独家｜匈牙利会告别“欧洲最亲华国家”定位吗？

Club 提要：“后欧尔班时代”开启，毛焦尔·彼得（Péter Magyar）领导的匈牙利新政府将于5月9日议会召开当天宣誓就职，匈牙利国际事务研究所（HIIA）研究员琼戈尔·维雷斯（Dr. CSONGOR B. Veress “洞察”第60期｜大选后的匈牙利内政外交走向及中匈关系前景）为北京对话撰稿指出，经济停滞、腐败争议与制度疲态成为欧尔班失利关键。他预计，新政府将推动“重新欧洲化”，但在移民、俄罗斯及对华关系上仍保持务实与民族主义色彩。对中国而言，匈牙利或将从“全面亲华”转向“有条件开放”。

蒂萨党赢得2026匈牙利议会选举之后。（图源：阿纳多卢通讯社）

在4月12日蒂萨党（尊重与自由党）取得压倒性胜利之后，毛焦尔·彼得表示，新政府可能在5月上旬就职，新一届议会预计将于5月9日召开。最终计票结果显示，蒂萨党在199个席位中获得141席，而青民盟获得52席，这意味着毛焦尔不仅取得执政权，还获得了三分之二“超级多数”，拥有修改奥尔班时代重要制度安排的正式能力。

对青民盟来说，这场失败的规模前所未有。这不是在一场势均力敌的竞争中失利，而是失去了“不可战胜”的政治神话。执政十六年后，欧尔班体制不仅与民族保守主义相联系，更与日益累积的疲劳相绑定：经济停滞、腐败指控反复出现、制度占据越发明显，许多选民不再认为其政治风格是保护性的，而是疲态尽显且自利的。大选前后的报告一致指出，对经济的不满、腐败问题和民主倒退，是欧尔班败选的核心驱动因素。

经济倒退是核心因素。近三年，匈牙利经济几乎处于停滞状态，大选前的支出更是加重了财政压力。投票前，观察家注意到，仅2026年前两个月，预算赤字已接近全年目标的40%。因此，无论哪个政府上台，都必须缩紧社会支出。匈牙利还面临被冻结的欧盟资金带来的持续的政治经济成本。青民盟长期宣称在宏观经济管理上具有优势，而在选举过程中，该说服力已经大打折扣。

通货膨胀、以电池产业为主导的增长承诺兑现失败，也对青民盟造成了打击。欧尔班曾大举押注，希望将匈牙利打造为电池和电动汽车制造中心，自2021年以来吸引了约260亿欧元的外国投资，其中很大一部分来自中国。但在今年3月，有观点指出该行业正处于下行阶段，电池产量已连续两年下降、宏观经济仍然停滞，而围绕盖德三星SDI等工厂的环境争议也已转化为政治负担。

还有一个结构性问题：青民盟执政时间过长，许多曾经的优势已经转变为弱点。欧尔班重构宪制、集中媒体权力、2022年后在紧急状态下通过法令执政、严格控制公共广播、对高校和非政府组织施压、在机构内部深度安插亲信，这些做法虽然增强了体制稳定性，却也使选举被塑造成“对整个体制的公投”，毛焦尔和蒂萨党成功抓住了后者。

蒂萨党为何能够胜出？首先，毛焦尔找到了此前反对派没有找到的一个竞争公式：他以一个可靠的“后青民盟保守派”的身份参选，而不是作为传统自由派或分裂的反欧尔班联盟人物。蒂萨党将自身定位为中右翼、亲欧盟，而毛焦尔本人将选举框定为“东方与西方之间的选择”，同时仍使用爱国主义语言与主流保守选民沟通。这在一个选民希望变革、但又不愿经历文化失序的国家中至关重要。

其次，毛焦尔的个人经历赋予了他不同寻常的政治触达能力。他是青民盟体系内部的前成员，这使他的反腐批评比反对派人士更具力量。他无法被轻易斥为一个“从未理解国家如何运作”的外部人士。与欧尔班的决裂，使他代表着这样一种观点：“连曾经的支持者都认为该体系已经腐化”，这种组合——既拥有体制内人士的可信度，又具备体制外挑战者的冲击力——十分罕见，在选举中极具杀伤力。

2025年2月，毛焦尔在蒂萨党集会上讲话。（图源：本人官方脸书账号）

第三，蒂萨党提出了务实的治理议程，而不仅仅是道德控诉。从选举第一天起，毛焦尔就承诺推进反腐败措施、加入欧洲检察官办公室、强化司法独立和调查自主权、改革扩大媒体和学术自由，以及加速与欧盟谈判以恢复被冻结的资金。这些承诺为选民提供了一种可信的转型叙事，不仅是“移除欧尔班”，更是“实现匈牙利正常化、重启经济增长”。市场做出积极反应的原因亦在于此。

