《特朗普如何将美国拖入与伊朗的战争？》The New York Times

一、文章原文

**How Trump took the United States to war with Iran**

By Jonathan Swan and Maggie Haberman, From The New York Times News Service

The black SUV carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House just before 11 a.m. on Feb. 11. The Israeli leader, who had been pressing for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran, was whisked inside with little ceremony, out of view of reporters, primed for one of the most high-stakes moments in his long career.

U.S. and Israeli officials gathered first in the Cabinet Room, adjacent to the Oval Office. Then Netanyahu headed downstairs for the main event: a highly classified presentation on Iran for President Donald Trump and his team in the White House Situation Room, which was rarely used for in-person meetings with foreign leaders.

Trump sat down, but not in his usual position at the head of the room's mahogany conference table. Instead, the president took a seat on one side, facing the large screens mounted along the wall. Netanyahu sat on the other side, directly opposite the president. Appearing on the screen behind the prime minister was David Barnea, director of Mossad, Israel's foreign intelligence agency, as well as Israeli military officials. Arrayed visually behind Netanyahu, they created the image of a wartime leader surrounded by his team.

Susie Wiles, White House chief of staff, sat at the far end of the table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who doubled as the national security adviser, had taken his regular seat. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Gen. Dan Caine, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who generally sat together in such settings, were on one side; joining them was John Ratcliffe, the CIA director. Jared Kushner, the president's son-in-law, and Steve Witkoff, Trump's special envoy, who had been negotiating with the Iranians, rounded out the main group. The gathering had been kept deliberately small to guard against leaks. Other top Cabinet secretaries had no idea it was happening. Also absent was the vice president. JD Vance was in Azerbaijan, and the meeting had been scheduled on such short notice that he was unable to make it back in time.

The presentation that Netanyahu would make over the next hour would be pivotal in setting the United States and Israel on the path toward a major armed conflict in the middle of one of the world's most volatile regions. And it would lead to a series of discussions inside the White House over the following days and weeks, the details of which have not been previously reported, in which Trump weighed his options and the risks before giving the go-ahead to join Israel in attacking Iran.

This account of how Trump took the United States into war is drawn from reporting for a forthcoming book, "Regime Change: Inside the Imperial Presidency of Donald Trump." It reveals how the deliberations inside the administration highlighted the president's instincts, his inner circle's fractures and the way he runs the White House. It draws on extensive interviews conducted on the condition of anonymity to recount internal discussions and sensitive issues.

The reporting underscores how closely Trump's hawkish thinking aligned with Netanyahu's over many months, more so than even some of the president's key advisers recognized. Their close association has been an enduring feature across two administrations, and that dynamic — however fraught at times — has fueled intense criticism and suspicion on both the left and the right of American politics. And it shows how, in the end, even the more skeptical members of Trump's war Cabinet — with the stark exception of Vance, the figure inside the White House most opposed to a full-scale war — deferred to the president's instincts, including his abundant confidence that the war would be quick and decisive.

The White House declined to comment.

**Netanyahu's Hard Sell**

In the Situation Room on Feb. 11, Netanyahu made a hard sell, suggesting that Iran was ripe for regime change and expressing the belief that a joint U.S.-Israeli mission could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic. At one point, the Israelis played for Trump a brief video that included a montage of potential new leaders who could take over the country if the hard-line government fell. Among those featured was Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran's last shah, now a Washington-based dissident who had tried to position himself as a secular leader who could shepherd Iran toward a post-theocratic government.

Netanyahu and his team outlined conditions they portrayed as pointing to almost certain victory: Iran's ballistic missile program could be destroyed in a few weeks. The regime would be so weakened that it could not choke off the Strait of Hormuz, and the likelihood that Iran would land blows against U.S. interests in neighboring countries was assessed as minimal. Besides, Mossad's intelligence indicated that street protests inside Iran would begin again, and — with the impetus of the Israeli spy agency helping to foment riots and rebellion — an intense bombing campaign could foster the conditions for the Iranian opposition to overthrow the regime. The Israelis also raised the prospect of Iranian Kurdish fighters crossing the border from Iraq to open a ground front in the northwest, further stretching the regime's forces and accelerating its collapse.

Netanyahu delivered his presentation in a confident monotone. It seemed to land well with the most important person in the room, the American president. "Sounds good to me," Trump told the prime minister. To Netanyahu, this signaled a likely green light for a joint U.S.-Israeli operation.

Netanyahu was not the only one who came away from the meeting with the impression that Trump had all but made up his mind. The president's advisers could see that he had been deeply impressed by the promise of what Netanyahu's military and intelligence services could do, just as he had been when the two men spoke before the 12-day war with Iran in June.

Earlier in his White House visit on Feb. 11, Netanyahu had tried to focus the minds of the Americans assembled in the Cabinet Room on the existential threat posed by Iran's 86-year-old supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. When others in the room asked the prime minister about possible risks in the operation, Netanyahu acknowledged these but made one central point: In his view, the risks of inaction were greater than the risks of action. He argued that the price of action would only grow if they delayed striking and allowed Iran more time to accelerate its missile production and create a shield of immunity around its nuclear program.

