中东战火，让北极收获“意外之财”？

Club 提要：北京对话特约专家、中美研究中心（ICAS）主任洪农日前在《南华早报》撰文指出，在中东新一轮战事爆发后，北极地区的战略价值正迅速凸显。霍尔木兹海峡封锁使全球能源运输受阻，海湾出口国急于寻找新通道。美国阿拉斯加液化天然气项目正在加速推进，与此同时，俄罗斯、挪威、格陵兰和加拿大等北极相关国家和地区，也正以不同方式受益于北极能源与航道所带来的“安全溢价”。 

（翻译｜杨敏，核译｜金地）

3月25日，洪农在南华早报发文（图源：《南华早报》网页截图）

随着伊朗封锁霍尔木兹海峡这一全球最关键的能源通道之一——全球约五分之一的石油和液化天然气贸易是经由这条狭窄的水道进行的，石油出口国正在争分夺秒寻找替代路径。

沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋已紧急转向通过陆上管道维系出口；但多国官员警告称，即便有海军护航，也难以确保船只能够安全通行。

海湾地区承受着最直接的冲击，而更遥远的北方，则在战略层面感受到了这场冲突的余震。

以阿拉斯加为例，由美国政府支持的阿拉斯加液化天然气项目将在今年确定管道投资方案，明年年初确定出口终端投资方案，并计划在2031年实现首批出口。该项目规划年产能为2000万吨，目前已获得约1300万吨的初步承诺，发展势头正劲。重要的是，阿拉斯加具有海湾供应商无法提供的优势：无需经过霍尔木兹海峡即可直达东北亚。

这一优势至关重要，尤其是对日本、韩国和其他亚洲油气进口国而言。日本最大的发电企业JERA表示，阿拉斯加不仅紧邻亚洲需求中心，且拥有长期处于待开发状态的大型天然气储量，有助于保障该地区的液化天然气供应安全。换句话说，阿拉斯加液化天然气项目不再仅仅是一个商业提案。随着中东危机加剧，它正被逐渐重新塑造为一项能源安全资产。

但，北极红利并非美国独有。俄罗斯的北极液化天然气虽然受到制裁，但并未被完全排挤出市场；其中一部分正持续流向亚洲买家。如果说美国正从这一增值项目的“安全溢价”中获利，那么俄罗斯的北极资源作为维持出口和体现制裁之下经济韧性的手段也变得更加重要。

随着资源安全和航运线路在当今世界越来越重要，俄罗斯北极资产的重要性可能会增加——即便这种重要性仍受到制裁和外部压力的制约。

美俄之外，其他北极国家也在受益，但方式不尽相同。对于挪威来说，相比出口量的激增，现有供应关系的战略价值上升使之获益更多。奥斯陆从未忽视极地油气资源：目前已将获得许可的油气勘探区块扩大到76个，其中68个位于巴伦支海。然而，这种潜在收益受到产能的限制。挪威国家石油公司最近表示，其已没有富余的油气产能可以投向市场。

因此，挪威的北极红利不在于增加供应，而在于其已有产能所附带的安全溢价。

格陵兰方面，其北极红利来源于另一种模式。尽管在2021年停止发放新的油气勘探许可，但这并未降低其在新的战略版图中的重要性。随着各国政府越来越重视供应链多样化和关键矿产，格陵兰岛更可能从其战略资源的价值提升而非油气储量中受益。

加拿大获得的收益则更加间接，其体现不太在于油气资源本身，而更多表现在北方基础设施重要性的提升、关键矿产开发的推进，以及高纬度资源安全地位的上升。

接下来的问题是，尽管乌克兰战争仍在进行，这种不断变化的格局最终是否会促使各国以某种方式恢复与俄罗斯的合作。答案不会是简单的肯定或否定，而是会趋于碎片化。

2022年2月22日，德国卢布明工业区的一幅地图上悬挂着关于北溪2号天然气管道标识（图源：德新社）

在欧洲，相关政治和法律障碍难以逾越。针对俄罗斯管道天然气和液化天然气，欧盟已经通过了正式禁令，将逐步实现2027年初全面禁止从俄罗斯进口液化天然气，2027年秋起全面禁止进口俄罗斯管道天然气。欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩警告称，重新依赖俄罗斯化石燃料将是一个“战略错误”。因此，欧盟与莫斯科的能源关系在短期内不太可能回到曾经的状态。

然而，要求重新审视这一立场的压力并未消失。比利时首相德韦弗最近主张，欧洲应恢复与俄罗斯的关系以重新获得廉价能源。他的言论随即引发了强烈反对，但也同时表明，未来任何与俄罗斯相关的能源合作都更可能呈现出分歧而非趋同：欧洲与俄罗斯的联系将继续萎缩，而亚洲市场和一些非西方国家可能仍会保留选择性接触的空间。

