特朗普撤军德国：欧洲“再校准”，但会转向中国吗？

Club 提要：北京对话特约研究员、清华大学苏世民书院博士后研究员易吴霜在《南华早报》撰文指出，特朗普从德国撤军5000人，为跨大西洋关系与中欧互动打开新窗口。但这一窗口的性质和边界需要审慎研判。欧洲战略自主的逻辑是追求独立于美国，欧盟对华“系统性竞争者”定位未变，战略自主不等于“亲华转向”。 

5月10日，易吴霜在南华早报发文（图源：《南华早报》网页截图）

5月2日，特朗普政府宣布从德国撤出5000名美军并放话，后续削减“远不止5000”。这一决定的导火索，是德国总理默茨此前批评美国处理伊朗战争的方式。西方舆论的第一反应集中在政治层面——又是特朗普与欧洲盟友的一次口水战。但若仅停留在这一层，就会错过更值得关注的结构性问题。

时机本身耐人寻味。撤军决定宣布之际，正是王毅外长2026年以来在慕尼黑、布达佩斯及多次部长级通话中阐述“伙伴而非对手”框架的同一时期。跨大西洋摩擦确实为中欧关系开启了一扇分析的窗口，但这扇窗口究竟有多宽，需要审慎研判。哪些是过渡性因素、哪些是结构性约束，是研判中最关键的一步。

值得关注的乐观信号是真实存在的。美国2026年国防战略由五角大楼政策负责人科尔比主导，明确将欧洲降至“较为有限”的常规支持地位。特朗普扬言可能从西班牙和意大利继续撤军，并曾将北约称为“纸老虎”——这些言论已促使欧洲启动应急规划，包括各方报道的“欧洲版北约”备份框架。欧洲国防开支预计到2030年将翻倍接近7500亿美元。波兰总理图斯克警告称，跨大西洋联盟最大的威胁来自内部分裂而非外部对手——这反映出欧洲精英层中相当普遍的情绪。

特朗普施压杠杆背后的结构性约束同样是真实的，中国战略界已经对此投入了相当的关注。美国战略与国际研究中心（CSIS）4月下旬发布的报告估算，在为期39天的对伊朗作战行动中——这场行动于4月7日停火协议达成时结束——美军消耗了约一半的爱国者拦截弹、52%至80%的萨德拦截弹、45%的精确打击导弹。补足这些库存预计需要1到4年。比这些百分比更值得注意的是CSIS的基准判断：即便在伊朗战争之前，美军库存“已不足以应对一场与同等量级对手的冲突”，而美国的生产速率远低于公开目标。与此同时，美国陆军正在推进“陆军转型倡议”，将其力量结构从“九一一”以来反恐战争所形成的反叛乱姿态，转向应对高端对手的作战体系。最适合冷战式静态部署的部队结构，恰恰是当前转型重点改造的对象。换言之，狼的叫声这次响了不少，但牧人本身也确实瘦了。中国官方媒体已就美军弹药库存消耗作出详细报道，国内分析人士也已注意到这对美国同时维持三个战区作战承诺的能力构成的影响。

但与此同时，约束信号也同样真实存在，而这部分在讨论中可能被低估。2025年7月中欧领导人会晤期间，欧盟在特朗普关税压力下并未在电动汽车反补贴税立场上让步，也未重启《全面投资协定》的谈判。中欧关系中的若干老问题——欧方所称的产能过剩、稀土出口管制争议、欧方对中俄关系的认知——并未因华盛顿的不可靠而缓解。欧洲精英层对“对冲不可靠盟友”与“转向另一战略选择”之间的区别看得很清楚。与华盛顿的摩擦带来的并不是与北京的对接，而是欧洲战略自主进程的加速。

2026年1月，欧盟针对中国电动汽车出台新方案，提出采用最低进口价格机制，即中国出口商承诺不低于特定价格在欧盟市场上销售，替代此前加征的17%至35.3%不等的反补贴税。（图源：彭博社）

中欧战略空间的研判，关键在于把欧方的种种约束分成两类来看。一类是过渡性的：人事更迭、措辞过激、具体关税威胁，这些会随美国政治周期变化而变化。另一类则是结构性的、更具持久性的因素。俄罗斯作为欧洲最直接安全关切的地位，只要乌克兰战争持续就将延续。欧盟战略词汇中将中国定位为“系统性竞争者”的措辞，自2019年提出后已在历届委员会中得到沿用。欧洲产业政策的“去风险”轨迹已嵌入监管架构之中，难以因短期外交回暖而改变。最根本的一点是，欧洲战略自主的内在逻辑是冲着美国的不可靠去建构的——其目标是独立性，而非另寻盟友替代。把过渡性当成结构性、或反之，都会构成战略上的误读。

印太维度是其中最具实质意义、却最容易被以欧洲为中心的评论所遮蔽的部分。同样的能力约束既给了特朗普在欧洲施压的杠杆，也限制了美国在亚洲投射延伸威慑的能力。美国民主党参议员布卢门撒尔在4月下旬警告称，从印太司令部向中东转运弹药已对亚洲战备产生严重影响——这意味着美国战略所“优先”的战区，正在被系统性地抽调以维持其所“降级”战区的作战行动。韩国战略评论已经看到这一逻辑：如果柏林会因为批评伊朗作战而被“惩罚”，首尔在分担成本谈判中应预期同样的逻辑被沿用。东京虽因印太支柱地位获得短期保护，但战略学说不能直接变成可用的拦截弹。亚洲盟友的反应模式，整体呈现的是再校准而非重新定位——马尼拉与华盛顿的安全合作仍在继续，东京加快了国防开支，首尔则在联盟对冲中保持谨慎。

战略机会窗口是真实的，但它的边界同样真实。美国的困境、欧洲的徘徊、亚洲的观望，三者性质不同，节奏不同，方向也不同。这一时刻最值得关注的，是它们之间的差异，而不是它们的总和。

以下为英文原文：

When US President Donald Trump announced that 5,000 US troops would leave Germany, the immediate reading in Western capitals was political: another round in Trump’s running quarrel with European allies, triggered by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s criticism of Washington’s handling of the war with Iran.

