姚云竹：中国在美国被重新定义（中英文）

图片来源：Matt Barber

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中美两国关系已跌到了上世纪90年代以来的最低水平。美国正在重新定义中国，这导致它出现政策上的转向。

本文中英文版分别来源于“中美聚焦”中英文网站，作者系盘古智库顾问委员会高级顾问、中国人民解放军军事科学院中美防务关系研究中心荣誉主任姚云竹。

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中国在美国被重新定义

姚云竹

随着贸易战的不断升级，地缘战略竞争的日趋激烈，意识形态冲突的暗流涌动，中美两国关系已跌到了上世纪90年代以来的最低水平。美国正在重新定义中国，这导致它出现政策上的转向。

在重新定义中国方面，唐纳德·特朗普总统发挥了关键的作用。他指责中国通过贸易顺差占尽便宜，同时剽窃美国的知识产权，发动网络攻击，抢走美国的就业机会，而且利用了之前历任政府的弱点。他承诺要阻止中国继续利用他的国家，并死守苛刻的贸易谈判条件。特朗普作为总统重新定义中国，促成了政策的急剧改变。

特朗普政府的外交政策和国家安全班子发挥着即时而直接的影响。他们把中国重新定义为最强劲的地缘战略对手：挑战美国在亚太（或印太）地区的主导地位；用军事力量或经济实力胁迫美国的盟友和伙伴国；削弱美国的军事优势；侵犯以规则为基础的海上秩序；企图通过“一带一路”倡议重建区域经济结构。他们的观点充分反映在《国家安全战略报告》、《国防战略报告》、《核态势评估报告》等官方文件中，他们的正式讲话和印太战略构想也十足表达了这种观点。

在塑造公众对中国的看法和政府的对华政策方面，美国的中国问题研究界一直通过政策咨询渠道和与媒体的频繁互动发挥着重要作用。过去40多年来，美国的主流对华政策主张一直是接触与防范并进。通过接触与合作，鼓励中国朝着符合美国利益的方向转型。而通过防范和遏制，美国仍随时准备在必要的时候与中国竞争甚至对抗。美国历届政府所采取的都是这种做法。但近年来，中国问题研究界日益弥漫着失望、不满和沮丧，其中最失望的是中国非但没有按照预想的那样发生转变，相反它迅速崛起成为有着完全不同的社会制度和意识形态的超级大国。在对中国的认知上，中国问题专家一直是最直言不讳的，他们在当前的对华政策辩论中同样如此。然而，如果以为他们想的和他们说的是一回事，那就大错特错了。《外交》杂志最近邀请一批专家，来谈他们是否同意“美国与中国的国家利益完全不相容”这一命题，在34位受访者中，有14人表示同意，2人表示强烈同意，15人不同意，3人表示强烈反对，5人持中立态度。如果在这样根本的深层问题上都存在势均力敌的分歧，那么他们离达成共识还远着呢。

最近通过的《台湾旅行法》和2019财年《国防授权法》证明，国会在鼓励和强化对华政策的消极转向方面发挥了重要作用。例如，虽然五角大楼取消了对中国人民解放军海军参加环太平洋演习的邀请，但2019财年《国防授权法》有过之而无不及，规定除非中方停止在南海填海造地，并撤走在人工岛上的武器装备，否则将禁止中方参加未来的演习。

通过以准确、有见地，或者有偏见甚至恶意的方式解读中国，媒体在传播公共话语和塑造国家对华视角方面掌握着巨大的权力。美国企业、地方政府、军队及其他各行各业，以及美国的盟友和合作伙伴，它们对中国的担忧和不同期望都对重新定义中国起了推波助澜的作用。

同样重要的还有公众舆论的走向。皮尤研究中心的最新调查显示，对中国有好感的美国人减少了，令他们担心的主要问题包括美国对华债务、网络攻击、失业和贸易逆差。不过，大约一半年轻人（18-29岁）却对中国有好感。公众舆论走向是缓慢而无形的，但它会积聚动能，在改变或维持政府的政策方面发挥巨大作用。

当前，中国正在以多种不同的方式被重新审视和定义。其原因可能多种多样，但对中国的普遍感觉是沮丧，这种感觉在一个分裂的、两极分化的美国足以成为团结人心的因素。人们比较一致的看法是应该对中国采取强硬行动，但具体怎么做，还没有达成共识。特朗普总统的对华贸易战遭到商界领袖的反对，中国被贴上地缘战略敌人的标签让经验丰富的中国通感到吃惊，加强地区同盟和伙伴关系迫使其他国家要做出艰难的选择，就连呼吁加强与台湾的军事关系，也仅仅获得了台湾人小心翼翼的回应。

中美关系40年来历经风雨，如今两国再次处在汹涌的波涛中，而且风更疾、浪更高。重要的是要明白和理解对方的变化，管控政策的转变，在决策中把握好行动-反应周期。到目前为止，中国一直是审慎冷静地应对特朗普总统任意多变的政策，例如，中国不再使用对美“贸易战”一词，因为它意味着最终结果是胜利，或者失败。中国使用的表述方式是“贸易摩擦”，就贸易摩擦而言，理想的终结状态是“降级”。

中美关系太重要，以致不容有失，不仅对两国是如此，对地区的长期安全与繁荣、对世界的持久和平也是如此。

Redefining China in the U.S.

