洪农：特朗普的格陵兰叙事，考验的不只是北约

Club提要：1月18日，中美研究中心（ICAS）主任、北京对话特约专家洪农在《南华早报》撰文指出，格陵兰岛不仅是战略要地，更是检验同盟体系如何处理主权与信任问题的试金石。文章结合特朗普近期就格陵兰问题的强势表态，警示美方将其视为“资源猎物”的叙事正在侵蚀跨大西洋同盟信誉，并可能外溢至印太地区，加剧全球治理不确定性。

1月18日，洪农在南华早报发文（图源：《南华早报》网页截图）

过去，有关美国收购格陵兰岛的讨论常被视作一种言语上的挑衅而被一笔带过。然而，最新的事态升级却让人难以视而不见。就在美国副总统万斯准备接待丹麦及格陵兰岛外长前数小时，特朗普宣称，如果美国不能控制格陵兰岛，那是“不可接受的”。

当领土野心与高层外交交织在一起时，它迫使盟友划下公开的红线，压缩了进行低调危机管理的空间，并将原本可能的谈判姿态演变为一场关于信誉的较量。

格陵兰岛的战略意义毋庸置疑。它扼守北大西洋与北极航道，拥有关键的早期预警与威慑基础设施，并在有关关键矿产与供应链的辩论中日益占据中心位置。但除此之外，格陵兰岛更是一个测试案例，检验同盟在面对大国竞争时如何处理主权、规范与信任问题。

对于北约和欧洲伙伴而言，丹麦是条约盟友；格陵兰岛虽实行自治，但法理上属于丹麦王国。这一宪法现实使得有关领土控制的言论显得格外敏感。

2025年9月17日，丹麦武装部队成员在格陵兰岛康克鲁斯瓦克（Kangerlussuaq）参加联合军事演习（图源：路透社）

欧洲领导人被迫将格陵兰岛视为一个关乎主权与同盟原则的问题，而非普通的争端。丹麦领导人对此的回应是，在重申主权的同时强调北极安全应通过北约合作来加强，而非双边交易。与此同时，格陵兰地方领导人也面临压力，必须对外宣示自治权、维护其内部合法性。

对美国而言，代价在于务实合作正变得难以维系。在同盟政治中，基调即是信任的信号。在万斯会议之前，丹麦和格陵兰官员已表示，他们正与北约盟友密切合作，增加在格陵兰及周边地区的军事存在，包括计划贯穿2026一整年的演习活动。

美方有些人会辩称，控制格陵兰是国家安全的必需。然而，安全逻辑并不能自动转化为可被接受的主权索求。一旦领土话语进入公共讨论，问题就不再仅仅是特朗普在格陵兰想要什么，而是同盟内部适用何种规则：什么样的话语是被允许的？什么样的压力是可以接受的？当涉及领土完整问题时，小国盟友又该如何解读美国的承诺？

正因如此，格陵兰问题应被视为一种对同盟关系管理的挑战。联盟的能力固然重要，但其信誉同样建立在克制、安抚与可预测性之上，尤其是在内部成员之间。如果美国要求盟友在一个战区承担风险，它就必须避免在另一个战区制造不必要的焦虑。同盟凝聚力是一种战略资产；对其漫不经心的对待所带来的代价，将远超任何新闻周期的热度。

2025年3月28日，美国副总统万斯视察位于格陵兰岛的美军皮图菲克太空基地（图源：路透社）

格陵兰的治理其实存在一条务实的替代路径：在投资能力、基础设施建设和透明的经济伙伴关系方面展开竞争。格陵兰的长期需求并非秘密。互联互通、港口、能源系统、劳动力发展、行政能力以及监管专业知识，将决定项目如何推进以及谁能从中受益。如果美国希望获得更强的存在感，它可以寻求与格陵兰当地的优先事项保持一致，而非表现得像是要凌驾于其上。

