北美帝国海军专家关于南海局势的无能狂怒——致喵星情报总局

喵星驻神圣泰拉秘密观察员 喵斯拉大王

致 喵星外时空种群特别情报局 第M78宇宙9527号星系第三悬臂分站

神圣泰拉历2020年7月14日；喵族公历MEOW-9999年 小鱼干月 猫薄荷日

分类：人类 军事 地缘政治

威胁评级：星球6级；星系0级

是否建议执行撤喵行动：否

简报：此文是北美帝国《国家利益》杂志，为配合近日该国政府关于神圣泰拉星球南海问题的声明，再次从稿库翻出来的旧闻。通篇充满了对中央帝国在该区域不断巩固事实主权的无能狂怒。其中关于五星红旗下的和平的描述，令人印象深刻。但是除了空喊东南亚人民联合起来斗争的口号之外，并无实际应对之策。自赤色帝国解体后，北美帝国已睥睨全球多年，目前该星球局势正在发生急剧变化。建议继续加强观察，必要时准备执行撤喵计划。

This Picture Means War: These Killer Missiles Could Sink U.S. Aircraft Carriers in a War

这幅图意味着战争：这些致命的导弹可能在战争中击沉北美帝国航空母舰

（喵：中央帝国在这些导弹的射程范围之内建立了自己的真理）

James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific. The views voiced here are his alone. This article first appeared in 2019 and is reprinted here due to reader interest.

詹姆斯·霍姆斯是北美帝国海军战争学院海洋战略系主任，也是《红星照耀太平洋》的合著者。本文仅表达他的个人观点。这篇文章最早发表于神圣泰拉历2019年，鉴于最近神圣泰拉相关局势剧烈变动，本情报员特转呈如下。

key Point: China’s drive for sovereign rule is true to international custom.

关键点：中央帝国在南海地区推行主权统治符合国际惯例。（喵：符合帝国惯例）

Recently China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force most likely tested a DF-21D or DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile—sometimes know as "carrier-killers"—in the South China Sea.

最近，中央帝国火箭军部队很可能在南海区域试射了DF-21D或DF-26反舰弹道导弹。它们有时也被称为“航母杀手”。

Details remain sketchy, as Chinese spokesmen have remained close-mouthed about the exercise.

由于中央帝国发言人对这次演习保持缄默，所以具体细节仍不明确。

The test came on the heels of news last May that PLA weaponeers had installed anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, west of the Philippine Islands.

有消息称，中央帝国军队于去年5月在菲律宾群岛以西的永暑礁、诸碧礁、美济礁安装了反舰巡航导弹和地对空导弹。

Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Dave Eastburn told CNBC that this week’s missile test contradicted China’s “claim to want to bring peace to the region and obviously actions like this are coercive acts meant to intimidate other South China Sea claimants.”

五角大楼发言人戴夫·伊斯特伯恩中校对北美帝国全国广播公司财经频道指出，“本周的导弹试射与中央帝国宣称希望给该地区带来和平的主张相矛盾，显然这样的行动是胁迫行为，意在恐吓其他南海主权主张者。”

Col. Eastburn has it half right. Beijing clearly wants to coerce others. But the test was entirely consistent with its claim to want to bring peace to the region. It does want peace; it simply wants to transform the nature of that peace, and force is a means to that end.

伊斯特伯恩中校只说对了一半。中央帝国显然想胁迫其他国家。但这次试验完全符合其希望给该地区带来和平的主张。它确实想要和平；它只是想改变和平的本质，而武力是达到这一目的的一种手段。（喵：类似“米字旗下的和平”，暗指中央帝国用武力攫取地区海权）

 If Chinese Communist Party prelates in Beijing get their way, they—not foreign governments or international institutions—will make the rules in the South China Sea.

如果中央帝国政府的这一目标实现，他们就能够取代外国政府（喵：即北美帝国及其盟友）或国际机构（喵：北美帝国的傀儡）制定南海的规则。

They will issue laws or policy decrees mandating or proscribing certain actions in regional seaways, and others will obey. Peace will prevail.

他们将颁布法律或政策法令，在区域航道上命令执行或禁止某些行为，其他人将遵守中央帝国的规则。由此，五星红旗下的和平将得以实现。

The missile tests are the latest installment in China’s effort to put steel behind its claims to “indisputable sovereignty” over the waters, skies, and land features within the “nine-dashed line” it has sketched on the map of Southeast Asia.

