美国以为自己很牛，其实连弱国都搞不定

美国《外交政策》网站4月26日刊登哈佛大学国际关系教授斯蒂芬·沃尔特文章《美国没有自己想象的那么强大》。

文：Stephen M. Walt

译：李翠萍

美国现在到底有多强大？

它还是当年那个单极强国吗？还能把自身意志强加于对手、盟友和中立国吗？还是那个哪怕政策再愚蠢、再危险、再有悖于别国利益，都可以强迫它们忍气吞声吗？还是说，美国实力其实存在明确而显著的局限，以至于它在设定和追求目标的时候必须更具选择性和战略性呢？

特朗普政府——尤其是在博尔顿成为白宫国家安全事务助理以及蓬佩奥接任国务卿之后——愈发倾向于前一种观念。不管特朗普最初的直觉是什么，博尔顿和蓬佩奥的上位都标志着美国开始回归小布什首届任期（副总统切尼和新保守派当道）时那种单边主义、斩尽杀绝式的对外政策。

那个时期的一个关键特征是，人们纷纷认为美国已经强大到了一种地步，可以单枪匹马解决许多问题，只需展示实力和决心就能恫吓其他国家，让它们屈服。

据说小布什的高级顾问卡尔·罗夫曾对一位名叫罗恩·苏斯金德的记者说：“今天的我们是一个帝国，我们采取行动的时候，就在创造新的现实。”对那时的美国来说，妥协和建设联盟是懦夫和绥靖者才干的事，正如切尼在2003年所说：“跟邪恶没什么好谈的，打就是了”。

尽管小布什和切尼的做法导致美国遭遇了一系列失败，但这种单边主义傲慢心态仍然延续到了特朗普政府。从特朗普对中国等许多经贸伙伴威胁甚至真的发动贸易战的决策来看，这种傲慢心态显而易见。同样，这正是这种心态导致美国冲动地放弃了跨太平洋伙伴关系协定，并退出了巴黎气候协定。

正是在这种心态的作用下，美国政府对朝鲜和伊朗摆出了“要么接受要么挨揍”的外交态度，提出不切实际的要求，然后加大制裁力度，指望这两个国家缴械投降，对美国唯命是从。但实际上这种对朝和对伊政策已屡屡被证明行不通。

这种单边主义傲慢心态在美国最近实施二级制裁的决定中体现得更加明显，美国将惩罚那些还在购买伊朗石油的国家，这可能导致油价上涨，并损害美国与中国、印度、土耳其、日本和韩国等国家之间的关系。

美国“首席裙带官”、特朗普女婿兼高级顾问库什纳一直承诺要披露新的所谓中东和平计划，也许它会让以色列总理内塔尼亚胡、共和党金主谢尔顿·阿德尔森和其他“大以色列”概念的支持者们感到高兴，但几乎可以肯定的是，它不会对地区和平事业有丝毫推动作用。

美国政府过早地承认胡安·瓜伊多作为委内瑞拉临时总统，并提出“马杜罗必须下台”的强硬要求。从中可以看出美国对自己具备控制结果的强大能力充满信心，但不管结果多么有利，美国都应该事先好好考虑到底如何着手行动。

所有这些政策背后的基本假设都是：对手必然在美国的压力下被迫服从美国的要求，而且其他国家也无法找到任何办法逃避、阻挠、转移、稀释、对冲、妨碍甚至抵消华盛顿方面采取的行动。它假定我们仍然生活在冷战后的单极时刻，只要美国有意愿动用实力就无往不利。

也许最重要的一点在于，这种对外政策道路不承认美国有必要在各种目的之间进行权衡。如果美国果真是全能的，那么在采购伊朗石油问题上制裁中国将不会影响中美贸易谈判，土耳其也不会因为受到类似压力而与俄罗斯越走越近。

美国还进一步假定，北约盟友万分迫切地希望美军驻守欧洲，以至于它们愿意接受美国再三的羞辱，还会追随美国去对抗中国——尽管越来越多的证据表明，实际情况并非如此。这种心态还导致美国看不到把宝全压在埃及、以色列、沙特阿拉伯和海湾地区有什么坏处，也不认为与伊朗或其他国家关系恶化甚至开战会造成太大风险。

美国鹰派人士觉得至少在短期内可以采取这种对外政策，其实这也不难理解。因为尽管美国近年来有许多失误，但它仍然非常强大。美国的积极援助是一些国家渴望获得的，美国“专注的敌意”则是任何国家都不能忽视的。

