巴基斯坦能否成为美国和伊朗的“关键调解者” ？

Club提要：3月31日，中国外长王毅与巴基斯坦外长达尔在北京会谈，针对中东危局，提出包括立即停火、推动和谈、保护平民与关键基础设施、保障霍尔木兹海峡通航安全及强化联合国宪章框架在内的五项倡议，旨在通过外交路径抑制冲突外溢并推动地区长期稳定。在此背景下，巴基斯坦信德大学助理教授西拉杰·尼扎马尼（Siraj Nizamani）为北京对话撰稿，分析巴基斯坦在美以对伊朗军事行动中的潜在调解角色，并指出，未来更可行的路径是通过多方合作与渐进式外交，推动对话并缓和紧张局势。

3月31日，中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅在北京同巴基斯坦副总理兼外长达尔举行会谈（图源：中评社）

（翻译｜潘佳怡， 核译｜金地、韩桦）

当前，美国、以色列与伊朗之间持续升级的战争已扰乱全球能源供应，加剧中东地区的不稳定性，令国际体系受到严重冲击。冲突本身的复杂性，加之伊朗对西方支持的调解方信任度下降，已经造成了一种“外交真空”（diplomatic vacuum）。

在这一背景下，巴基斯坦与土耳其、埃及等伙伴一道，逐步被视为潜在的促进冲突各方进行对话的调解者。本文围绕巴基斯坦可能承担的调解角色展开分析，并评估其在推动地区稳定方面的成功几率。

作为一个中等强国，自冲突爆发以来，巴基斯坦保持相对中立立场，这一姿态使其在伊朗方面获得了一定程度的信任，而这正是任何实质性调解所必需的前提条件。同时，巴基斯坦具备一定的战略机动性与操作灵活性，使之能够在多个利益攸关方之间同时展开接触。与部分海湾国家不同，巴基斯坦境内没有永久性的外国军事基地，这进一步强化了其作为独立行为体的形象。巴基斯坦的调解倡议也获得了包括海湾及东南亚在内的地区国家的审慎支持，显示出其在推动局势降温方面的潜在作用。

巴基斯坦以往在国际调解领域的历史经验也为其今天扮演类似的角色打下了坚实基础。20世纪70年代初，巴基斯坦曾作为美国与中国之间的“幕后渠道”，帮助双方建立沟通，并最终促成尼克松总统访华。

1970年10月，美国总统尼克松在白宫会见巴基斯坦总统叶海亚·汗时提出，中美关系十分重要，他要走向同中国和好。1971年4月，周恩来总理通过巴基斯坦邀请美方特使访华。时任美国总统国家安全事务助理基辛格7月1日启程，在伊斯兰堡佯装患病，乘巴航秘密抵京，与周恩来总理进行6次共17小时会谈，最终商定尼克松总统翌年访华、中美关系走向正常化安排。（图源：基辛格回忆录）

1988年，巴基斯坦参与了美国、苏联及阿富汗之间的外交谈判进程，为苏军撤出阿富汗的《日内瓦协议》框架提供支持。

更近一些的例子是，巴基斯坦对美国与阿富汗塔利班之间的外交接触给予支持，并最终促成了2020年的《多哈协议》。在这些经验基础上，巴基斯坦当下也可能尝试推动美伊之间的对话，其核心目标是缓和紧张局势、促成停火，并推动各方重返正式谈判渠道。当然，当前的地缘政治环境也为这种努力带来了新的挑战。

巴基斯坦国防部长赫瓦贾·阿西夫（右二）和阿富汗国防部长雅库布（左二）的握手画面（图源：巴基斯坦国防部长赫瓦贾·阿西夫的社交媒体账号）

巴基斯坦能够成为潜在调解者，还得益于其与美国和伊朗之间相对平衡的关系。作为伊朗的邻国，并拥有相当规模的什叶派人口，巴基斯坦在伊朗看来具有一定的可信度，其角色在某种程度上类似于中国在伊朗与沙特关系缓和中的作用——通过低调外交为直接对话创造条件。与此同时，美国在历史上也曾将巴基斯坦视为重要的中间渠道，尤其是在冷战时期。这种双重信任增强了巴基斯坦进行斡旋外交的分量，使其具备弥合冲突各方分歧的潜力。