Everyone in the room understood that Iran had the capacity to build up its missile and drone stockpiles at a far lower cost and much more quickly than the United States could build and supply the much more expensive interceptors to protect U.S. interests and allies in the region. Netanyahu's presentations — and Trump's positive response to them — created an urgent task for the U.S. intelligence community. Overnight, analysts worked to assess the viability of what the Israeli team had told the president.

**"Farcical"**

The results of the U.S. intelligence analysis were shared the following day, Feb. 12, in another meeting for only U.S. officials in the Situation Room. Before Trump arrived, two senior intelligence officials briefed the president's inner circle. The intelligence officials had deep expertise in U.S. military capabilities, and they knew the Iranian system and its players inside out. They had broken down Netanyahu's presentation into four parts.

First was decapitation — killing the ayatollah. Second was crippling Iran's capacity to project power and threaten its neighbors. Third was a popular uprising inside Iran. And fourth was regime change, with a secular leader installed to govern the country.

The U.S. officials assessed that the first two objectives were achievable with U.S. intelligence and military power. They assessed that the third and fourth parts of Netanyahu's pitch, which included the possibility of the Kurds mounting a ground invasion of Iran, were detached from reality.

When Trump joined the meeting, Ratcliffe briefed him on the assessment. The CIA director used one word to describe the Israeli prime minister's regime change scenarios: "farcical." At that point, Rubio cut in. "In other words, it's bullshit," he said. Ratcliffe added that given the unpredictability of events in any conflict, regime change could happen, but it should not be considered an achievable objective.

Several others jumped in, including Vance, just back from Azerbaijan, who also expressed strong skepticism about the prospect of regime change. The president then turned to Caine. "General, what do you think?"

Caine replied, "Sir, this is, in my experience, standard operating procedure for the Israelis. They oversell, and their plans are not always well-developed. They know they need us, and that's why they're hard-selling."

Trump quickly weighed the assessment. Regime change, he said, would be "their problem." It was unclear whether he was referring to the Israelis or the Iranian people. But the bottom line was that his decision on whether to go to war against Iran would not hinge on whether Parts 3 and 4 of Netanyahu's presentation were achievable. Trump appeared to remain very interested in accomplishing Parts 1 and 2: killing the ayatollah and Iran's top leaders and dismantling the Iranian military.

**General Caine's Concerns**

Caine — the man Trump liked to refer to as "Razin' Caine"— had impressed the president years earlier by telling him the Islamic State group could be defeated far more quickly than others had projected. Trump rewarded that confidence by elevating the general, who had been an Air Force fighter pilot, to be his top military adviser.

Caine was not a political loyalist, and he had serious concerns about a war with Iran. But he was very cautious in the way he presented his views to the president. As the small team of advisers who were looped into the plans deliberated over the following days, Caine shared with Trump and others the alarming military assessment that a major campaign against Iran would drastically deplete stockpiles of U.S. weaponry, including missile interceptors, whose supply had been strained after years of support for Ukraine and Israel. Caine saw no clear path to quickly replenishing these stockpiles. He also flagged the enormous difficulty of securing the Strait of Hormuz and the risks of Iran blocking it.

Trump had dismissed that possibility on the assumption that the regime would capitulate before it came to that. The president appeared to think it would be a very quick war — an impression that had been reinforced by the tepid response to the U.S. bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities in June.

Caine's role in the lead-up to the war captured a classic tension between military counsel and presidential decision-making. So persistent was Caine in not taking a stand — repeating that it was not his role to tell the president what to do, but rather to present options along with potential risks and possible second- and third-order consequences — that he could appear to some of those listening to be arguing all sides of an issue simultaneously. He would constantly ask, "And then what?" But Trump would often seem to hear only what he wanted to hear.

Caine differed in almost every way from a prior chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark A. Milley, who had argued vociferously with Trump during his first administration and who saw his role as stopping the president from taking dangerous or reckless actions. One person familiar with their interactions noted that Trump had a habit of confusing tactical advice from Caine with strategic counsel. In practice, that meant the general might warn in one breath about the difficulties of one aspect of the operation, then in the next note that the United States had an essentially unlimited supply of cheap, precision-guided bombs and could strike Iran for weeks once it achieved air superiority. To Caine, these were separate observations. But Trump appeared to think that the second most likely canceled out the first.

At no point during the deliberations did Caine directly tell the president that war with Iran was a terrible idea — though some of Caine's colleagues believed that was exactly what he thought.

