基式外交：中东和平的新契机 @《基式外交研究》2025年第8期

作者：亨利・A・基辛格

来源：大外交青年智库基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第8期

文源：Kissinger, Henry A. “A New Opening for Mideast Peace.” The Washington Post. December 3, 2004.

声明：基式外交研究中心转载、编译与翻译的内容均为非商业性引用（学术研究），不作商用，如有问题请即刻联系

一、中文翻译

三件戏剧性事件重塑了看似死气沉沉的中东外交格局，并为美国的重大外交行动开辟了道路：布什总统连任、亚西尔・阿拉法特逝世，以及以色列总理阿里埃勒・沙龙承诺从加沙地带撤军并拆除当地犹太人定居点。

成功的外交是必要性与机遇的结合。布什首届任期内，大西洋两岸多次呼吁美国启动和平进程，但彼时成功条件尚不具备。只要阿拉法特担任巴勒斯坦权力机构主席，他拒绝放弃恐怖主义、纵容自杀式爆炸袭击，以及腐败混乱的领导方式，注定了实质性谈判无法开展。阿拉法特的负面存在与圣战主义压力交织，使温和阿拉伯国家难以发挥建设性作用。

在以色列，沙龙凭借拒绝前任巴拉克在戴维营提出的“归还约旦河西岸90%土地”的纲领上台，其领导的利库德集团议席翻倍。沙龙坚持将结束巴勒斯坦起义作为谈判前提。欧洲领导人呼吁美国更积极介入，但支持的方案不切实际：以色列退至1967年边界、耶路撒冷分治、拆除1967年后的定居点、国际力量保障难民象征性回归（北约或联合国）——而这一切仅以巴勒斯坦承认以色列生存权为交换，这在外交中本是默认前提。以色列历任领导人（即使最鸽派）从未认为退至半个世纪前的停火线符合国家安全，巴勒斯坦亦从未明确承认以色列的合法性。

拆除定居点违背犹太国家历史，外部安全保障亦不可靠。若连以色列军队（自身家属安危系于一线）都无法保卫边境，国际部队更难胜任。此类部队更可能沦为恐怖分子勒索的人质（如伊拉克案例），或成为恐怖组织策划袭击的屏障。

布什政府拒绝将外交资本投入注定失败的事业，反而使温和势力利益交汇，有望实现突破。布什是首位赢得以色列深度信任的美国总统，以方明白其不会蓄意危及以色列安全——这是美国行动的心理基础。同时，以色列政局剧变：沙龙提出归还加沙并拆除定居点，开启了基于人口现实分治巴勒斯坦的新思路。

有人质疑沙龙此举实为巩固约旦河西岸控制的策略，但沙龙清楚，若破坏布什任内建立巴勒斯坦国的承诺，将失去美国支持，这就需要在领土问题上做出妥协。沙龙为此付出利库德集团多数席位代价，率少数派政府拆除加沙全部及约旦河西岸4个定居点，标志以色列政策革命性转折。他还修建安全隔离墙，划定无需国际干预的分界线，区分了耶路撒冷周边受保护的定居点与非战略要地。

阿拉法特去世后，巴勒斯坦新领导层摆脱其阴影，有望建立透明治理、确认与以色列共存并摒弃恐怖主义，消除全面协议的主要障碍。但挑战严峻：加沙派系分裂、哈马斯暴力肆虐、巴权力机构与武装分子合作、腐败横行。若撤军导致权力真空，混乱将葬送和平希望。巴勒斯坦需建立负责任领导层并放弃恐怖主义，选举狱中激进分子巴尔古提将背离这一方向。温和派需阿拉伯国家、西方及以色列支持方能推进改革。

大西洋两岸渐意识到持续摩擦损及根本利益。欧洲盟友因缺乏公众支持或信念参与伊拉克军事行动，转而认同将部分美国目标（如伊拉克重建）纳入自身议程。通过迎合阿拉伯激进势力与美国竞争只会导致僵局，并因巴勒斯坦问题悬而未决削弱温和派地位。布什总统似愿重建欧美传统伙伴关系。