有关关键矿产的辩论常常走偏，因为格陵兰岛被框定成了一个需要得到“保障”的资源奖品。这种论调会起到反效果并吓退资本，将商业项目变成主权冲突的导火索。

一种更低风险的路径是互利发展：提供符合格陵兰优先事项的治理支持、可信融资以及透明标准。这种战略成果——更高的协调一致性和更大的准入权——完全可以通过更少的政治摩擦来实现

对于欧洲而言，教训同样清晰。如果跨大西洋共同体希望减少对脆弱供应链的依赖，它必须有能力支持资源开发，而不是将其变成零和的主权大戏。这需要耐心的资本、可信的监管合作以及对当地政治环境的尊重。换言之，同盟需要一套“经济方略”工具箱来以补充（而非破坏）其安全目标。

1月13日，丹麦哥本哈根市面上的一顶反“MAGA”棒球帽，上面绣有“现在轮到努克了！”（Now it’s Nuuk!）和“美国走开”（Make America go away）的标语（图源：欧新社）

认为格陵兰只是大西洋两岸之间的争执，与亚洲的关联不大的观点是错误的。北极正日益通过跨战区的同盟信誉、与矿产与基础设施有关政治经济形势、塑造准入的治理规则这三个渠道与印太战略联系起来。

首先，信誉具有传导性。鉴于近期民调显示，仅有17%的美国人支持收购格陵兰岛，美国国内升级事态的空间有限。但在国外，被感知到的不可预测性会促使盟友在责任分担、实施制裁及经济安全协调等方面进行悄然的对冲。这在印太地区至关重要，因为美国在那里高度依赖联盟的凝聚力。

其次，高度安全化的框架重塑了资本流动与时间节奏。关注北极矿产、能源和物流的亚洲企业及政府密切注视着政治风险信号；当一个地区存在主权争议时，就会导致投资放缓、不确定性上升、交易成本攀升。这不仅是欧洲的问题，它也压缩了包括中国、日本、韩国、印度及东南亚在内的外部行为体的机会空间。

第三，治理与标准正成为真正的战场。如果美欧摩擦加剧，关于采购规则、两用技术限制、投资审查及数据治理的协调将更难维持。这增加了所有人的不确定性，尤其是那些需要清晰规则的局外人。

北约秘书长马克·吕特出席第56届世界经济论坛（图源：南华早报）

将格陵兰岛变成一个长期问题的最快方式，就是让辩论固化为主权竞赛。更低风险的路径是将其视为同盟治理问题：在深化北极布局的同时维护伙伴信任。最理想的路径是政治承诺与务实行动的结合：在明确尊重主权的同时，提供可靠的资金支持，并开展契合格陵兰发展需求的合作。

格陵兰岛的战略价值不会凭空消散。但在同盟体系已成为大国博弈核心筹码的今天，战略信誉的基石是政策的可预测性、行动的协调性以及兑现承诺的能力，绝非胁迫性的政治话术。北极不需要另一场主权大戏；它需要一套能实现同盟安全的行动指南。

（以下为英文原文）

Talk of the United States acquiring Greenland has often been dismissed as rhetorical provocation. But the latest escalation is harder to wave away. President Donald Trump said it would be “unacceptable” if the US did not control Greenland only hours before Vice-President J.D. Vance hosted the Danish and Greenlandic foreign ministers.

When territorial language is paired with senior-level diplomacy, it forces allies to draw public red lines, narrows the space for quiet crisis management, and turns what might have been a bargaining posture into a credibility contest.

Greenland’s strategic significance is real. It sits astride the North Atlantic and Arctic routes, hosts key early warning and deterrent infrastructure, and is increasingly central to debates over critical minerals and supply chains. But more than that, Greenland is a test case for how alliances handle sovereignty, norms and trust amid great power rivalry.

For Nato and European partners, Denmark is a treaty ally; Greenland is self-governing but part of the Kingdom of Denmark. That constitutional reality makes territorial language uniquely combustible.

