谁说中美必有一战？

美国《国家利益》杂志网站4月23日刊登圣母大学大三学生尼古拉斯·格兰普瑞文章《中美冲突并非无可避免》，本文获得该校“2019政策议论文大赛”优胜奖。

文：Nicholas Grandpre

译：由冠群

随着中国的崛起和美国逐渐从中东事务中抽身退出，众多外交政策评论家接二连三的预言世界将回到大国争霸的格局上来。如果中美两国都不会像苏联那样轰然崩溃，那么它们能否和平共处以及如何和平共处就成了21世纪最重大的国际安全问题。如果华盛顿方面能恪守国家安全利益，则中美两国和平共处的可能性会很高。

国际政治领域不少极具智慧的学者已经开始探讨这个问题，他们的观点值得简要回顾一下。约翰·伊肯伯里（John Ikenberry）认为美国应努力“在地区秩序中给予中国一定的地位和空间，来容纳崛起中的中国，以此换取北京方面接受并容纳美国的核心战略利益——其中包括继续让美国在东亚充当主导性的安全保障者。”

约翰·米尔斯海默（John Mearsheimer）一向对机构化解冲突的能力比较悲观，他在《大国政治的悲剧》一书中总结到，如果中国经济持续增长，“最终结局将是一场激烈的安全竞赛，有相当大的可能会引发战争。简而言之，中国的崛起不太可能是和平的。”格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）也宣称中美两国“注定一战”（这句话也是其著作的名称），无法避开“修昔底德陷阱”的悲剧。

夹在伊肯伯里“制度乐观主义”和米尔斯海默“悲观主义”两种突出观点之间，另外一些学者的观点遭到了忽视——包括詹妮弗·林德（Jennifer Lind），查尔斯·格拉泽（Charles Glaser）和迈克尔·贝克利（Michael Beckley）——他们提出了一系列敏锐的见解，综合起来形成了一种21世纪东亚局势理论框架，即便不能完全保障东亚地区平安无事，至少也可以将安全困境控制在和平的表象之下，防止其失控演变为毁灭性暴力冲突。

毫无疑问，中美关系接连出现了许多不祥征兆，其中特别值得关注的包括反复升级的贸易战，特朗普政府在《2018美国国防战略报告》中将中国定义为“战略竞争对手”，以及中国在南海采取的军事行动。但幸运的是，由于地理、技术以及美国政策选项的多样性等若干因素的作用，中美两国之间的冲突是完全可以避免的。中美两国并非注定一战。然而，要避免走上冲突之路，在很大程度上取决于美国外交建制派——鉴于他们近年来的种种失败，未来能否成功避免战争十分堪忧。

两国的地理位置决定了美国几乎不可能入侵中国本土，同样，中国也几乎不可能入侵美国本土。与1914年或1939年的中欧地区相比，今天的太平洋要安全得多。当年有谁夺取并占领了中欧地区的一片关键领土，的确会引发其他方面的合理恐惧。当然，现今悲观论者担心的的并不是美国或中国大举入侵对方，而是担心中美两国会围绕着三处最可能爆发冲突的领域展开争夺，即南海、钓鱼岛和台湾地区。

中国当仁不让地将自己看作东亚地区的头等强国。加入中国的各方面能力持续增长，它有可能会动用实力来塑造东亚地区形势使其朝着有利于自己的方向发展。广为人知的是，中共一向高度重视领土主权问题。中国很可能在台湾问题上打出外交、经济和政治的组合拳。

如果未来的美国领导人认为台湾问题属于美国国家核心利益范畴，那么中美冲突将很难避免。然而，如果美国能够（冷峻地、）实事求是地看待将台湾——承认它不过是一个偏远的小岛，不会直接影响美国捍卫其国家安全的能力——那么中美两国至少可以避免在台湾问题上爆发冲突。而且即便两岸统一之后，中国也不会成为地区霸主，也不会获得向美洲投射硬实力的能力。统一的中国不会在短期内对夏威夷、墨西哥或秘鲁动用武力。