美国仍然是一个巨大而有价值的市场，美元仍然是世界上主要的储备货币，美国有能力切断其他国家或金融机构与全球金融基础设施之间的联系，这给了华盛顿方面非同寻常的影响力。许多美国盟友习惯于顺从华盛顿，不愿做任何可能导致美国撤销支持的事情，这些都是可以理解的。

特朗普之流还可以得到波兰、匈牙利等欧洲右翼威权国家，以及道德败坏的中东盟国的支持。大多数美国人对外交政策并不那么在意，只要不付出过高的代价或过于丢人，大家一般对行政部门的主导没有太多异议。

即便美国具有以上优势，仍然有更具说服力的理由能解释为何这种具有霸凌性质的外交手段迄今没有取得重大成功，而且未来也不太可能成功。

首先，即使是实力比美国弱小得多的国家，也不愿屈服于美国的勒索。原因在于，一旦你在威逼之下露出屈从的迹象，接下来的要求可能就没有止境了。此外，当美国坚持让一个国家彻底投降时（比如让朝鲜全面解除武装或呼吁伊朗政权更迭），完全不提供任何好处来激励对方遵照美国的意愿。此外，由于特朗普在外交上表现得狡诈且反复无常，外国领导人又怎么会相信他（或蓬佩奥）给出的保证呢？把这些因素结合在一起，就知道美国很难达成协议。

其次，美国霸凌的对象几乎包括所有国家，这使它很难建立强大的联盟并依靠盟友支持来增进外交杠杆。这个问题在美国政府杂乱无章的对华经济外交中暴露无遗。由于美国退出了《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》，并与关键伙伴产生贸易争端，美国政府错过了组建工业强国大联盟以迫使中国改变经济行为的机会。

同样的教训也来自伊朗。特朗普政府有意扼杀伊朗核协议，这是显而易见的。它如此专注于撕毁协议，甚至有意惩罚其他签署国，徒劳地试图让伊朗臣服。尽管华盛顿背弃了协议，但德黑兰仍在继续遵守协议条款，但它的耐心不是无限的，特别要考虑到美国政府已经亮明其真实目标：政权更迭。

如果伊朗最终重新启动已搁置十多年之久的核武器计划，世界其他国家将不会站到美国一边支持其采取更有力的行动。为什么？因为所有人都知道，杀死伊核协议的是美国而不是伊朗，所以当美国控诉伊朗的行动时，不会有太多国家对美国抱以同情。如果华盛顿决定为自己的中东代理人出头再打一场战争，它们无疑会感到高兴，但不要指望它们或其他任何国家提供太多帮助。

第三，所有国家都不愿意接受他国摆布，更遑论这个国家还表现得自私、无常，并且对他国利益毫不掩饰的蔑视。因此，其他国家开始制定旨在限制美国影响力的变通方案也就不足为奇了，其中最突出的是它们开始设计全新的金融安排，避开那些华盛顿赖以胁迫盟国和对手的金融机构。正如亨利·法雷尔和亚伯拉罕·纽曼最近在《外交政策》杂志中所指出的，特朗普政府的强硬战术可能“不但不会让各国和企业减少与美国制裁对象的接触，反而可能导致各国和企业尽量减少接触美国领导的全球金融体系，并慢慢找到变通办法。随着时间的推移，这些变通办法甚至可能形成一整套行之有效的替代体系”。

最后，恃强凌弱只会刺激对手出于自身利益的考虑而联合起来，同时也推开了潜在的盟友。尽管中国和俄罗斯并非天然的盟友，但两国关系越来越密切绝非偶然。如果美国采取更明智的做法，也许会让莫斯科与北京保持距离。如果美国继续采取同样的霸凌手段冲动行事，将把像伊朗这样的国家也推向中俄。博尔顿之辈可能会给这些国家起一些老套的绰号，既然“邪恶轴心”和“暴政三套车”已经用过了，那么“滋事三合会”或“混乱联盟”也凑合能用。这样做忽略了一个事实，正是美国自己的政策推动了这些势力的结合。