**Trump the Hawk**

Distrusted as Netanyahu was by many of the president's advisers, the prime minister's view of the situation was far closer to Trump's opinion than the anti-interventionists on the Trump team or in the broader "America First" movement liked to admit. This had been true for many years. Of all the foreign policy challenges Trump had confronted across two presidencies, Iran stood apart. He regarded it as a uniquely dangerous adversary and was willing to take great risks to hinder the regime's ability to wage war or to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, Netanyahu's pitch had dovetailed with Trump's desire to dismantle the Iranian theocracy, which had seized power in 1979, when Trump was 32. It had been a thorn in the side of the United States ever since. Now he could become the first president since the clerical leadership took over 47 years ago to pull off regime change in Iran.

Usually unmentioned but always in the background was the added motivation that Iran had plotted to kill Trump as revenge over the assassination in January 2020 of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was seen in the United States as a driving force behind an Iranian campaign of international terrorism.

Back in office for a second term, Trump's confidence in the U.S. military's abilities had only grown. He was especially emboldened by the spectacular commando raid to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro from his compound on Jan. 3. No American lives were lost in the operation — yet more evidence to the president of the unmatched prowess of U.S. forces.

Within the Cabinet, Hegseth was the biggest proponent of a military campaign against Iran. Rubio indicated to colleagues that he was much more ambivalent. He did not believe the Iranians would agree to a negotiated deal, but his preference was to continue a campaign of maximum pressure rather than start a full-scale war. Rubio, however, did not try to talk Trump out of the operation, and after the war began, he delivered the administration's justification with full conviction.

Wiles had concerns about what a new conflict overseas could entail, but she did not tend to weigh in hard on military matters in larger meetings; rather, she encouraged advisers to share their views and concerns with the president in those settings. Wiles would exert influence on many other issues, but in the room with Trump and the generals, she sat back. Those close to her said she did not view it as her role to share her concerns with the president on a military decision in front of others. And she believed that the expertise of advisers like Caine, Ratcliffe and Rubio was more significant for the president to hear.

Still, Wiles had told colleagues that she worried about the United States being dragged into another war in the Middle East. An attack on Iran carried with it the potential to set off soaring gas prices months before midterm elections that could help decide whether the final two years of Trump's second term would be years of accomplishment or subpoenas from House Democrats. But in the end, Wiles was on board with the operation.

**Vance the Skeptic**

Nobody in Trump's inner circle was more worried about the prospect of war with Iran, or did more to try to stop it, than the vice president. Vance had built his political career opposing precisely the kind of military adventurism that was now under serious consideration. He had described a war with Iran as "a huge distraction of resources" and "massively expensive."

He was not, however, a dove across the board. In January, when Trump publicly warned Iran to stop killing protesters and promised that help was on its way, Vance had privately encouraged the president to enforce his red line. But what the vice president pushed for was a limited, punitive strike, something closer to the model of Trump's missile attack against Syria in 2017 over the use of chemical weapons against civilians.

The vice president thought a regime-change war with Iran would be a disaster. His preference was for no strikes at all. But knowing that Trump was likely to intervene in some fashion, he tried to steer toward more limited action. Later, when it seemed certain that the president was set on a large-scale campaign, Vance argued that he should do so with overwhelming force, in the hope of achieving his objectives quickly.

In front of his colleagues, Vance warned Trump that a war against Iran could cause regional chaos and untold numbers of casualties. It could also break apart Trump's political coalition and would be seen as a betrayal by many voters who had bought into the promise of no new wars.

Vance raised other concerns, too. As vice president, he was aware of the scope of America's munitions problem. A war against a regime with enormous will for survival could leave the United States in a far worse position to fight conflicts for some years. The vice president told associates that no amount of military insight could truly gauge what Iran would do in retaliation when survival of the regime was at stake. A war could easily go in unpredictable directions. Moreover, he thought there seemed to be little chance of building a peaceful Iran in the aftermath.

Beyond all of this was perhaps the biggest risk of all: Iran held the advantage when it came to the Strait of Hormuz. If this narrow waterway carrying vast quantities of oil and natural gas was choked off, the domestic consequences in the United States would be severe, starting with higher gasoline prices.

**"Because It Always Is"**

Tucker Carlson, the commentator who had emerged as another prominent skeptic of intervention on the right, had come to the Oval Office several times over the previous year to warn Trump that a war with Iran would destroy his presidency. A couple weeks before the war began, Trump, who had known Carlson for years, tried to reassure him over the phone.

"I know you're worried about it, but it's going to be OK," the president said.

Carlson asked how he knew.

"Because it always is," Trump replied.

**The Final Decision**

In the final days of February, the Americans and the Israelis discussed a piece of new intelligence that would significantly accelerate their timeline. The ayatollah would be meeting above ground with other top officials of the regime, in broad daylight and wide open for an air attack. It was a fleeting chance to strike at the heart of Iran's leadership, the kind of target that might not present itself again.

Trump gave Iran another chance to come to a deal that would block its path to nuclear weapons. The diplomacy also gave the United States extra time to move military assets to the Middle East. The president had effectively made up his mind weeks earlier, several of his advisers said. But he had not yet decided exactly when. Now Netanyahu urged him to move fast.