在可预见的未来，中国的后院里有太多事情需要解决。日本、韩国、印度、越南和澳大利亚等国的利益都决定了它们有意阻挠中国在亚洲占据主导地位。这当然也符合美国的利益，但实现东亚均势并不一定需要美国提供大规模安全保障、核保护伞，也不需要时时刻刻发表遏制中国的好战言论。

或许与直觉相反，实现地区均势的最佳途径可能是美国撤军。撤军将鼓励亚洲“中等强国”提高自身军事实力（可能包括追求核能力）来制衡中国。收缩不是将地区霸权拱手让给中国，而是要促成迈克尔·贝克利所说的那种已经初露端倪的地区新均势。中国强势的海洋主张以及“反介入/区域拒止（A2/AD）系统”范围覆盖到部分邻国，都使人有理由怀疑中国能否完全控制南海或东海。周边的中等强国可能阻挠中国建立控制权，而这又恰好是地区霸权的先决条件。

美国撤出东亚的另一个好处是它掐断了最可能引发中美冲突的导火索。正如查尔斯·格拉泽所言，“保护亚洲的盟友可能需要美国从事小规模政治冲突和军备竞赛，这会恶化中美两国的政治关系。”

在国际体系里，最强大的行为体之间总会存在一定程度的不安全因素。所有国家必须时时对彼此保持戒惧，毕竟他人的意图难以预料。然而，我们不可以将安全困境的必然性与激烈冲突甚至全面开战的必然性混为一谈。即使最冷酷的新现实主义者也承认，国家在考虑和确保安全的时候有做出不同选择的余地。国际政治不是机械僵化的。中美冲突的潜在导火索全部集中在东亚。这意味着美国在面对每一场潜在冲突时，可选择让步。中美关系会越来越充满张力，但未来是否以负责任的态度管控张力，则是美国政府可以选择的。

好消息是，美国是一个极其安全的国家，或许是世界历史上最安全的国家。太平洋和大西洋像两道巨大的护城河环绕着它，而周边弱小的邻居又几乎不怀任何恶意。尽管中国崛起会对美国揽到自己头上的价值观构成威胁，甚至威胁到美国主导的自由主义国际秩序，但中国绝不会威胁到严格意义上的美国国家安全。

如果美国的决策者们能够克服短视的毛病，不再执迷于以自己为模板重新塑造世界，就没有理由认为中美两国的紧张关系会步步恶化并最终造成全面武装冲突。未来是战争还是和平，取决于美国外交决策者们能否审慎抉择。不过，照美国政坛近期趋势来看，恐怕难以乐观。惟愿下一代美国领导人能比前任们多一份克制。

Conflict with China is Not Inevitable

As China rises and America’s interventions in the Middle East fade away, a stream of proclamations from the foreign policy commentariat has announced a return to great power competition. Short of a Soviet-like collapse, the most important international security question of the twenty-first century will be whether and how the United States and China might coexist in peace. The odds are good that they will if Washington stays focused on its strict national security interests.

Many of the brightest minds in international politics have already weighed in, and their conclusions are worth reviewing in brief. G. John Ikenberry has argued that the United States should work “to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing accepting and accommodating Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia.”

Naturally less optimistic about institutions’ ability to mitigate conflict, John Mearsheimer argued in the conclusion to The Tragedy of Great Power Politics that if China’s economy continues to grow “the result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be peaceful.” Similarly, Graham Allison declared that the United States and China are Destined for War, tragically unable to avoid the “Thucydides Trap.”

Overlooked in the debate between Ikenberry’s institutional optimism and Mearsheimer’s pessimism are other scholars—including Jennifer Lind, Charles Glaser, and Michael Beckley—who have presented a series of incisive arguments which, in combination, outline the basis for, if not a fully tranquil twenty-first century East Asia, an East Asia where the security dilemma will exist below the surface rather than bubble over into destructive violence.