这一切并不意味着北极可以取代海湾地区，而证明一个能源中心的动荡会提高其他替代地区的战略溢价。

这一点才是北极红利的真实含义——非指该地区突然变得更富庶，而是世界重新意识到，当传统能源中心变得不再稳定时，高纬度资源、航道和基础设施的战略分量会相应增加。

北极不再仅仅是气候变化与区域治理有关的遥远舞台；它正日益成为能源安全、供应链重组和大国竞争等因素交织的前沿地带。那些能够将资源优势转化为更安全的供应、更强的基础设施布局和更大的战略影响力的一方，将在全球竞争的下一阶段占据先机。

对于包括中国在内的主要能源消费国而言，问题不在于是否追逐北极红利，而在于是否理解了正在发生的深层转变。海湾地区或许仍是全球能源的重心，但随着地缘政治风险的扩散，高北纬地区的战略价值只会不断攀升。

以下为英文原文：

As traditional energy centres become less stable, the Arctic’s resources, shipping routes and infrastructure are growing in importance

Gulf exporters are scrambling to bypass the Strait of Hormuz after Iran choked off most of the maritime traffic in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rushed to divert exports through overland pipelines; officials warned that even naval escorts could not guarantee safe passage. About a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passed through this narrow waterway.

The immediate shock was felt in the Gulf. The strategic aftershock is being felt much farther north.

That shift is visible in Alaska. The US-backed Alaska LNG project now aims to finalise investment decisions on the pipeline this year and on the export terminal early next year, with first exports by 2031. With planned capacity of 20 million tonnes a year and preliminary commitments covering about 13 million tonnes, the project is gaining fresh momentum. Importantly, Alaska offers something Gulf suppliers cannot: direct access to North Asia without passing through Hormuz.

That matters, especially for Japan, South Korea and other Asian importers. JERA, Japan’s largest power generator, has said Alaska offers proximity to Asian demand centres and access to long-stranded large gas reserves, helping to support regional LNG supply security. Alaska LNG, in other words, is no longer just a commercial proposition. With instability in the Middle East, it is increasingly being reframed as an energy security asset.

But the Arctic windfall is not confined to the United States. Russia’s Arctic LNG, though sanctioned, has not been pushed out of the market altogether; part of it is continuing to shift towards Asian buyers. If the US is gaining from the security premium attached to a newly revalued project, Russia’s Arctic resources are also mattering more as a means of sustaining exports and economic resilience under pressure.

As the world places greater weight on resource security and shipping routes, the importance of Russia’s Arctic assets may increase – even as that importance remains constrained by sanctions and external pressure.

Other Arctic actors are benefiting too, but not in the same way. For Norway, the gain lies less in a sudden export surge than in the rising strategic value of its existing supply. Oslo has not stepped back from Arctic hydrocarbons: it has expanded its licensed oil and gas exploration blocks to 76, including 68 in the Barents Sea. But the upside is capped by capacity. Norwegian energy giant Equinor recently said it had no spare oil and gas capacity left to bring to market.

Norway’s Arctic gain, then, is not about ramping up supply so much as about the security premium attached to what it already produces.

Greenland points to a different kind of Arctic gain. Its decision to stop issuing new oil and gas exploration licences in 2021 does not make it irrelevant to the new strategic picture. As governments across the world place greater emphasis on supply-chain diversification and critical minerals, Greenland is more likely to benefit from the rising value of strategic resources than from hydrocarbons.

Canada’s gains are even more indirect, reflected less in hydrocarbons than in the growing importance of northern infrastructure, critical mineral development and high-latitude resource security.

The next question is whether this shifting landscape will eventually bring countries back into some form of cooperation with Russia, despite the war in Ukraine. The answer will not be a simple yes or no. It will be fragmented.

In Europe, the political and legal barriers remain high. The European Union has formally adopted a stepwise ban on Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports, with LNG imports to be fully prohibited from the beginning of 2027, and pipeline gas from autumn 2027. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has warned that returning to Russian fossil fuels would be a “strategic blunder”. Europe is therefore unlikely to return any time soon to the energy relationship it once had with Moscow.

Yet the pressure to revisit that position has not disappeared. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever recently argued that Europe should restore relations with Russia to regain access to cheaper energy. His remarks triggered an immediate backlash but also suggest any future Russia-related energy cooperation will be marked more by divergence than convergence: Europe will continue shrinking its ties, while Asian markets and some non-Western actors may still leave room for selective engagement.

None of this means the Arctic can replace the Gulf. It means, instead, that instability in one energy centre raises the strategic premium on alternatives elsewhere.

This, ultimately, is the real meaning of the Arctic’s windfall. The region is not suddenly becoming richer. Rather, the world is rediscovering that when traditional energy centres become less stable, high-latitude resources, shipping routes and infrastructure gain strategic weight.

The Arctic is no longer just a distant arena of climate change and regional governance; it is increasingly a frontier where energy security, supply-chain restructuring and great-power competition meet. Those who can turn resource advantages into more secure supply, stronger infrastructure positioning and greater strategic influence will hold the edge in the next phase of global competition.

For major energy consumers, including China, the issue is not whether to chase an Arctic windfall, but whether they understand the deeper shift under way. The Gulf may remain the world’s energy centre of gravity, but as geopolitical risk spreads, the strategic value of the high north will only keep rising.