That same week, Kushner and Witkoff called from Geneva after the latest talks with Iranian officials. Over three rounds of negotiations in Oman and Switzerland, the two had tested Iran's willingness to make a deal. At one point, they offered the Iranians free nuclear fuel for the life of their program — a test of whether Tehran's insistence on enrichment was truly about civilian energy or about preserving the ability to build a bomb. The Iranians rejected the offer, calling it an assault on their dignity.

Kushner and Witkoff laid out the picture for the president. They could probably negotiate something, but it would take months, they said. If Trump was asking whether they could look him in the eye and tell him they could solve the problem, it was going to take a lot to get there, Kushner told him, because the Iranians were playing games.

**"I Think We Need to Do It"**

On Thursday, Feb. 26, around 5 p.m., a final Situation Room meeting got underway. By now, the positions of everyone in the room were clear. Everything had been discussed in previous meetings; everyone knew everyone else's stance. The discussion would last about an hour and a half.

Trump was in his usual place at the head of the table. To his right sat the vice president. Next to Vance was Wiles; then Ratcliffe; then the White House counsel, David Warrington; then Steven Cheung, the White House communications director. Across from Cheung was Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary; to her right was Caine, then Hegseth and Rubio. The war-planning group had been kept so tight that the two key officials who would need to manage the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Energy Secretary Chris Wright, were excluded, as was Tulsi Gabbard, director of national intelligence.

The president opened the meeting, asking, "OK, what have we got?"

Hegseth and Caine ran through the sequencing of the attacks. Then Trump said he wanted to go around the table and hear everyone's views.

Vance, whose disagreement with the whole premise was well established, addressed the president: "You know I think this is a bad idea, but if you want to do it, I'll support you."

Wiles told Trump that if he felt he needed to proceed for America's national security, then he should go ahead.

Ratcliffe offered no opinion on whether to proceed, but he discussed the stunning new intelligence that the Iranian leadership was about to gather in the ayatollah's compound in Tehran. The CIA director told the president that regime change was possible depending on how the term was defined. "If we just mean killing the supreme leader, we can probably do that," he said.

When called on, Warrington, the White House counsel, said it was a legally permissible option in terms of how the plan had been conceived by U.S. officials and presented to the president. He did not offer a personal opinion, but when pressed by the president to provide one, he said that as a Marine veteran, he had known an American service member killed by Iran years earlier. This issue remained deeply personal. He told the president that if Israel intended to proceed regardless, the United States should do so as well.

Cheung laid out the likely public relations fallout: Trump had run for office opposed to further wars. People had not voted for conflict overseas. The plans ran contrary, too, to everything the administration had said after the bombing campaign against Iran in June. How would they explain away eight months of insisting that Iranian nuclear facilities had been totally obliterated? Cheung gave neither a yes nor a no, but he said that whatever decision Trump made would be the right one.

Leavitt told the president that this was his decision and that the press team would manage it as best they could.

Hegseth adopted a narrow position: They would have to take care of the Iranians eventually, so they might as well do it now. He offered technical assessments: They could run the campaign in a certain amount of time with a given level of forces.

Caine was sober, laying out the risks and what the campaign would mean for munitions depletion. He offered no opinion; his position was that if Trump ordered the operation, the military would execute. Both of the president's top military leaders previewed how the campaign would unfold and the U.S. capacity to degrade Iran's military capabilities.

When it was his turn to speak, Rubio offered more clarity, telling the president: "If our goal is regime change or an uprising, we shouldn't do it. But if the goal is to destroy Iran's missile program, that's a goal we can achieve."

Everyone deferred to the president's instincts. They had seen him make bold decisions, take on unfathomable risks and somehow come out on top. No one would impede him now.

"I think we need to do it," the president told the room. He said they had to make sure Iran could not have a nuclear weapon, and they had to ensure that Iran could not just shoot missiles at Israel or throughout the region.

Caine told Trump that he had some time; he did not need to give the go-ahead until 4 p.m. the following day.

Aboard Air Force One the next afternoon, 22 minutes before Caine's deadline, Trump sent the following order: "Operation Epic Fury is approved. No aborts. Good luck."

二、中文翻译

［特朗普如何将美国拖入与伊朗的战争］

作者：乔纳森·斯旺、玛吉·哈伯曼，《纽约时报》新闻社

2月11日上午11点刚过，一辆载着以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的黑色SUV抵达白宫。这位数月来一直敦促美国同意对伊朗发动大规模攻击的以色列领导人，在几乎没有欢迎仪式的情况下被迅速带入屋内，避开记者的视线，准备迎接他漫长政治生涯中最具风险的时刻之一。

美以官员首先聚集在椭圆形办公室旁的内阁会议室。随后，内塔尼亚胡下楼参加主议程：在白宫战情室向总统特朗普及其团队做一场关于伊朗的高度机密汇报——战情室极少被用于与外国领导人的当面会谈。