European leaders are pushed to treat Greenland as a sovereignty-and-alliance issue, not a routine dispute. Danish leaders have responded by reaffirming sovereignty while emphasising that Arctic security should be strengthened through Nato cooperation rather than bilateral bargaining. Greenlandic leaders, meanwhile, face pressure to signal autonomy and protect local legitimacy.

For Washington, the cost is that practical cooperation becomes harder to sustain. In alliance politics, tone is a trust signal. Ahead of the Vance meeting, Danish and Greenlandic officials said they were increasing their military presence in and around Greenland in close cooperation with Nato allies, including exercise activities planned throughout 2026.

Some in Washington will argue Greenland is a national security necessity. But security logic does not automatically translate into acceptable sovereignty claims. And once territorial language enters the discourse, the question becomes not only what Washington wants in Greenland, but what rules apply inside the alliance: what is permitted rhetoric or acceptable pressure, and how smaller allies interpret American commitments when the object is their territory.

This is why the Greenland episode is best understood as an alliance management challenge. Capability matters, but credibility also rests on restraint, reassurance and predictability – especially among treaty partners. If the US asks allies to take risks in one theatre, it must also avoid generating unnecessary anxiety in another. Alliance cohesion is a strategic asset; treating it casually imposes costs that outlast any news cycle.

There is a practical alternative: compete through investment capacity, infrastructure delivery and transparent economic partnership. Greenland’s long-term needs are not a secret. Connectivity, ports, energy systems, workforce development, administrative capacity and regulatory expertise will determine how projects proceed and who benefits. If Washington wants a stronger presence, it can pursue an approach that aligns with Greenlandic priorities rather than appearing to override them.

The critical-minerals debate is often mishandled because Greenland is framed as a resource prize to be “secured”. That framing invites backlash and deters capital – turning projects into sovereignty flashpoints.

A lower-risk approach is mutually beneficial development: governance support, credible financing and transparent standards aligned with Greenlandic priorities. The strategic outcome – greater alignment and access – can be achieved with far less political friction.

For Europe, too, the lesson is clear. If the transatlantic community wants to reduce reliance on fragile supply chains, it must be able to support resource development without turning it into a zero-sum sovereignty drama. That requires patient capital, credible regulatory cooperation and respect for local political constraints. In other words, alliances need an “economic statecraft” toolkit that complements security goals rather than undermines them.

Treating Greenland as a transatlantic quarrel with limited relevance to Asia would be a mistake. The Arctic is increasingly linked to the Indo-Pacific strategy through three channels: alliance credibility across theatres, the political economy of minerals and infrastructure, and governance rules that shape access.

First, credibility travels. With only 17 per cent of Americans backing efforts to acquire Greenland in a recent poll, the domestic margin for escalation is limited. Abroad, perceived unpredictability invites quiet hedging among allies – on burden-sharing, sanctions and economic-security coordination. That matters in the Indo-Pacific, where the US depends on coalition cohesion.

Second, highly securitised framing reshapes capital and timelines. Asian companies and governments tracking Arctic minerals, energy and logistics watch political risk signals closely; when a territory becomes a sovereignty battleground, investment slows, uncertainty rises and transaction costs climb. This is not only a European problem – it narrows the opportunity set for external actors, including in China, Japan, South Korea, India and Southeast Asia.

Third, governance and standards are becoming the real battleground. If US-Europe friction deepens, coordination on procurement rules, dual-use restrictions, investment review and data governance may become harder to sustain. That raises uncertainty for everyone – especially outsiders who need clarity.

The quickest way to turn Greenland into a chronic headache is for the debate to harden into a sovereignty contest. A lower-risk path is to treat it as an alliance-governance problem: deepen Arctic positioning while preserving partner trust. That works best when clear reassurance on sovereignty is matched by practical delivery – credible financing and cooperation aligned with Greenlandic priorities.

Greenland’s strategic value will not disappear. But in an era where alliances are a core source of leverage, credibility is built through predictability, coordination and delivery – not coercive framing. The Arctic does not need another sovereignty drama; it needs an alliance-safe playbook.