尽管如此，蒂萨党的胜利不应该被过度浪漫化。这是一次明确的选举授权，但并不意味着整个选民群体在意识形态上彻底转向自由主义。毛焦尔显然已经引导匈牙利转向欧洲，但并不支持乌克兰快速加入欧盟，并认为这一问题应交由全民公投决定。他承诺与欧盟和北约合作，但同时强调与俄罗斯保持“务实关系”。在移民问题上，他也表示将延续严格反非法移民的立场，而非彻底逆转欧尔班时期的边境政策。因此，更恰当的理解是：在民族主义约束下重新锚定西方，而非全面转向自由主义。

因此，新一届政府的外交政策取向如下：更加亲欧、略微倾向大西洋主义，在乌克兰问题上减少阻挠但仍保持谨慎，基于利益且重视主权。匈牙利很有可能不会再充当欧盟许多事务的“惯常搅局者”，特别是在对乌克兰的财政援助机制和与欧盟之间更广泛的法治争议上。毛焦尔表示，匈牙利无意阻止欧盟向乌克兰提供900亿欧元的贷款，并将立即着手与欧盟委员会展开磋商，但是，这不应被误解为向波兰式或波罗的海国家式外交政策的转变。在对俄政策方面，新政府似乎有意降低欧尔班时代的紧密联系，但不会切断涉及能源与贸易利益的务实合作渠道。

在国内政策方面，新政府最有可能优先推进反腐立法、机构改革、与欧盟方面协商以及有选择性的国家结构调整。毛焦尔已经确定，反腐败、司法独立、调查自主、媒体和学术自由等领域可以快速推进，同时宣布将组建更大规模的内阁，单独关注卫生健康、教育和环境保护等问题。这表明毛焦尔的执政理念旨在实现政权更替与行政改革的双重目标。

但国内风险同样显著。首先是执行风险，欧尔班时代的青民盟官员仍然广泛存在于各主要政府机构中，可能会拖延或削弱改革。其次是时机风险，匈牙利必须在8月底前满足解冻部分欧盟资金的条件，但多名分析人士怀疑必要的改革能否如期完成。第三是政治越界风险，凭借141个议会席位，蒂萨党可以迅速行动，但任何以反腐承诺为基础的政府如果开始表现出独断专行、心存报复、权力集中，就会走向脆弱。

最后一点尤其适用于毛焦尔本人。他的优势显而易见，他精力充沛、立场清晰、竞选策略严谨、深谙欧尔班体系内情，且具备将反对派分散力量整合为单一胜选机器的能力。但他的短板同样真实存在，行政领导经验经验不足、执政能力未经检验，出身于其目前所谴责的同一体系，且行事风格可能趋于对抗性。国际新闻自由组织对其胜选表示支持，但也告诫他需在欧盟法律框架内谨慎推进公共媒体改革。这一早期信号颇具深意，表明毛焦尔确有能力瓦解被操纵的旧体系，但外界评判将关注他能否重建中立机构，而非仅仅以一派统治取而代之。

新政府对华政策

在对华双边关系方面，最可能的结果是调整，而非断裂。欧尔班政府将匈牙利打造为欧盟内部在政治上最为适应中国的伙伴，其高度开放的投资政策与某些欧盟涉华立场上的外交庇护相辅相成。匈牙利也成为了中国资本在欧洲的主要投资地。2025年，中国投资者对匈投资达39.7亿欧元，占投资项目总价值的近57%，其经济权重之大无法忽略。

2022年9月5日，匈牙利外交与对外经济部长西雅尔多（后排左二）和中国驻匈牙利使馆临时代办杨超（后排左三）出席并见证宁德时代与德布勒森市的签约仪式。（图源：经济日报）

因此，我并不认为毛焦尔政府会撤销现存的大型中国制造业项目，如德布勒森的宁德时代工厂、塞格德的比亚迪工厂。这些项目沉没成本巨大、就业影响切实存在，且匈牙利工业仍以嵌入欧洲汽车和电池供应链为主要战略。据描述，宁德时代的德布勒森项目投资达73亿欧元、规划产能达100吉瓦时，提供约9000个就业岗位。而比亚迪的塞格德工厂在全面投产后，预计年产汽车20万辆。