特朗普落座，但并未坐在他惯常的桃花心木会议桌首位。相反，总统坐在一侧，面朝安装在墙上的大屏幕。内塔尼亚胡坐在另一侧，正对总统。总理身后的屏幕上是以色列对外情报机构摩萨德局长大卫·巴尔内亚，以及以色列军方官员。他们呈现在内塔尼亚胡身后的视觉效果，营造出一位战时领袖被其团队簇拥的画面。

白宫幕僚长苏西·怀尔斯坐在桌子远端。同时担任国家安全顾问的国务卿马可·鲁比奥坐在他惯常的位置。国防部长皮特·赫格塞思和参谋长联席会议主席丹·凯恩将军——在这类场合通常坐在一起——坐在一侧；和他们一起的是中央情报局局长约翰·拉特克利夫。总统的女婿贾里德·库什纳，以及一直在与伊朗谈判的特朗普特使史蒂夫·威特科夫，构成了主要参与人员。

这次会议被刻意控制在小规模，以防泄密。其他内阁高级官员对此毫不知情。副总统也缺席了——万斯当时身在阿塞拜疆，会议安排得太仓促，他无法及时赶回。

内塔尼亚胡接下来一小时的汇报，将成为推动美国和以色列走向中东这个全球最动荡地区之一重大武装冲突的关键节点。在接下来的数天乃至数周内，这将引发白宫内部的一系列讨论——这些讨论的细节此前从未被报道过——在此过程中，特朗普权衡了各种选项和风险，最终批准与以色列联合攻击伊朗。

本文对特朗普如何将美国拖入战争的记述，取材于即将出版的新书《政权更迭：唐纳德·特朗普的帝王总统内幕》的报道工作。它揭示了政府内部的讨论如何凸显出总统的直觉、其核心圈子的裂痕以及他管理白宫的方式。本文依据大量以匿名条件进行的访谈，以还原内部讨论和敏感问题。

报道强调了特朗普的鹰派思维与内塔尼亚胡在长达数月的时间里是多么高度契合，这种契合程度甚至超过了一些总统关键顾问的认知。两人的密切关系历经两届政府，始终是一个持久的特征——尽管时有摩擦——这种关系激起了美国政坛左右两派强烈的批评和怀疑。报道还表明，最终，即便是特朗普战争内阁中更具怀疑态度的成员——除了万斯这个白宫内部最反对全面战争的人物——也都屈从于总统的直觉，包括他对于战争将迅速果断结束的充分信心。

白宫拒绝置评。

【内塔尼亚胡的强力游说】

在2月11日的战情室，内塔尼亚胡进行了强力游说，暗示伊朗已具备政权更迭的条件，并表示相信美以联合行动终于可以终结这个伊斯兰共和国。其间，以色列方面为特朗普播放了一段简短视频，内容包含一系列可能在该国强硬政府倒台后接管国家的新领导人蒙太奇画面。其中引人注目的是礼萨·巴列维，他是伊朗末代国王流亡在外的儿子，如今是驻华盛顿的异见人士，一直试图将自己定位为可以引领伊朗走向后神权政府的世俗领导人。

内塔尼亚胡及其团队勾勒出他们所描绘的“近乎必胜”的条件：伊朗的弹道导弹计划可以在几周内被摧毁；伊朗政权将被严重削弱，以至于无法封锁霍尔木兹海峡；伊朗在邻国打击美国利益的可能性被评估为极低。此外，摩萨德的情报显示，伊朗国内的街头抗议将再次爆发，并且在以色列情报机构煽动骚乱和叛乱的推动下，一场密集的轰炸行动可以为伊朗反对派推翻政权创造条件。以色列还提出了伊朗库尔德武装分子从伊拉克越境，在西北部开辟地面战线、进一步牵制政权力量并加速其崩溃的可能性。

内塔尼亚胡以一种自信而平稳的语调完成了汇报。这似乎打动了房间里最重要的人——美国总统。“我觉得听起来不错，”特朗普对总理说。对内塔尼亚胡而言，这意味着美以联合行动很可能获得绿灯。

内塔尼亚胡并非唯一在会后获得特朗普已基本下定决心印象的人。总统的顾问们可以看出，他对内塔尼亚胡的军事和情报机构所能展现的潜力深感震撼，正如两人在2025年6月为期12天的对伊战争前通话时一样。

当天早些时候，内塔尼亚胡在白宫访问期间试图让聚集在内阁会议室的美国官员聚焦于伊朗86岁最高领袖哈梅内伊所构成的生存威胁。当在场其他人向总理询问行动可能面临的风险时，内塔尼亚胡承认了这些风险，但提出了一个核心观点：在他看来，不作为的风险大于行动的风险。他辩称，如果推迟打击，让伊朗有更多时间加速导弹生产和为其核计划构建免疫屏障，行动的成本只会越来越高。