新中东政策的挑战在于整合多元要素：以色列政策、巴勒斯坦温和化、与友好阿拉伯国家关系、与欧俄中印等关键力量的互动，以及伊拉克战争。布什首届任期各自为政，第二届任期可制定综合战略，构建温和派和平联盟。此类政策需以积极目标为导向，而非被动缓解矛盾。

这要求各方具备远见：以色列不能接受以消灭自己为目标的邻国，但也不应拖延和平进程至西岸完全民主化。其有权要求对方承认共存并解散恐怖机构，再行撤离数万定居者。美欧应以改善西岸民生、提供治理技术援助等措施，鼓励巴勒斯坦建立稳定无恐政权。

伊拉克危机将影响温和阿拉伯政权的立场。它们深知自身命运或系于美国在伊拉克的成败：若美国失利，鲜有阿拉伯领导人愿冒险支持巴方妥协；若1月30日选举增强合法性且安全改善，阿拉伯或支持巴方倡议。

巴勒斯坦问题并非缓解伊拉克困境的工具，二者是同一问题的两面。各方需直面重大抉择：以色列需认识到人口与技术趋势使拖延益发危险；巴勒斯坦若拒妥协将令民众再陷世代苦难；欧洲需破除“美国是谈判救世主”的幻想，推动双方互让。

渐进式和平进程已至尽头，剩余次要问题无法满足各方。既往路线图因措辞模糊得以谈判，此次需更精确的路线图。现有四方机制、欧洲盟友及俄罗斯应明确解决方案原则，寻求地区大国支持并主导实施。

以巴美近期变化使领土与巴方义务具体化成为可能：以1967年边界为基础、参照戴维营与塔巴原则划定安全隔离墙，除5-8%战略防御用地外，西岸全部归还巴勒斯坦。以色列可将北部阿拉伯人口密集区领土转让巴方以改善人口平衡，分界线外定居点将由巴方管辖（可能被放弃）。计划需规定加沙撤军至谈判结束期间的临时政府安排。巴方必须真正承认以色列、建立透明机构并解散境内及邻国针对以色列的恐怖组织。

我们必须清醒：任何维护以色列的计划都无法安抚激进势力，新方案不会赢得各方感激，其部分内容在以色列仍将遭遇抵制，亦无法解决伊拉克困局或终结中东反美情绪。但美国强有力的领导可激励地区温和派，使其有动力与理由摒弃导致地区世代冲突的政策。

这一方案可为中东未来提供符合各方尊严与人类良知的愿景，展现一条融合以美友谊、盟友关切及温和派利益的破局之路，使伊斯兰世界能以符合其伟大传统的方式——而非作为灾难——发挥重要作用。

二、英语原文

Three dramatic events have recast the seemingly moribund Middle East diplomacy and opened the way for a major American diplomatic initiative: the reelection of President Bush, the death of Yasser Arafat, and the commitment of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to withdraw from Gaza and dismantle Jewish settlements there.

Successful diplomacy represents a merger of necessity with opportunity. During Bush's first term there were many appeals from both sides of the Atlantic for American initiatives to start a peace process. But the conditions for success did not exist. So long as Arafat was president of the Palestinian Authority, his refusal to renounce terrorism, his encouragement of suicide bombings, and his corrupt and chaotic leadership doomed meaningful negotiation. And Arafat's blighting presence, combined with the pressures of jihadism, prevented moderate Arab states from playing a helpful role.

In Israel, Sharon had come to power, more than doubling the seats in parliament of his conservative Likud Party, on the basis of a program that rejected the proposal made at Camp David by his predecessor, Ehud Barak, to return more than 90 percent of the West Bank to Palestinian rule. Sharon insisted, as a precondition to any negotiation, on an end to the intifada.