然而，巴基斯坦在发挥调解作用时仍面临显著的结构性和政治限制。首先，巴基斯坦与以色列没有正式外交关系，因此必须依赖第三方渠道，这可能带来沟通延迟甚至误判。其次，巴基斯坦需要在美国、伊朗以及海湾盟友之间保持微妙平衡，一旦被认为偏向某一方，其中立性就可能受到质疑。此外，冲突各方之间长期积累的深度不信任，尤其是美伊之间以及伊朗与以色列之间的敌对关系，也使任何妥协都变得十分困难。在国内层面，巴基斯坦社会对与以色列接触存在敏感情绪，这也可能限制政府的外交空间。同时，巴基斯坦在经济和外交资源方面的能力有限，难以提供强有力的激励措施。再加上地区大国竞争等地缘政治因素，这些条件都对巴基斯坦的调解行动形成了制约。

3月29日，沙特外交大臣费萨尔、巴基斯坦副总理兼外长达尔、土耳其外长费丹、埃及外长阿卜杜勒阿提在巴基斯坦首都伊斯兰堡举行会谈（图源：新华社）

在复杂的地缘政治冲突中，成功的调解往往依赖“秘密外交”、“抱团协作”以及渐进式谈判，而不是线性推进的解决路径。历史经验表明，当正式谈判在政治上难以启动时，“幕后外交”往往能够发挥重要作用。例如1971年的美中关系缓和以及《奥斯陆协议》的早期阶段，都体现了这一点。在当前局势下，巴基斯坦的角色也不应局限于单独斡旋，而应推动一个以多方合作为基础的调解框架，与土耳其、埃及等伙伴“抱团协作”，并考虑邀请阿曼或中国等相对中立的行为体参与，以减少伊朗对西方主导调解的疑虑。伊朗与沙特关系缓和的案例已经表明，来自非西方、又能深耕本地的调解者，在弥合战略分歧方面正发挥越来越重要的作用。

在具体路径上，与其一开始就追求全面政治解决方案，更现实的做法是采取渐进式、议题导向的方式，例如优先围绕局势降温、人道主义合作或海上安全等议题。鉴于关键各方没有直接外交关系，尤其是伊朗与以色列之间，因此需要采用将“穿梭外交”和“可信中介”进行间接接触相结合的方式。在此轮危机中，巴基斯坦能否发挥作用，关键不在于简单复制过去的调解模式，而在于采取灵活的多方合作策略，以适应当前冲突的结构性约束。

在复杂地缘政治环境中，作为潜在调解者的巴基斯坦，既面临机遇，也受到明显限制。其相对均衡的对外关系、过往的调解经验以及在部分地区国家中的信誉，使其具备“可行但非决定性”的中间调解者地位。然而，与以色列缺乏直接关系、不同区域联盟之间的竞争以及战争各方根深蒂固的不信任等结构性因素，都限制了巴基斯坦成为核心调解者的能力。 

未来，巴基斯坦更可能在由非西方、地区信任度较高的多方合作框架中发挥作用，并通过灵活、渐进的外交策略推动局势降温。与其期待一次性解决冲突，更现实的目标是为对话创造条件、减少紧张局势，并为未来谈判铺路。在日益多极化的世界中，这样一种有限但务实的角色，依然具有重要的地区和全球战略意义。

2025年9月，特朗普在白宫会见巴基斯坦总理谢里夫和巴基斯坦陆军参谋长阿西姆·穆尼尔（图源：华尔街日报）

以下为英文原文：

By Dr. Siraj Nizamani （Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Pakistan）

The ongoing conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has disrupted global energy supplies and intensified instability in the Middle East, significantly impacting the international system. The complexity of the conflict, combined with growing mistrust of Iran toward Western-backed mediators, has created a diplomatic vacuum. In this context, Pakistan, alongside partners such as Türkiye and Egypt, has emerged as a potential facilitator of dialogue between the conflicting parties. This article analyzes Pakistan’s prospective role as a mediator and evaluates the likelihood of its success in promoting regional stability. 

As a middle power, Pakistan has maintained a relatively neutral stance since the beginning of the conflict. This neutrality has helped it gain a degree of trust from Iran, which is essential for any meaningful mediation. Pakistan also possesses strategic maneuverability and operational flexibility, allowing engagement with multiple stakeholders simultaneously. Unlike many Gulf states, Pakistan has avoided permanent foreign military bases, strengthening its perception as an independent actor. Its initiative has received cautious support from regional actors, including Gulf and Southeast Asian states, highlighting its potential to contribute to de-escalation. 