房间里所有人都明白，伊朗以远低于美国的成本、快得多的速度建立导弹和无人机库存，而美国则需要建造和供应昂贵得多的拦截器来保护美国及其地区盟友的利益。内塔尼亚胡的汇报——以及特朗普的积极回应——为美国情报界带来了紧迫任务。分析人员连夜评估以色列团队向总统所陈述方案的可信度。

【“荒谬至极”】

美国情报分析的结果于次日（2月12日）在战情室的另一场仅限美国官员参加的会议上公布。在特朗普到来之前，两名高级情报官员向总统的核心圈子做了简报。这些情报官员对美国军事能力有深厚的专业知识，对伊朗体制及其参与者了如指掌。他们将内塔尼亚胡的汇报分解为四个部分。

第一是斩首行动——刺杀最高领袖。第二是摧毁伊朗投射力量、威胁邻国的能力。第三是伊朗内部的民众起义。第四是政权更迭，推举一位世俗领导人治理国家。

美国官员评估认为，前两个目标借助美国的情报和军事力量是可以实现的。他们评估认为，内塔尼亚胡方案中的第三和第四部分——包括库尔德人对伊朗发动地面入侵的可能性——脱离了现实。

当特朗普加入会议时，拉特克利夫向他汇报了评估结果。中央情报局局长仅用一个词形容以色列总理的政权更迭设想：“荒谬至极。”这时，鲁比奥插话道：“换句话说，纯属扯淡。”拉特克利夫补充说，考虑到任何冲突中事件都不可预测，政权更迭有可能发生，但不应该被视为一个可实现的目标。

其他几人随即加入讨论，包括刚从阿塞拜疆赶回的万斯，他也对政权更迭的前景表示了强烈怀疑。总统随后转向凯恩。“将军，你怎么看？”

凯恩回答道：“长官，根据我的经验，这是以色列人的标准操作。他们过度推销，他们的计划并不总是成熟周全。他们知道需要我们，所以才强力推销。”

特朗普迅速消化了评估意见。他说，政权更迭将是“他们的问题”。尚不清楚他指的是以色列人还是伊朗人民。但底线是：他是否对伊朗开战的决定，并不会取决于内塔尼亚胡方案中第三和第四部分是否可实现。特朗普似乎仍对实现第一和第二部分——消灭最高领袖和伊朗高层领导人、摧毁伊朗军队——非常感兴趣。

【凯恩将军的担忧】

凯恩——特朗普喜欢称他为“飞驰凯恩”——几年前曾告诉总统，“伊斯兰国”组织可以远比其他人预期的速度更快地被击败，这给总统留下了深刻印象。特朗普将这种信心兑现为提拔这位曾担任空军战斗机飞行员的将军，成为其最高军事顾问。

凯恩并非政治忠诚分子，他对与伊朗开战有着严重担忧。但他向总统表达观点时非常谨慎。在接下来几天内，当参与计划的小型顾问团队进行讨论时，凯恩向特朗普和其他人分享了令人警惕的军事评估：一场针对伊朗的大规模战役将极大消耗美国的武器库存，包括导弹拦截器，这些武器的供应在多年支持乌克兰和以色列之后已经捉襟见肘。凯恩看不到快速补充这些库存的明确路径。他还指出了确保霍尔木兹海峡安全的巨大困难以及伊朗封锁海峡的风险。

特朗普驳回了这种可能性，认为伊朗政权在此之前就会投降。总统似乎认为这将是一场非常短暂的战争——这种印象因6月美国轰炸伊朗核设施时对方反应冷淡而得到强化。

凯恩在战争前夕所扮演的角色，体现了军事建议与总统决策之间的经典紧张关系。凯恩如此坚持不表态——反复强调他的角色不是告诉总统该做什么，而是提供选项以及潜在风险和可能的二阶、三阶后果——以至于在某些听众看来，他似乎同时在论证一个问题的所有方面。他会不断追问：“然后呢？”但特朗普往往似乎只听到他想听的东西。

凯恩与前任参谋长联席会议主席马克·米利将军几乎在所有方面都截然不同，米利在特朗普第一任期内曾与特朗普激烈争论，并将自己的角色视为阻止总统采取危险或鲁莽行动。一位熟悉两人互动的人士指出，特朗普有一种将凯恩的战术建议与战略咨询混淆的习惯。在实践中，这意味着这位将军可能在一次呼吸中警告行动某一方面存在的困难，然后在下一次呼吸中指出美国拥有几乎无限供应的廉价精确制导炸弹，一旦取得空中优势，可以对伊朗进行数周打击。对凯恩来说，这是两个独立的观察。但特朗普似乎认为第二个很可能会抵消第一个。

在整个讨论过程中，凯恩从未直接告诉总统与伊朗开战是一个糟糕的主意——尽管凯恩的一些同僚认为这正是他内心的想法。

【鹰派特朗普】

尽管内塔尼亚胡为许多总统顾问所不信任，但这位总理对局势的看法，比特朗普团队中的反干涉主义者或更广泛的“美国优先”运动所愿承认的，更接近于特朗普本人的意见。这种情况多年来一直如此。在特朗普两届总统任期内所面对的所有外交政策挑战中，伊朗独树一帜。他视其为一个极其危险的对手，愿意冒巨大风险来削弱该政权发动战争或获取核武器的能力。

