Turkey and some neighbors of Iraq should be convoked after the Iraqi election. Political discussions between the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad and Iranian authorities regarding Iraq have already been approved.

These cannot be the sole contacts with Baghdad's neighbors. The functions of the contact group would be to advise on the political evolution of Iraq, to broaden the basis of legitimacy of the government and to reflect a broad international interest in the stability and progress of the region. As time goes on, the group could become a forum to deal with other issues affecting Middle East stability, including some of the causes of Islamic radicalism. A political framework is not a substitute for a successful military outcome, but military success cannot be long sustained without it.

四、译文拾贝

American withdrawal from Iraq（美国从伊拉克撤军）：指美国从伊拉克战场逐步减少军事存在的行动，涉及战略调整与地区安全影响。

Turning point（转折点）：对国际政治格局或战略方向产生重大影响的关键事件节点。

Forced retreat（被迫撤退）：因军事失利或战略压力而不得不采取的撤退行动，常伴随政治声誉损失。

Prudent and carefully planned strategy（审慎且周密计划的战略）：基于风险评估和长期目标设计的系统性行动方案，强调稳定性与可控性。

Radical Islam（激进伊斯兰主义）：主张通过暴力或极端手段推行伊斯兰教法的意识形态，与世俗化、多元化价值观对立。

Jihad（圣战）：伊斯兰语境中“奋斗”的宗教概念，被极端组织曲解为针对非穆斯林的暴力斗争。

Islamic militants（伊斯兰激进分子）：以暴力手段追求政治或宗教目标的伊斯兰极端组织成员。

U.S. credibility（美国的公信力）：国际社会对美国政策可靠性和履行承诺能力的信任程度。

Regional issues（地区问题）：特定地理区域内涉及多国利益的政治、安全或经济争端。

Guerrilla warfare（游击战）：非正规武装力量通过机动、突袭等战术对抗正规军的战争形式。

Stalemate（僵局）：冲突双方力量均衡，导致军事或政治进展停滞的状态。

Exit strategy（撤军战略）：军事干预后有序撤离的计划，需兼顾后续政治稳定与安全保障。

Anti-guerrilla operations（反游击战行动）：针对游击武装的军事打击和治安维护行动。

Military commanders（军事指挥官）：负责军事行动指挥的高级将领，需权衡战场态势与政治目标。

Political and security elements（政治与安全要素）：影响国家或地区稳定的政治结构与军事安全因素的综合体系。

Psychological impact（心理影响）：国际行动对目标群体或国际社会心理认知产生的长期效应。

Secular and inclusive government（世俗包容性政府）：尊重多元文化、宗教，实行非宗教化治理的政权形式。

International consensus（国际共识）：多国对某一问题达成的普遍认可或合作意向。

Geopolitical realities（地缘政治现实）：由地理位置、资源分布和战略利益构成的客观政治格局。

Contact group（联络小组）：为协调特定议题而临时组建的多国协商机制。

Multilateralism（多边主义）：通过国际组织或多国合作解决全球性问题的外交理念。

Islamic radicalism（伊斯兰激进主义）：主张以极端手段实现伊斯兰政治化的意识形态运动。

Militia disarmament（民兵解除武装）：解散非正规武装组织并收缴其武器的安全措施。

Sectarian interests（宗派利益）：基于宗教或族群分歧的局部政治集团利益诉求。

Sunni areas（逊尼派地区）：以逊尼派穆斯林为主要人口的地理区域，常与什叶派形成对立。

Shiite regions（什叶派地区）：以什叶派穆斯林为主要人口的地理区域，与逊尼派存在历史矛盾。

National force（国家武装力量）：代表国家统一意志、超越宗派或地区利益的正规军事力量。

Collateral consequences（附带后果）：军事行动或政策引发的非预期政治、社会连锁反应。

Timetable-driven withdrawal（时间表驱动的撤军）：按预设时间表而非实际局势调整的撤军策略，可能加剧风险。

Strategic stalemate（战略僵局）：冲突双方在长期对抗中无法取得决定性优势的战略状态。