Undoubtedly, there has been a litany of disturbing signs regarding the future of Uncle Sam’s relationship with the Middle Kingdom, particularly the escalatory trade war, the Trump administration’s decision to brand China a “strategic competitor” in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and China’s militaristic approach to the South China Sea. But luckily, several factors—geography, technology, and the sheer range of policy options available to the United States—point to the conclusion that conflict is fully avoidable. The United States and China are not destined for war. However, staying off the path to conflict will be largely up to the U.S. foreign policy establishment—a worrying admission given that establishment’s recent failures.

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Geography means that a U.S. invasion of mainland China is virtually unthinkable, as is a Chinese invasion of the United States. Today’s Pacific is far more security-rich than Central Europe in 1914 or 1939. There, an enemy taking and holding crucial territory was a legitimate fear. Of course, the roots of pessimists’ fears do not stem from a fear of large-scale invasion launched by the United States or China against the other great power. Rather, there are three arenas where conflict between the United States and China is most likely: the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and Taiwan.

China views itself as the rightful first-order power in East Asia. Assuming China’s capabilities continue to grow, it will likely use its power to the shape the region towards its interests. It is no secret that the Republic of China’s sovereignty has long bothered the Communist Party of China. The People’s Republic of China will probably use some combination of diplomatic, economic, and political power to undermine Taiwan.

If future U.S. leaders decide that Taiwanese sovereignty is within the purview of America’s strict national interest, then conflict will be difficult to avoid. However, if (somewhat coldly) the United States recognizes Taiwan for what it is—a small, distant island with no direct impact on America’s ability to procure national security for itself—then conflict, at least over Taiwan, can be avoided. Even the conquest of Taiwan would not make China a regional hegemon, nor would it provide China with the ability to project significant power into the Americas. A reunified China is not going to exert military power in Hawaii, Mexico, or Peru anytime soon.

For the foreseeable future, China will have enough on its plate in its own backyard. Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and Australia all have an interest in preventing Chinese dominance in Asia. America shares that interest, but reaching a balance of power in East Asia does not necessitate extensive security guarantees, nuclear umbrellas, and bellicose rhetoric focused on containing China at every point.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the best path to a regional balance of power is U.S. withdrawal. Withdrawal would provide Asia’s “middle powers” with an incentive to balance against China by increasing their military capabilities, which may include the pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Rather than ceding regional hegemony to China, retrenchment would facilitate what Michael Beckley argues is an already emergent balance of power in the region. China’s aggressive maritime claims and the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems to China’s neighbors give reason to doubt that China will be capable of establishing full control of either the South or East China Seas. The middle powers can stop China from seizing such prerequisites for regional hegemony.

Pulling back from East Asia will also eliminate potential flashpoints where conflict between the United States and China is most likely. As Charles Glaser has pointed out, “[p]rotecting U.S. allies in Asia might require the United States to engage in political skirmishes and military competition that will strain its political relations with China.”

Some amount of insecurity between the most powerful actors in the international system is inevitable. Intentions are inscrutable, and states must often fear the worst in one another. However, the inevitability of a security dilemma must not be conflated with the inevitability of intense conflict or outright war. Even the most hardened neorealists recognize that there is room for choice in how states think about and procure security. International politics is not mechanistic. Each potential flashpoint in the U.S.-Chinese relationship is in East Asia. This means that at each flashpoint, America will have the option of backing down. The United States and China are on a path to tension, but it is up to future U.S. administrations to responsibly manage those tensions.

The good news is that the United States is an incredibly secure country—perhaps the most secure country in the history of the world. We are surrounded by two enormous moats and weak neighbors who harbor negligible ill-will towards us. While China’s rise may threaten the values that the United States ascribes to itself and may even threaten the American-led liberal international order, it does not threaten the strict national security of the United States.

If policymakers overcome their myopic obsession with remaking the world in America’s image, there is no reason to assume tensions must escalate into full-blown military conflict. The choice between war and peace may depend upon the prudence of U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers. If recent history is any guide, this should provide little comfort. Here’s to hoping the next generation exercises more restraint than the last.

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