投资监管的政策框架也将发生变化，最可能出现的转变是从意识形态上的亲华开放转向以经济条件为导向的开放。近期报道表明，毛焦尔希望实现一种平衡，即仍然欢迎中国投资，但会加强环境执法、提高附加值要求，并希望匈牙利不再仅充当低成本组装平台的角色。这也与毛焦尔所秉持的不在“去工业化”下“再欧洲化”的整体战略相符。

这对匈牙利制造业的产能安全具有直接影响。从狭义上看，现存产能大概率是安全的：宝马德布勒森工厂已进入生产阶段，比亚迪开始试生产，宁德时代仍在进行人员招聘和逐步扩大产能。但从更宏观的战略视角看，匈牙利制造业模式面临五大风险：欧洲电动汽车需求的周期性疲软；产业过度集中于汽车与电池行业；本土环保势力的抵制；劳动力与技能瓶颈；以及来自欧盟乃至美国的地缘政治去风险化压力。因此，新政府的挑战不在于是否保留中国投资，而在于如何本土化，将其融入更具韧性的匈牙利发展模式。

琼戈尔·维雷斯教授在“洞察”第60期｜大选后的匈牙利内政外交走向及中匈关系前景（图源：北京对话）

（翻译：杨敏；核译：韩桦）

英文原文如下：

After Tisza’s (Respect and Freedom Party) landslide victory on April 12, Péter Magyar says the new government could take office in the first half of May, with the new parliament expected to convene on May 9. Final counting gave Tisza 141 of 199 seats, against 52 for Fidesz, giving Magyar a two-thirds supermajority and the formal capacity to amend major Orbán-era arrangements. 

The scale of the defeat matters: Fidesz did not merely lose a close contest; it lost its monopoly on political inevitability. After sixteen years in power, Viktor Orbán’s system had become identified not only with national conservatism, but with accumulated fatigue: a stagnant economy, repeated corruption allegations, increasingly visible institutional capture, and a political style that many voters no longer saw as protective, but as exhausted and self-serving. The pre-election and post-election reporting consistently points to dissatisfaction with the economy, corruption, and democratic backsliding as core drivers of Orbán’s defeat. 

The economic backdrop was central. Hungary has been near-stagnant for roughly three years, while pre-election spending widened fiscal pressure. Before the vote that whichever government emerged would have to rein in social spending, noting that the budget deficit had already reached nearly 40% of the full-year target in the first two months of 2026. Hungary also faced the lingering political and economic costs of frozen EU money. In electoral terms, Fidesz’s long-standing claim to superior macroeconomic stewardship had become much less persuasive. 

Inflation and the failed promise of a battery-led growth surge also hurt Fidesz.Orbán had wagered heavily on turning Hungary into a battery and EV manufacturing hub, backed by roughly €26 billion in foreign investment since 2021, much of it Chinese. But in March that the sector was in a downturn, battery output had fallen for two years, the wider economy remained stagnant, and environmental controversies around plants such as Samsung SDI in Göd had become politically damaging. 

There was also a structural political problem: Fidesz had governed so long that many of its former strengths became vulnerabilities. Orbán’s constitutional redesign, concentration of media power, governing by decree since 2022 under emergency powers, tight control over public broadcasting, pressure on universities and NGOs, and deep placement of loyalists in institutions made the system look durable, but also made the election easier to frame as a referendum on the regime itself. Tisza successfully did exactly that. 

Why did Tisza win? First, because Péter Magyar found the one opposition formula that previous challengers had not: he ran as a credible post-Fidesz conservative rather than as a traditional liberal or fragmented anti-Orbán coalition figure. Tisza positions itself as a centre-right and pro-EU, and Magyar himself framed the election as a choice between East and West while still speaking in a language legible to mainstream patriotic voters. That mattered in a country where many voters wanted change without wanting cultural dislocation. 

Second, Magyar’s biography gave him unusual political reach. He is a former insider from the Fidesz world, which made his anti-corruption critique more potent than that of long-time opposition figures.He could not be dismissed as an outsider who “never understood how the state works.” At the same time, his break with Orbán allowed him to personify the idea that the system had become corrupt even by the standards of its own former believers. That combination – insider credibility plus outsider insurgency – is rare and electorally powerful. 

Third, Tisza offered a practical governing agenda, not only a moral indictment. Magyar promised anti-corruption measures from day one, accession to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, stronger judicial independence, tighter investigative autonomy, media and academic freedom reforms, and rapid talks with Brussels to recover frozen funds. This gave voters a plausible transition story: not just “remove Orbán,” but “normalize Hungary and restart growth.” Markets reacted positively for the same reason. 