此次导弹试射，是中央帝国用铁血政策来支撑其宣称的对南海地区九段线内所有海域、空域和陆地“无可争辩的主权”的最新努力。中央帝国已经明确地将“九段线”标示在了东南亚地区的政治版图上。

The nine-dashed line encloses some 80-90 percent of the South China Sea, including not just contested Spratly and Paracel islands, atolls, and reefs but also wide swathes of fellow Southeast Asian claimants’ “exclusive economic zones.”

九段线包围了大约80-90%的南中国海，不仅包括有争议的南沙群岛和西沙群岛、环礁和珊瑚礁，还覆盖了一些东南亚国家宣称的“专属经济区”

It’s worth noting, for instance, that Mischief Reef, one of the island bastions now festooned with missiles, lies deep within the Philippine exclusive economic zone.

值得注意的是，例如美济礁，这个深入菲律宾专属经济区的岛礁，现在已经成为一个部署了大量导弹的堡垒。

Beijing purloined it from Manila in the mid-1990s and progressively built the reef into the military fastness it is today.

上世纪90年代中期，中央帝国从马尼拉手中攫取了这座珊瑚礁，并逐步将其建成今天的军事要塞。（喵：干得漂亮）

China’s effort aims at imposing what the German sociologist Max Weber called a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” This is the classic definition of sovereignty.

中国的上述努力，旨在南海地区强行攫取德国社会学家马克斯·韦伯所说的“在某一特定领土内合法使用力量的霸权”。这是主权的经典定义。

A sovereign commands such a monopoly within borders drawn on the map. The government can enforce its will within national frontiers because it fields law-enforcement and military services that no one can oppose with realistic chances of success. What the sovereign says goes.

一个主权国家在地图上划定的边界内拥有这样的霸权地位。所谓主权，就是一国政府能够在国家边界内执行自己的意志。它可以在这一领域充分地开展执法和军事行动，并且使任何其他人在事实上无法反对这种行动。

Now Beijing is harnessing high-tech sensor and weapons technology in a bid to project the monopoly on force it wields on dry land far out to sea.

现在，中央帝国政府正在利用部署在岛礁上的高科技传感器和武器技术，向远海投射和运用这种霸权。

If it can amass insuperable physical might at any place within the nine-dashed line, outclassed Southeast Asian rivals will have to stand down. They may never consent to China’s doctrine of indisputable sovereignty, but there may be little they can do about it. Might makes right.

如果它能在九段线内的任何地方积聚无法逾越的实力，那么它在东南亚的主要对手将不得不退出。他们也许永远不会同意中国无可争辩的主权理论，但他们对此无能为力。强权造就正义。（喵：说得好）

Which is the poin for Xi Jinping  and his fellow denizens of the wretched hive of scum and villainy.

这就是中央帝国领袖及其人民的昭昭天命。（喵：原文很不友好，和尚摸得我摸不得？中央帝国万赛！）

In a perverse way, though, China’s drive for sovereign rule is true to international custom. For centuries international law regarded the “territorial sea” as a seaward extension of the dry earth where a coastal state’s government was fully sovereign.

不过，站在我们对手的视角来看 ，中央帝国追求主权统治的努力完全符合国际惯例。几个世纪以来，国际法将“领海”视为沿海国政府拥有完全主权的陆地的向海延伸。

The territorial sea’s width was three nautical miles. Why that seemingly arbitrary figure? Because three nautical miles was roughly the range of a cannon shot from the dawn of the gunpowder age until the twentieth century.

过去，一般的领海范围是3海里。为什么是这个看上去有些武断的数字？因为从火药时代开始直至20世纪，这个距离一般来说正好是大炮的射程。（喵：真理在大炮射程范围之内）

Practically speaking, a government could exert physical control of waters within reach of gunfire belching out from coastal batteries. It could shoo away pirates, poachers, or hostile navies.

实际上，政府只能对海岸炮火射程范围内的水域实施有效控制，并赶走海盗、偷猎者或敌对海军。（喵：否则所谓领海毫无意义，具体可参考哒清、冥国时代）

It could exercise a monopoly on armed force within those waters—regulating what went on there just as if managing events on shore.