Yao Yunzhu

With a rising trade war, intensifying geostrategic competition, and a simmering ideological clash between China and the United States, relations between them have fallen to the lowest level since 1990s. The U.S. is redefining China, which leads to policy shifts.

President Donald Trump plays a pivotal role in redefining China. He blames China for gaining too much from the trade surplus, stealing US intellectual property, launching cyberattacks, grabbing American jobs, and exploiting the weakness of previous administrations. He pledges to stop China from taking further advantage of his country and insists on harsh terms for trade negotiations. As president, Trump’s redefinition of China has an abrupt and significant policy shift.

The foreign policy and national security teams in the Trump Administration exert immediate and direct impact on China policy.They reconceptualize China as the most formidable geostrategic rival: challenging America’s dominance in the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) region, coercing its allies and partners with military force and economic power, eroding its military superiority, violating rule-based maritime order, and trying to rebuild a regional economic construct by implementing the “Belt and Road Initiative”. Their perspectives are adequately reflected in official documents like the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review, as well as their official statements and formulation of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The China research community in the U.S. has always played a significant role in shaping the public perspective of, and government policy on, China, through policy consultation channels and frequent interactions with the media. For more than four decades, the mainstream proposition has been to engage and hedge against China at the same time. Through engagement and cooperation, China has been encouraged to transform in ways that converge with American interests. And by hedging and containing, the US remains ready and capable to compete with, or even confront China when necessary. This approach has been adopted by successive administrations. In recent years, a growing feeling of disappointment, discontent, and frustration permeates the China study circle. The sourest part is that China has not changed itself as expected; instead, it has rapidly risen as a superpower, with a very different social system and ideology. The China experts have been the most vocal in defining China, and they are no less articulate in the current China policy debate. However, it would be wrong to assume them to be similar in how they think and what they say. Foreign Affairs recently asked a pool of experts to state whether they agree or disagree with the proposition that “U.S. and Chinese national interests are fundamentally incompatible”. Of the 34 responders, 14 agreed, and 2 strongly agreed; 15 disagreed, 3 strongly disagreed; and 5 took a “neutral” stand. If a half-half divide exists on an issue as profound and fundamental as this, they are far from reaching consensus.

The recent passages of the Taiwan Travels Act, and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2019 proves Congress to be a major actor in encouraging and solidifying the negative shifts in China policy. For example, even though the Pentagon has disinvited the Chinese PLA Navy from the 2018 Rim Pac Exercise, the FY 2019 NDAA further prohibits China from future participation unless it ceases land reclamation in the South China Sea and removes all weapons from its reclaimed land.

By interpreting China in ways either accurate, or insightful, or biased, or even malicious, the media holds great power in informing the public discourse and shaping the nation’s perspective of China. The numerous concerns over and different expectations of China from American business, local governments, military, and many others in the U.S., as well as those held by U.S. allies and partners, all contribute to the process of redefining China.

Last but not least are the trends in public opinion. The most recent Pew Research Center survey reveals a decline in the number of Americans having favorable opinions of China. And their major concerns include U.S. debt to China, cyberattacks, loss of jobs, and the trade deficit. However, about half of the young people（age 18-29）, express a favorable view of China. Trends in public opinion are slow and intangible, but it builds momentum and plays a huge role in changing or sustaining government policies.

At present, China is being reexamined and redefined in many different ways. The reasons may be diverse and different, but the feeling of frustration regarding China seems common, and grows strong enough to be a rallying factor in a divided and polarized America. The common idea is to act tough with China, but there is no consensus on how to do it. President Trump’s trade war with China is opposed by business leaders. The labeling of China as a geostrategic foe alarmed seasoned China hands. The beefing up of regional alliances and partnerships push other countries to hard choices. And even the call for elevated military ties with Taiwan is responded to by Taiwanese with caution.

China and the U.S. have gone through ups and downs in their relationship for four decades. Right now, they are again in very choppy waters, with stronger winds and greater waves. It is important to understand and interpret changes in the other, manage policy changes, and control the action-reaction cycle in policy making. So far, China has responded to President Trump’s abrupt and random policy turns with prudence and calm. For example, China refrains from using the term “trade war” with the U.S., which implies victory or defeat as a result, and uses the expression “trade frictions”, with regard to which, the ideal end state is de-escalation.

The China-America relationship is simply too important to fail, not only for both countries, but also for long-term regional security and prosperity, and lasting world peace.■

本文中英文版分别来源于“中美聚焦”中英文网站

责任编辑：罗震