European leaders appealed for a more active U.S. role, but on behalf of an unfulfillable program: return of Israel to the 1967 frontiers; partition of Jerusalem; abandonment of settlements beyond the 1967 line; and some symbolic return of refugees guaranteed by some kind of international force, (NATO or the United Nations-all this in return for no tangible quid pro quo other than a formal acceptance of Israel's right to existence, a point generally taken for granted in diplomacy. No Israeli leader-even the most dovish-has ever considered as compatible with Israel's security a return to the cease-fire line of a war that ended over a half-century ago. Nor have Palestinian leaders ever unambiguously accepted the legitimacy of Israel in any borders.

The abandonment of settlements ran counter to the entire history of the Jewish state, while the idea of a security guarantee by outside forces provided no assurances. If Israeli armed forces, with their own families at risk, are not able to secure Israel's frontiers, no international contingent is apt to do so. More likely, such a contingent would become hostage to terrorist blackmail, as has happened in Iraq, or become a screen behind which terrorist groups could plan attacks without fear of preemption.

The Bush administration's refusal to expend U.S. diplomatic capital on a doomed enterprise has brought matters to a point where a confluence of interests of all moderate forces might initiate a breakthrough. No previous president has done as much to earn Israel's trust as George W. Bush. Israel's leaders realize that he will not knowingly risk Israel's security-the psychological precondition for a U.S. initiative. At the same time, the Israeli political scene has been transformed. By offering the return of Gaza to Arab rule and the dismantling of the Jewish settlements there, Sharon has opened the possibility of a new approach based on a partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state substantially reflecting demographic reality.

Some reject this interpretation of Sharon's policies, asserting that the surrender of Gaza is only a tactic to solidify Israel's hold on the West Bank. But Sharon surely knows that he will not be able to maintain U.S. support if he undermines Bush's repeated commitment to bring about a Palestinian state during his presidency. This requires a territorial compromise.

Sharon has acted on this premise. At the price of losing his Likud majority and governing with a minority coalition, he has taken the crucial step of abandoning all settlements in Gaza and four on the West Bank, marking a revolutionary departure in Israeli policy. He has also established a security fence between Israeli and Palestinian territory, defining a dividing line that provides its own security without the need of a shaky international presence. It also permits a distinction between those settlements close to the 1967 line and protected by the security fence-mostly around Jerusalem-and those not essential to Israel's security.

Among the Palestinians, Arafat's death removes a figure who viewed the peace process as at best a tactical pause in a struggle to eventually remove what he considered the illegitimate Israeli presence. A new Palestinian leadership freed of the Arafat incubus has an opportunity to create transparent governance, affirm coexistence with Israel and renounce terrorist tactics, thereby removing major obstacles to an overall agreement.

These obstacles are immense. Gaza is riven by factions. Hamas is a major force for violence; the military units of the Palestinian Authority have been cooperating with the militants. Corruption and lawlessness are endemic. If the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza leads to a collapse of authority, the resulting chaos could destroy all hopes for progress. The Palestinians have an obligation to produce a responsible, transparent leadership and to abandon reliance on terrorism. The election of Marwan Barghouti, the militant serving time in an Israeli prison, would be inconsistent with these prospects. But moderate Palestinians cannot take these steps by themselves. To be able to make the difficult decisions that await them, they need the support of friendly Arab states, the West and Israel.

Both sides of the Atlantic are beginning to recognize that constant friction is against their fundamental interests. Key European allies, unable or unwilling to generate either the public support or the conviction to associate themselves with the military effort in Iraq, understand the importance of making at least some of the American objectives their own (including political and economic reconstruction efforts in Iraq). Competing with the United States by appealing to radical Arab trends guarantees a stalemate and, by keeping open the Palestinian wound, undermines the position of all moderates threatened by fundamentalists and radical jihadists. For his part, President Bush appears receptive to rebuilding the traditional partnership with Europe.

The challenge of a new approach to Middle East policy will be to meld divergent strands into a coherent and compatible whole: the policies of Israel; a moderate Palestinian evolution; relations with friendly Arab states; relations with important players such as our European allies, Russia, and, ultimately, even China and India; and the Iraq war. In Bush's first term, these issues were handled individually; the second term presents an opportunity to develop an integrated strategy for bringing about a coalition of moderates for peace. Such a policy needs to be put forward with a strong affirmation of positive purposes, not defensively as a means to ease difficulties.