此外，内塔尼亚胡的方案与特朗普瓦解伊朗神权政体的愿望不谋而合。这个政权于1979年掌权，当时特朗普32岁。此后它一直是美国的眼中钉。现在，他有可能成为自47年前教士领导层掌权以来，首位在伊朗实现政权更迭的总统。

通常不被提及但始终存在的额外动机是：伊朗曾策划杀害特朗普，以报复2020年1月卡西姆·苏莱曼尼将军被暗杀一事——苏莱曼尼在美国被视为伊朗国际恐怖主义行动的推动力量。

回到白宫第二任期后，特朗普对美国军事实力的信心只增不减。1月3日那场令人叹为观止的突袭行动——从大院内抓获委内瑞拉领导人尼古拉斯·马杜罗——尤其让他底气十足。行动中没有任何美国人丧生——这在总统看来，是美国军队无与伦比实力的又一证明。

在内阁中，赫格塞思是对伊朗军事行动的最大支持者。鲁比奥向同僚表示，他的态度要矛盾得多。他不相信伊朗人会同意谈判协议，但他的偏好是继续极限施压，而不是发动全面战争。然而，鲁比奥并未试图劝说特朗普放弃行动；战争开始后，他以十足的说服力阐述了政府的理由。

怀尔斯对一场新的海外冲突可能带来的后果有所担忧，但在大型会议上，她并不倾向于在军事问题上强硬表态；相反，她鼓励顾问们在那些场合向总统分享他们的观点和担忧。怀尔斯会在许多其他问题上施加影响，但在与特朗普和将军们同处一室时，她选择静观其变。与她亲近的人表示，她不认为当着其他人的面向总统表达对军事决策的担忧是她的职责所在。她相信像凯恩、拉特克利夫和鲁比奥这样的顾问的专业意见对总统来说更重要。

尽管如此，怀尔斯曾告诉同僚，她担心美国再次被拖入另一场中东战争。对伊朗的攻击有可能在中期选举前数月引发汽油价格飙升——这些中期选举可能决定特朗普第二任期的最后两年是成就之年，还是收到众议院民主党传票的年份。但最终，怀尔斯支持了这一行动。

【怀疑者万斯】

特朗普核心圈子里，没有人比副总统更担心与伊朗开战的前景，也没有人比他做得更多来试图阻止它。万斯的政治生涯建立在对如今正被严肃考虑的这类军事冒险主义的明确反对之上。他曾将一场对伊战争描述为“资源的巨大分散”和“极其昂贵”。

然而，他并非无差别的鸽派。1月份，当特朗普公开警告伊朗停止屠杀抗议者，并承诺援助“正在路上”时，万斯曾私下鼓励总统执行其红线。但副总统推动的是有限的惩罚性打击，更接近特朗普2017年因叙利亚对平民使用化学武器而发动导弹攻击的模式。

副总统认为，一场针对伊朗的政权更迭战争将是一场灾难。他的偏好是完全不进行打击。但知道特朗普很可能以某种方式干预后，他试图引导向更有限的行动。后来，当总统似乎已下定决心进行大规模行动时，万斯又主张应以压倒性力量行动，以期快速达成目标。

在同僚面前，万斯警告特朗普，一场对伊战争可能引发地区混乱和难以计数的伤亡，还可能撕裂特朗普的政治联盟，被许多相信“不再有新战争”承诺的选民视为背叛。

万斯还提出了其他担忧。作为副总统，他了解美国军备问题的规模。一场对抗具有巨大生存意志的政权的战争，可能使美国在未来数年内处于更糟糕的作战状态。副总统告诉身边人，再多的军事洞察力也无法真正衡量伊朗在政权存亡攸关时将如何报复。战争很容易走向不可预测的方向。此外，他认为在战后建立一个和平的伊朗似乎可能性很小。

除此之外，也许最大的风险在于：伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡占有优势。如果这条承载着巨量石油和天然气的狭窄水道被封锁，美国国内的后果将十分严重，首当其冲的就是更高的汽油价格。

【“因为总是如此”】

评论员塔克·卡尔森——右翼中另一位重要的干预怀疑者——在过去一年中多次来到椭圆形办公室，警告特朗普一场对伊战争将毁掉他的总统任期。战争开始前几周，与卡尔森相识多年的特朗普试图在电话中安抚他。

“我知道你很担心，但一切都会好起来的，”总统说。

卡尔森问他如何知道。

“因为总是如此，”特朗普回答。

【最终决定】

2月的最后几天，美以双方讨论了一条新情报，这将大大加速他们的时间表。最高领袖将与其他政权高级官员在地面以上会面，在光天化日之下，完全暴露在空袭范围之内。这是一个稍纵即逝的机会，可以打击伊朗领导层的核心，这样的目标可能不会再次出现。