For Beijing, the more interesting reading is structural. The drawdown coincides with a period in which Foreign Minister Wang Yi has spent much of 2026 cultivating a “partners not rivals” framing with European counterparts. Transatlantic friction creates an analytical opening. But the strategic window is narrower than the optics suggest and reading which constraints are durable and which are negotiable is the harder task.

What Beijing sees as encouraging is real. The 2026 US National Defence Strategy, shaped by US undersecretary of defence for policy Elbridge Colby, explicitly downgrades Europe to “more limited” conventional support. Trump’s threat to “probably” pull troops from Spain and Italy, and his characterisation of Nato as a “paper tiger”, has accelerated European contingency planning.

Reports of a “European Nato” backup framework, gaining momentum after Berlin abandoned its long-standing opposition, are no longer fringe. European defence spending is projected to nearly double by 2030 to roughly US$750 billion. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s warning that the greatest threat to Nato is internal disintegration rather than external attack captures a mood widely shared among European elites.

The structural constraint behind Trump’s leverage is real, and Chinese analysts are studying it carefully. A Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis of the US-Israeli campaign against Iran estimates that US forces expended roughly half their Patriot interceptors, between 53 and about 80 per cent of the THAAD inventory, and around 45 per cent of its Precision Strike Missiles. Replenishment will take one to four years.

CSIS judged even pre-Iran stockpiles “insufficient for a peer competitor fight”, and US production rates fall well below demand. The US Army is, meanwhile, midstride through its Army Transformation Initiative, as part of larger efforts to restructure its force away from post-9/11 counter-insurgencies towards peer warfare with China and Russia.

The formations best suited to a static Cold War-era footprint in Bavaria are precisely the ones being restructured. The wolf, in other words, is louder this time, but the shepherd is genuinely thinner. Chinese state media has reported the depletion in detail, with analysts noting the implications for US capacity to sustain commitments across multiple theatres.

Cause for Beijing tempering its expectations is also real. Brussels held firm at the July 2025 EU-China summit despite Trump’s tariff barrage. It has not completely relented on measures related to electric vehicles or opted to revive the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment.

The structural irritants – Chinese industrial overcapacity, rare earth export controls and Beijing’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war – have, if anything, sharpened de-risking instincts rather than relaxed them. European elites understand the difference between hedging against an unreliable ally and switching sides. Friction with Washington does not produce alignment with Beijing; it produces accelerated efforts towards strategic autonomy, of which de-risking from China is a defining feature.

The analytical task for Beijing is reading which European constraints are transitional and which are durable. Some are clearly transitional: personalities will change with the next US election cycle and American rhetorical excess may moderate. Tariff threats are tactical instruments that can be negotiated.

Other factors are durable. Beijing’s strategic discussion would be well served to weigh them more heavily. Russia will remain Europe’s most immediate security concern as long as the Ukraine war continues. Brussels’ own strategic vocabulary categorises China as a “systemic rival”.

European de-risking efforts are embedded in regulatory architecture and insulated from short-term diplomatic warming. Moreover, European strategic autonomy is being constructed against US unreliability rather than alongside Chinese partnership; its logic is independence, not alliance substitution. Confusing one for the other would be a strategic error.

The Indo-Pacific dimension is the most consequential, and the part most likely to be obscured by European-focused analysis. The same US capability constraints that make Trump’s European leverage possible also limit US ability to project extended deterrence in Asia.

US Senator Richard Blumenthal warned in April that munitions transfers from the US Indo-Pacific Command to the Middle East had a serious impact on Asian readiness – meaning the theatre prioritised by the National Defence Strategy has been systematically depleted to sustain operations in the theatre the strategy deprioritises.

South Korean commentators have already drawn parallels: if Berlin can be punished for criticising US policy, Seoul should expect similar outcomes. Tokyo, prioritised as the Indo-Pacific anchor, is temporarily insulated by doctrine. However, doctrine does not deliver interceptors.

For Beijing, the analytically honest reading is that US credibility erosion is genuine but uneven, and that Asian allies are recalibrating in ways that may not produce the strategic realignment Beijing might prefer. Manila’s continued security cooperation with Washington, Tokyo’s accelerated defence spending and Seoul’s careful hedging strategy all suggest that recalibration is not the same as repositioning.

The strategic window is real but bounded. Beijing shouldn’t position itself as Europe’s alternative anchor – a path foreclosed by structural factors out of its control – but instead read the transitional vulnerability with sober realism, sustain its “partners not rivals” approach and avoid the triumphalism that often accompanies visible US difficulty.

The wolf has come to Europe’s door. Whether the shepherd rebuilds and whether allies hold their ground in the meantime, are questions Beijing should observe carefully, not presumptively benefit from. A tired US is not the same as a Europe ready to pivot, nor a US-allied Asia ready to follow.