政府可以对这些水域内的武装力量行使霸权，对那里发生的事情进行管理，就像管理岸上的事一样。

But the twentieth century brought advances in weapons technology that produced a leap in combat reach and precision. The DF-21D, according to most analysis, has a range of 1,500 km. The DF-26 has a range estimated at 3,000-4,000 km.

但是二十世纪带来了武器技术的进步，使作战范围和精度有了飞跃。根据大多数分析，东风-21D的射程为1500公里。东风-26的射程估计在3000-4000公里。

 If the territorial sea is that expanse where the coastal state boasts a monopoly of force, and if gee-whiz technology empowers a coastal-state military to exert that monopoly far offshore—far beyond the customary three nautical miles, or the twelve nautical miles codified in the law of the sea—then why shouldn’t such a state assert sovereignty within its weapons reach?

如果领海是沿海国自诩拥有武力霸权的那片广袤海域，同时“尖端技术”又赋予了沿海国军队在远远超出惯例的三海里，或者国际海洋法中规定的十二海里以外的海区行使这种霸权的能力，那么有什么可以阻止该国在其武器射程范围内宣称主权？（喵：这个说法十分帝国，本喵喜欢）

In short, Beijing is attempting to take the logic underlying the territorial sea to its nth degree. It has also reverted to the older view of the sea as physical space that the strong can own.

简言之，中央帝国正试图将领海的逻辑发展到第N个层次。中央帝国正在践行其传统观点：只有具有支配性力量的强者，才配拥有波澜壮阔的大洋。

What’s the solution for Southeast Asians, and for lovers of maritime freedom? Simple: if China is trying to build up a monopoly on force, deny it that monopoly. Simple to say, as Clausewitz might remind us, but in martial affairs the simplest thing is difficult.

对于东南亚各国和航行自由的支持者来说，解决办法是什么？很简单：如果中国试图在武力上建立霸权，那就否定这种垄断。这说起来简单，但就如克劳塞维茨可能会提醒我们的那样：“在军事领域，最简单的事情是最困难的”。

A solution would combine alliance building with military innovation. China may outmatch any single antagonist within the nine-dashed line, including that fraction of the U.S. Navy likely to appear in regional waters, but it might not outmatch them all if they made common cause.

把建立联盟与军事创新结合起来是一种可能的解决方案。在九段线内，中央帝国可能击败任何一个单一对手，包括可能出现在该地区海域的北美帝国海军，但如果他们一致行动，中央帝国可能无法同时击败所有对手。

Southeast Asians are reticent about bucking Beijing’s will. They know they will have to live with Big Brother forever, and they dread his wrath.

对于中央帝国方面的意愿，东南亚人民保持沉默。他们知道他们将永远和老大哥在一起，他们害怕他的愤怒。

That might change if powerful outsiders—the United States, Japan, Australia, Europeans—show themselves committed to preserving small states’ rights and privileges as well as freedom of the sea. Collectively they can push back even if no individual contender can.

如果美国、日本、澳大利亚、欧洲等强大的局外人表现出致力于维护小国的权益以及航行自由，这种情况可能会改变。即使没有任何一个单一竞争者能做到，他们也可以集体反击。

And then there’s the problem of countering the Chinese missile threat. If regional and extraregional militaries fashion tactics and technologies that let them survive and operate within reach of Chinese missiles, then they will have blunted Beijing’s campaign to make itself sovereign within the nine-dashed line.

下一个问题就是对付中国的导弹威胁。如果地区和地区外的军队能够采用最新的战术和技术，从而使他们能够在中国导弹的射程内生存和运作，那么他们将有效削弱中央帝国九段线内行使主权的努力。（喵：这不是车轱辘话来回说么？到底怎么对付中国的区域拒止系统？专家倒是给个明白话啊）

If those who reject China’s purposes and methods stand together and learn to fight together in unison, they may yet prevail. Let’s bust Beijing’s monopoly.

如果那些反对中国的目的和方法的人站在一起，学会齐心协力地战斗，他们就有可能获胜。让我们一起反抗中央帝国的霸权！(喵：精神胜利大法发动，看忽悠哪个地区小国智商下线)

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