Pakistan’s experience in mediation provides a strong foundation for its role. In the early 1970s, it served as a back-channel intermediary between the US and China, facilitating communication that eventually led to President Nixon’s visit to Beijing. In 1988, Pakistan engaged with the US, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan to help structure the Geneva Accords for Soviet troop withdrawal. More recently, it supported diplomatic engagement between the US and the Afghan Taliban, culminating in the 2020 Doha agreement. Building on this track record, Pakistan can now seek to facilitate dialogue between the US and Iran, with core objectives of de-escalation, cessation of hostilities, and a return to formal negotiation channels, though the current geopolitical landscape presents unique challenges. 

Pakistan’s position as a potential mediator is strengthened by its balanced relations with both the US and Iran. As a neighboring country with a significant Shia population, it is viewed by Iran as a credible facilitator, similar to China’s role in the Iran–Saudi rapprochement, where quiet diplomacy created conditions for direct engagement. Simultaneously, the US has historically trusted Pakistan as an intermediary, particularly during the Cold War. This dual trust enhances Pakistan’s diplomatic leverage and positions it as a viable actor capable of bridging divides between conflicting parties. 

However, Pakistan’s role faces significant structural and political constraints. One major limitation is its lack of direct diplomatic relations with Israel, which necessitates reliance on third-party intermediaries, creating potential delays and miscommunication. Pakistan must carefully balance relations with the US, Iran, and key Gulf allies, as any perceived tilt could undermine its neutrality. Deep-rooted mistrust between the conflicting parties, particularly the US and Iran as well as Israel and Iran, further complicates mediation, as willingness to compromise remains limited. Domestically, Pakistan contends with political sensitivities, including public opposition to engagement with Israel, which may restrict diplomatic flexibility. Its limited economic and diplomatic leverage reduces the capacity to offer strong incentives. Regional geopolitical dynamics, including major power rivalries, also constrain maneuverability. These factors, combined with the multi-layered nature of the conflict, make mediation challenging, requiring cautious, balanced, and sustained engagement. 

Successful mediation in complex geopolitical conflicts typically relies on discreet diplomacy, coalition-based engagement, and incremental negotiation strategies rather than a linear approach. Historical precedents, such as the 1971 US–China rapprochement and early phases of the Oslo Accords, demonstrate the effectiveness of back-channel diplomacy when formal dialogue is politically unfeasible. In the present context, Pakistan’s role must extend beyond bilateral facilitation toward a coalition-based framework involving partners like Türkiye and Egypt, potentially expanded to include neutral actors such as Oman or China, whose involvement could mitigate Iran’s mistrust of Western-backed mediation. The success of the Iran–Saudi rapprochement underscores the growing relevance of non-Western and regionally embedded mediators in bridging strategic divides. 

An incremental, issue-specific approach—focusing initially on de-escalation measures, humanitarian concerns, or maritime security—may prove more viable than attempting comprehensive political settlements at the outset. Given the absence of direct diplomatic relations between key actors, particularly Iran and Israel, a hybrid model combining shuttle diplomacy and indirect engagement through trusted intermediaries becomes essential. Pakistan’s effectiveness will depend not on replicating past mediation models in isolation, but on adopting a flexible, multi-actor strategy tailored to the unique structural constraints of the conflict. 

Pakistan’s potential role as a mediator reflects both opportunity and limitation within a complex geopolitical landscape. Its balanced relations, historical facilitation experience, and credibility among regional actors position it as a viable, though not decisive, intermediary. Structural challenges—including the absence of direct ties with Israel, competing regional alliances, and deep-rooted mistrust—significantly constrain its capacity as a primary mediator. Pakistan’s effectiveness will hinge on operating within a coalition of non-Western and regionally trusted actors while employing flexible and incremental diplomatic strategies. Rather than delivering a comprehensive resolution, Pakistan’s most realistic contribution lies in facilitating dialogue, reducing tensions, and creating conditions conducive to future negotiations. In an increasingly multipolar world, such a role, though limited, remains strategically significant for regional and global stability.