This presupposes farsighted policies by all concerned. Israel cannot be asked to accept as a neighbor a state dedicated to its eradication. At the same time, it must not insist on postponing the beginning of the peace process until democratization on the West Bank is complete. But it has every right to demand the acceptance of genuine coexistence and the disavowal of the apparatus of terrorism before it agrees to move tens of thousands of its settlers from the West Bank. The United States, Europe and Israel should undertake some confidence-building measures to encourage the Palestinians toward a stable, terrorism-free regime by easing the conditions of life on the West Bank and, if asked, extending technical assistance to its governance.

The degree to which the moderate Arab regimes are prepared to abandon their positions on the fence and provide the necessary legitimacy will inevitably be affected by the Iraqi crisis. They are well aware that the fate of moderate regimes in the region may be decided by the outcome of the U.S. efforts in Iraq. If America falters, few Arab leaders will increase their peril by supporting the adjustments in the Palestinian position that a settlement requires. If the Jan. 30 elections lead to enhanced legitimacy, and security improves, Arab support for a Palestine initiative may well be forthcoming.

A Palestinian initiative is not, as is often stated, a way to ease the situation in Iraq. The two problems are two sides of the same coin. All parties will have to come to grips with major decisions. Israel must recognize that demographic and technological trends make procrastination increasingly precarious. Palestinian leaders must understand that if they reject compromise, they doom their people to another generation of suffering and frustration. European leaders need to understand that they contribute most effectively to peace by counteracting the illusion that America is the deus ex machina of negotiations that delivers the maximum Arab program without any sacrifice on the Palestinians' part. They should foster the recognition that both sides need to make major concessions.

We have come to the end of the step-by-step process. There are not enough peripheral issues left that might satisfy the parties even partially. Heretofore, road maps have been negotiable only if phrased in language so general and ambiguous as to permit each of the parties to interpret it in the manner most closely approximating their position. This time a more precise and specific road map should guide the peace process. The existing Quartet, key European allies and Russia, should define the principles and outlines of a possible settlement, seek the support of regional powers and take a leadership role in its implementation.

The recent changes in Israel, Palestine and the United States permit some specificity, with respect to territory and to Palestinian obligations. The territorial dividing line should be defined by a security fence paralleling the 1967 borders along principles discussed at Camp David and Taba. This would return all of the West Bank to Palestinian rule except the 5 to 8 percent needed for the strategic defense of Israel.

In compensation, Israel would transfer some of its current territory to the Palestinian state. It would be best to transfer territory with significant Arab populations from the northern part of Israel to improve the demographic balance. Israeli settlements located beyond the dividing line would be subject to Palestinian jurisdiction, which would probably imply their abandonment. Finally, such a plan should set forth provisions for the establishment and support of an interim government in Gaza for the time between the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the conclusion of negotiations. The Palestinian contribution to peace must be a genuine recognition of Israel, transparent institutions and a dismantling of the terrorist apparatus on Palestinian territory or aimed at Israel from other neighboring states.

We should have no illusions. No plan that preserves Israel will pacify radical Arabs or those Palestinians who view negotiations as an interim step on the road to eradication of Israel. A new plan would not gain the gratitude of the parties, since they have to make major sacrifices. Aspects of it will be bitterly resisted in Israel, however much implied in current Israeli policy. It will not solve our dilemmas in Iraq or end hostility to America in the Middle East. But strong U.S. leadership could give moderate leaders in the region the incentive and justification to overcome a policy that dooms the region to another generation of struggle and death.

It could provide a vision for the future of the Middle East compatible with the dignity of all parties and our own conscience. It could show a path out of the current impasse that combines our friendship with Israel, concern for the views of our allies, and the stake all moderates have in enabling the Islamic world to play a major role not as a scourge but in a manner compatible with its own great traditions.