因此，我们正在见证一场现实考验，两种关于当代地缘政治的愿景正在相互竞争。其中一种认为，美国实力基本上没有减弱，并相信美国的物质能力、地理优势和牢固的制度能力可以结合起来，使它能以很小的代价和很高的成功率推行其野心勃勃的修正主义对外政策。我所赞同的第二种观点认为，美国非常强大，并且由于许多原因它具备先天优势；但其实力是有限的，必须设定待解决事项的优先次序，并在许多问题上与其他国家合作。这种观点还强调，其他国家不可能因受到胁迫就卑躬屈膝，有效和持久的国际协议需要一定程度的相互妥协，即便与敌对国家之间也是如此。

美国已经在2001年到2004年测试过第一种观点，结果是几乎彻底失败。我知道，科学进步需要我们复制过去的试验结果，但美国真的需要把这个试验再做一遍吗？

America Isn’t as Powerful as It Thinks It Is

Just how powerful is the United States? Is it still the unipolar power, able to impose its will on adversaries, allies, and neutrals, and force them—however reluctantly—to go along with policies they think are foolish, dangerous, or simply contrary to their interests? Or are there clear and significant limits to U.S. power, suggesting that it should be more selective and strategic in setting goals and pursuing them?

The Trump administration has embraced the first position, especially since John Bolton became White House national security advisor and Mike Pompeo took over assecretary of state. Whatever President Donald Trump’s initial instincts may have been, their arrival marked a return to the unilateralist, take-no-prisoners approach to foreign policy that characterized George W. Bush’s first term as president, when Vice President Dick Cheney and the neoconservatives held sway.

A key feature ofthat earlier period was the assumption that the United States was so powerful that it could go it alone on many issues and that other states could be cowed into submission by demonstrations of U.S. power and resolve.

As a senior advisor to Bush (reportedly Karl Rove) told the journalist Ron Suskind: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Compromises and coalition-building were for wimps and appeasers; as Cheney himself reportedly said in 2003: “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”

The Bush-Cheney approach produced a string of failures, but the same unilateral arrogance lives on in the Trump administration.

It is evident in Trump’s decision to threaten (or in some cases, to actually begin) trade wars not just with China but with many of America’s economic partners. It was part and parcel of the impulsive decisions to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership and leave the Paris climate accord.

It is the basis ofthe administration’s “take it or leave it” approach to diplomacy with North Korea and Iran, wherein Washington announces unrealistic demands and then ratchets up sanctions in the hope that the targets will capitulate and give the United States everything it wants, even though this approach to both countries has repeatedly failed in the past.

It is even more obvious in the recent decision to impose secondary sanctions on states that are still buying Iranian oil, a move that threatens to drive up oil prices and damage U.S. relations with China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and others.

It is almost certainly true of the so-called peace plan that nepotist-in-chief Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor, keeps promising to reveal, a proposal likely to make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Republican donor Sheldon Adelson, and other fans of the concept of Greater Israel happy but won’t advance the cause of peace in the slightest.

A similar faith in America’s vast ability to control outcomes can also be seen in the premature recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela and the strident U.S. demands that “Maduro must go.” However desirable that outcome would be, it would be nice if we had some idea how to bring it about.

The underlying assumption behind all of these policies is that U.S. pressure—you know, what Pompeo likes to call “swagger”—will eventuallyforce acknowledged adversaries to do whatever it is the United States demands of them, and that other states won’t find ways to evade, obstruct, divert, dilute, hedge, hinder, or otherwise negate what Washington is trying to do. It assumes we are still dwelling in the unipolar moment and that all that matters is the will to use the power at America’s disposal.

Perhaps most important, this approach denies that there are any real trade-offs between any of these objectives. If the United States is really all-powerful, then sanctioning China over oil purchases from Iran won’t have any impact on the trade talks that are now underway with Beijing, and Turkey won’t respond to the same pressure by moving closer to Russia.

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It further assumes that America’s NATO allies are so desperate to keep the U.S. military in Europe that they will accept repeated humiliations and follow the U.S. lead against China, despite the growing evidence that this is not the case. It sees no downsides to going all-in with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, and it sees little risk should relations with Iran or others escalate to war.

To be fair, it is not hard to understand why hawks think they can get away with this approach to foreign policy, at least in the short term. Despite many recent missteps, the United States is still very powerful. Its active assistance is still something that some other states want, and its “focused enmity” is something no state can completely ignore.

The United States is still a vast and valuable market, the dollar remains the world’s main reserve currency, and the ability to cut other states or financial institutions off from the infrastructure of global finance gives Washington unusual leverage. Many U.S. allies are accustomed to deferring to Washington and are understandably reluctant to do anything that might encourage the United States to withdraw support.