Still, Tisza’s victory should not be romanticized. It was an emphatic mandate, but not a clean ideological realignment of the entire electorate toward liberal progressivism. Magyar has clearly reoriented Hungary toward Europe, yet he has also said he would not support fast-track Ukrainian EU membership and that the question should go to a referendum. He has promised cooperation with the EU and NATO, but also “pragmatic relations” with Russia, and on migration he has signaled continuity with a strict anti-irregular-migration line rather than a wholesale reversal of Orbán-era border policy. This is best understood as a Western re-anchoring with nationalist constraints, not as a full-spectrum liberal reset. 

The incoming government’s foreign policy orientation is therefore: strongly more European, moderately more Atlanticist, less obstructionist on Ukraine, but still cautious, interest-based, and sovereignty-conscious. Hungary will likely stop acting as the EU’s habitual spoiler on many dossiers, particularly financial support mechanisms for Ukraine and broader rule-of-law disputes with Brussels. Magyar’s intent not to block the EU’s €90 billion Ukraine loan and his immediate effort to open talks with the Commission. Yet this should not be mistaken for a Polish-style or Baltic-style foreign policy conversion. On Russia, the incoming leadership appears willing to reduce the political intimacy of the Orbán era, but not to sever pragmatic channels where energy and trade interests remain at stake. 

On domestic policy, the most likely early priorities are anti-corruption legislation, institutional repair, negotiations with Brussels, and selective state restructuring. Magyar has identified anti-corruption, judicial independence, investigative autonomy, media freedom, and academic freedom as areas where he can move quickly. He has also announced a larger cabinet that restores standalone attention to health, education, and environmental protection. That suggests a governing philosophy aimed at both regime change and administrative repair. 

But the domestic risks are substantial: the first is implementation risk. Entrenched Fidesz appointees remain embedded across major institutions and could slow or blunt reform. The second is timing risk: Hungary has an end-August deadline to meet conditions for part of the frozen EU recovery money, and multiple analysts doubt that all required reforms can be completed in time. The third is political overreach: with 141 seats, Tisza can move fast, but any government born from anti-corruption promises is especially vulnerable if it begins to look arbitrary, vindictive, or centralized in its own right. 

That last point applies especially to Péter Magyar himself. His strengths are obvious: energy, clarity, campaigning discipline, insider knowledge of the Orbán system, and the ability to collapse opposition fragmentation into a single winning vehicle. His liabilities are just as real. He is politically new at the level of actual executive leadership; his governing capacity is untested; he comes from the same ecosystem he now condemns; and his style can be confrontational. International press freedom groups welcomed his victory but also warned him to handle public-media reform carefully and within EU law. That is a telling early sign: Magyar has the authority to dismantle a captured system, but he will be judged on whether he rebuilds neutral institutions rather than merely replacing one camp’s dominance with another’s. 

The New Government's policy on China

On bilateral relations with China, the likely outcome is adjustment, not rupture. Orbán made Hungary China’s most politically accommodating partner inside the EU, pairing very open investment policy with diplomatic shielding on some China-related EU positions.Hungary also became a leading destination for Chinese capital in Europe. Chinese investors accounted for €3.97 billion, or nearly 57% of the total value of investment projects in 2025. This economic weight is too large for any serious Hungarian government to ignore. 

For that reason, I do not expect the Magyar government to unwind major existing Chinese manufacturing projects such as CATL in Debrecen or BYD in Szeged. The sunk costs are immense, the employment stakes are real, and Hungary’s broader industrial strategy still depends on remaining embedded in European automotive and battery supply chains. CATL’s Debrecen project has been described as a €7.3 billion investment with planned capacity of 100 GWh and around 9,000 jobs, while BYD’s Szeged plant is designed for about 200,000 vehicles annually once fully ramped. 

What will change is the political and regulatory wrapper around those investments. The most plausible shift is from ideologically pro-China openness to economically conditional openness. Recent reporting suggests Magyar wants balance: Chinese investment remains welcome, but with tougher environmental enforcement, more value-added expectations, and less willingness to let Hungary serve merely as a low-cost assembly platform. That would be consistent with his broader project of re-Europeanizing the country without deindustrializing it. 

This has direct implications for the security of manufacturing capacity in Hungary. In the narrow sense, existing capacity is probably secure: BMW’s Debrecen plant is already moving into production, BYD has begun trial production, and CATL is still staffing and ramping. In the broader strategic sense, however, Hungary’s manufacturing model is exposed to five risks: cyclical weakness in European EV demand; concentration in autos and batteries; local environmental backlash; labor and skills bottlenecks; and geopolitical de-risking pressure from the EU and, potentially, the United States. The challenge for the new government is therefore not whether to keep Chinese investment, but how to domesticate it into a more resilient Hungarian development model.