特朗普给了伊朗另一个机会，来达成一项阻止其走向核武器的协议。外交活动也让美国有额外时间向中东调动军事资产。据几位顾问称，总统在几周前就已基本下定决心，但他还没有决定确切的时间。现在，内塔尼亚胡敦促他快速行动。

同一周，库什纳和威特科夫在日内瓦与伊朗官员最新一轮会谈后打来电话。经过在阿曼和瑞士的三轮谈判，两人测试了伊朗达成协议的意愿。有一次，他们提出为伊朗的核计划提供终身免费的核燃料——以测试德黑兰坚持铀浓缩究竟是为了民用能源，还是为了保留制造核弹的能力。伊朗拒绝了这一提议，称其是对伊朗尊严的侮辱。

库什纳和威特科夫向总统描绘了情况。他们说，可能可以谈出点什么，但需要几个月时间。库什纳告诉他，如果特朗普问他们能否直视他的眼睛告诉他可以解决问题，那还需要大量工作才能达成，因为伊朗人在玩把戏。

**“我认为我们需要这么做”**

2月26日，星期四，下午5点左右，最后一场战情室会议开始了。此时，房间里每个人的立场都已明确。一切都已在之前的会议中讨论过；每个人都知道别人的态度。讨论持续了大约一个半小时。

特朗普坐在他惯常的会议桌首位。右手边坐着副总统。万斯旁边是怀尔斯，然后是拉特克利夫，然后是白宫法律顾问大卫·沃林顿，然后是白宫通讯主任史蒂文·张。张的对面是白宫新闻秘书卡罗琳·莱维特；她的右手边是凯恩，然后是赫格塞思和鲁比奥。战争规划小组被控制得非常严密，以至于需要管理全球石油市场史上最大供应中断的两名关键官员——财政部长斯科特·贝森特和能源部长克里斯·赖特——都被排除在外，国家情报总监图尔西·加巴德也是如此。

总统开场问道：“好吧，我们有什么？”

赫格塞思和凯恩介绍了攻击的顺序。随后，特朗普说他想逐一听取桌上每个人的意见。

万斯——其反对整个行动前提的立场早已明确——对总统说：“你知道我认为这是个坏主意，但如果你想这么做，我会支持你。”

怀尔斯告诉特朗普，如果他觉得为了美国国家安全需要继续推进，那么他应该继续。

拉特克利夫没有对是否继续发表意见，但他讨论了那条令人震惊的新情报——伊朗领导层即将在德黑兰最高领袖的住所聚集。中央情报局局长告诉总统，政权更迭是可能的，取决于如何定义这个术语。“如果我们只是指杀死最高领袖，我们大概可以做到，”他说。

当被点名时，白宫法律顾问沃林顿表示，就美国官员构思并向总统提交的计划而言，这是一个法律上允许的选项。他没有给出个人意见，但当总统要求他提供时，他说，作为一名海军陆战队退伍军人，他认识一名多年前被伊朗杀害的美国军人。这个问题对他而言仍是个人之痛。他告诉总统，如果以色列无论怎样都打算继续行动，美国也应该这样做。

张阐述了可能的公关后果：特朗普竞选时反对更多战争。人们投票不是支持海外冲突。这些计划也与政府在6月轰炸伊朗行动后所说的一切相悖。他们将如何解释过去八个月坚持称伊朗核设施已被彻底摧毁的说法？张既没有说“是”也没有说“否”，但他说无论特朗普做出什么决定都是正确的。

莱维特告诉总统，这是他的决定，新闻团队会尽力处理。

赫格塞思采取了狭隘的立场：他们迟早要对付伊朗人，不如现在就动手。他提供了技术评估：他们可以在一定时间内以一定兵力进行行动。

凯恩保持冷静，阐述了风险和行动对弹药消耗的影响。他没有发表意见；他的立场是：如果特朗普下令行动，军队将执行。两位总统的最高军事领导人预览了行动将如何展开以及美国削弱伊朗军事能力的力量。

轮到鲁比奥发言时，他提供了更清晰的表述，告诉总统：“如果我们的目标是政权更迭或起义，我们不应该这么做。但如果目标是摧毁伊朗的导弹计划，这个目标我们可以实现。”

所有人都屈从于总统的直觉。他们曾目睹他做出大胆的决定，承担难以估量的风险，并以某种方式总能胜出。现在没有人会阻止他。

“我认为我们需要这么做，”总统对房间里的人说。他说，他们必须确保伊朗不能拥有核武器，必须确保伊朗不能仅仅向以色列或整个地区发射导弹。

凯恩告诉特朗普，他还有些时间；他可以在次日下午4点前做出决定。

次日下午，在空军一号上，距离凯恩给出的最后期限还有22分钟时，特朗普发出了以下命令：“批准‘史诗之怒行动’。不得中止。祝好运。”