Trump and company can also count on the support of authoritarian soul mates in the European right (including the present rulers in Poland and Hungary), as well as America’s morally compromised allies in the Middle East. Plus, most Americans don’t care all that much about foreign policy and are usually willing to go along with whatever the executive branch is doing, provided that it doesn’t prove too costly or embarrassing.

Nonetheless, there are even more potent reasons why this bullying approach has produced no major foreign-policy successes so far and is unlikely to yield significant success in the future. First of all, even much weaker states are loath to succumb to blackmail, for one very good reason: Once you’ve shown you can be coerced, there may be no end to subsequent demands. Moreover, when the United States insists on complete capitulation (i.e., by calling for total North Korean disarmament or regime change in Iran), it gives the target state zero incentive to comply. And given Trump’s amply demonstrated dishonesty and fickle approach to diplomacy, why would any foreign leader believe any assurances he (or Pompeo) might give? Put all this together, and you have a perfect recipe for“no deal.”

Second, bullying nearly everyone makes it much harder construct powerful coalitions whose support can enhance America’s diplomatic leverage. This problem is perhaps most apparent in the administration’s haphazard approach to economic diplomacy with China. By leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership and picking trade fights with other key partners, the administration missed an opportunity to organize abroad coalition of industrial powers united by a desire to get China to reform its own economic practices. Trump’s trade team may still get some sort of deal with Beijing, but it won’t be as good as what they could have achieved with a more sophisticated and cooperative effort.

Much the same lesson applies to Iran. The Trump administration deliberately set out to killthe Iran nuclear deal, and it did it in plain sight. It is so focused on this goal that it is even willing to punish the other signatories in a vain attempt to get Iran to say uncle. Tehran has continued to abide by the terms of the agreement despite Washington’s reneging on the deal, but its patience is probably not infinite, especially when the administration has made it clear that regime change is its real objective.

Should Iran eventually restart its nuclear weapons program—which has been in abeyance for more than a decade—the rest of the world is not going to suddenly line up behind the United States and support more forceful action. Why? Because everyone knows that it was the United States—not Iran—that killed the deal, and there won’t be a ton of sympathy for America when it starts bleating about Iran’s response. America’s Middle East clients will no doubt be happy if Washington decides to fight another war on their behalf, but don’t count on a lot of help from them or from anyone else.

Third, other states don’t like being beholden to the whims of others, and especially when others behave selfishly, erratically, and with ill-disguised contempt for others’ interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, other states are starting to develop workarounds designed to limit U.S. leverage, most notably by designing financial arrangements outside the network of institutions that Washington hasbeen using to coerce allies and adversaries into compliance. As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman recently wrote in FP, “instead of leading states and businesses to minimize contact with the targets of U.S. sanctions,”  the Trump administration’s strong-arm tactics“may lead states and businesses to minimize their contact with the U.S.-led global financial system and to start to construct their own workarounds. Overtime, those workarounds might even begin to accumulate into an effective alternative system.”

Lastly, being abully encourages adversaries to join forces out of their own self-interest, while giving potential allies more reason to keep their distance. It is no accident that Russia and China continue to move closer together—even though they are not natural allies, and a smarter U.S. approach could give Moscow reasons to distance itself from Beijing—and America’s same bullying impulses are going to push states like Iran even closer to them. Bolton and those of his ilk will probably come up with some trite new moniker for this group—“Axis of Evil” and“Troika of Tyranny” are taken, so perhaps “Triad of Troublemakers” or“Coalition of Chaos”—ignoring the fact that their own policies have helped push these powers together.

What we are witnessing, therefore, is a real-world test of two competing visions of contemporary geopolitics. One version sees U.S. power as essentially undiminished and believes that a combination of material capabilities, favorable geography, and entrenched institutional capabilities will allow it topursue an ambitious and revisionist foreign policy at little cost and with a high probability of success. The second version—to which I subscribe—sees the United States as very powerful and in a privileged position (for various reasons) but also believes there are limits to U.S. power and that it is necessary to set priorities, minimize trade-offs when possible, and collaborate with others on many issues. It also assumes that others cannot be browbeaten into abject capitulation and that effective and durable international agreements require a degree of mutual compromise, even with adversaries.

The United States tested Version #1 from 2001 to 2004, and the results were a near-total failure. I realize that trying to replicate past results is important to scientific progress, but does America really need to repeat this particular experiment again?

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